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Forum for those who are concerned about the advancement of urban development in Indonesia

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    On May 26, 2010, I received an email from the editor of Pacific Affairs who invited me to review a new book titled The Appearances of Memory: Mnemonic Practices of Architecture and Urban Form in Indonesia. It's my pleasure to accept the invitation and about a week later I received the book and started reading it. While I was preparing the review of the book, I received similar email from the reviews editor of Planning Theory and I respectfully declined the invitation because I had agreed to review the book for Pacific Affairs.

    The book was written by Professor Abidin Kusno, an Associate Professor at the Institute of Asian Research and the Canada Research Chair in Asian Urbanism and Culture at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada.

    The review of The Appearances of Memory: Mnemonic Practices of Architecture and Urban Form in Indonesia has been published in Pacific Affairs 84(2): 399-401 in June 2011. I am pleased to share my review of this book in this blog as you can find below.



    Indonesia, with a population of over 230 million making it the fourth-largest country in the world, has been experiencing rapid urbanization in the last two decades. This in turn has led to problems in various aspects of urban life in Indonesia, exacerbated by the economic crisis in 1997. The resignation of President Suharto in May 1998, following his failure to address the impact of the economic crisis, marked the end of his New Order regime and the beginning of profound social and political transformation in Indonesia, including its cities. The changes in the cities cannot be separated from the history of the country, which underwent a period of colonialism, a period of revolutionary struggle for independence, a period of authoritarian rule under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and a thirty-two-year authoritarian period under Suharto’s New Order Regime.

    The Appearances of Memory: Mnemonic Practices of Architecture and Urban Form in Indonesia offers new perspectives and interesting analysis of political cultures and the experience of urbanism in Indonesia, providing the reader with a better understanding of the complexity of urban problems in the country. Kusno’s main thesis posits that there have been connections between the built environment and political consciousness in Indonesian cities in the colonial and national periods. The book is organized into four thematic sections: governmentality, remembering and forgetting, reminiscences and mental nebulae. The chapters in the book are organized from the everyday present in the 2000s to the events of the colonial period. Those who are familiar with Kusno’s work will not find much new material in this book. Six out of nine chapters in the book have appeared elsewhere, many of which have been widely cited.

    The book is a pleasure to read, stimulating and well conceived. A variety of figures in
    the book also amply supplement the narrative. Kusno offers an intriguing analysis of urban issues in Indonesia from the combined disciplines of architecture, history and politics. Such analysis is unique and will contribute significantly to the literature of urban studies, not only in the Indonesian context but on a broader level. In this book, Kusno also coins such terms as nationalist urbanism (26), state modernism (94) and market modernism (94) which could apply to cities in other countries.

    I found a lot of compelling discussions in the book, particularly those on Jakarta’s visual environments including the busway project, superblocks, kampongs, the street vendors, the preservation of Old Batavia, and the redevelopment of Glodok after the May 1998 riot. Drawing from those visual environments, this book reveals how the visual environments are well connected with the anxieties over the sense of change at different historical moments in Jakarta. Kusno clearly demonstrates the interplay between collective memories and the changing realm of the visual environment in the city.

    Despite its many virtues, the book does not discuss the most important public visual environment in the city, particularly in Jakarta, which is green areas. As Jakarta’s population grows, its green areas shrink. The population in the city grew from 3.5 million in 1965 to more than 14 million in 2010, but in contrast the green areas have shrunk from 35 percent of Jakarta’s land area in 1965 to only 9.3 percent in 2009. New luxury homes, condominiums, shopping malls, hotels, commercial buildings and offices have proliferated over the last three decades. Many have been built at the expense of green areas. An analysis of the shrinking green areas in Jakarta would be a very compelling additional section to this book.

    The busway project is one of the innovative ways in which the Jakarta administration has addressed the transportation problems in the city. This book offers a cultural politics analysis of the busway project and demonstrates how it interacts with the
    political culture of the Jakarta administration, but fails to analyze the effectiveness of this project in alleviating transportation problems. This book offers an in-depth analysis of mosques and gatehouses during the colonial and postcolonial eras, but does not provide further discussion of Indonesian traditional piazzas (alun-alun) which are a unique component of Indonesian cities. A further analysis of alun-alun in both colonial and national periods would be an excellent additional section to this book.

    My other regret is the subtitle of this book. The cases in this book were drawn primarily from Jakarta and a few cities in Java. Indonesia is a large country with over 17,000 islands and 300 distinctive ethnic groups, and it should not be represented by only Jakarta and a few cities in the island out of nine chapters in the book have appeared elsewhere, many of which have been widely cited.






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    On February 6, 2012, Jakarta Globe reported the ongoing construction work of two elevated roads: 5.5 kilometers Antasari-Blok M and 2.3 kilometers Casablanca-Sudirman. The city officials said the works were set to be completed by August 2012 and expected to ease traffic density in the area by half. Will elevated roads eas Jakarta’s traffic woes?

    Late Traffic in Jakarta
    The traffic congestion in Jakarta can't be separated from the high growth rate of vehicle ownership -- 236 cars and 891 motorcycles per day or about 10 percent per year -- which is not supported by the growth of road development, which is only less than 1 percent per year. The development of new roads will never meet the high growth rate of vehicle ownership. A new highway or a widened road only alleviates traffic congestion for a short period of time. After a few years, any new highway fills with traffic that would not have existed if the highway had not been built. Similarly, any widened road fills with more traffic in just a few months. Such a phenomenon is called induced demand. Because of induced demand, neither building new roads nor widening roads are viable long-term solutions to traffic congestion.

    The new roads will also undermine the efforts of developing the mass transportation system in Jakarta. The main idea of developing the mass transportation system including busway, monorail, and the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) projects in reducing the traffic congestion is to reduce the number of car riders and motorcyclists in the Jakarta’s streets. The car riders and motorcyclists are expected to use the mass transportation modes and reduce the burden of the Jakarta’s streets. The new roads will attract car riders back to the Jakarta’s streets.

    Not only will the elevated roads cause the induced demand and worsen traffic congestion, but also could jeopardize the livability of neighborhoods along the elevated road. In many cities in other countries, such as Seoul, New Orleans, San Francisco and New York City, the elevated freeways caused the declining livability of neighborhoods along the elevated freeways. In many developed countries, we have seen the shift in urban planning from enhancing mobility toward promoting livability.

    Jakarta

    You can read the story of the Chonggyecheon freeway in Seoul, the New York City’s West Side elevated highway, two elevated freeways in San Francisco-- Embarcadero and Central Freeways and the New Orleans elevated expressway in the previous post. Learning from those stories, it is clear that the elevated roads is not the solution for the traffic congestion in Jakarta, and also they could cause the decline of livability of neighborhoods along the elevated roads.

    In order to alleviate transportation problems in Jakarta, the city administration should focus their efforts on the completion of the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT). Jakarta is the largest city in the world without a metro or MRT. Major cities in Southeast Asia which have fewer population than Jakarta have had their metro systems for years, including Manila (1984), Singapore (1987), Kuala Lumpur (1995) and Bangkok (2004). The MRT would become the most expensive public projects in Jakarta’s history, but it is the answer to ease the Jakarta’s traffic jams. The critical key for the Jakarta's success in overcoming the traffic congestion is the conversion of car riders and motorcyclists into public transport riders/MRT riders rather than the development of new elevated roads.

    (This article also appeared at The Jakarta Globe on February 14, 2012)



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    The official result of Jakarta's gubernatorial election has been announced by the Jakarta General Elections Commission (KPU Jakarta) on September 29, 2012. The KPU Jakarta declared that Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, and his running mate Basuki Purnama Tjahaja, better known as Ahok won the election with 2,472,130 votes or 53.82% of the total votes. Jokowi and Ahok will be inaugurated as the new Jakarta  Governor and Vice Governor on October 15, 2012. Jokowi will lead Jakarta in the next five years to build his vision of a "New Jakarta". What can we expect from his leadership about "New Jakarta" particularly on transportation?


    In reference to what Jokowi has said during his campaigning, we should expect a new and better approach in addressing many acute urban problems in Jakarta including traffic congestion, floods, slums areas, and street vending. I commend the mindset of Jokowi in addressing the most acute urban problem of Jakarta-- traffic congestion. He understands that the correct way of addressing traffic congestion is not building more roads, but developing mass transportation. He said during his campaign that "Move People, Not Cars" was the solution for the Jakarta's traffic congestion.

    Jokowi made pledges to expand the routes and the modes of Transjakarta Busway. He observed that the current mode of Transjakarta could only carry 40 passengers and caused a long delay during peak hours. He suggested that buses be replaced by rail-buses which can carry 300-400 passengers. He promised to continue the development of monorail and expedite the development of the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) or also popularly known as Metro. He would also encourage the use of private cars by imposing electronic road pricing (ERP) and increasing parking fees.

    Unlike the Governor Bowo administration, Jokowi openly opposes the development of six elevated toll roads in Jakarta. He argued that the development of elevated toll roads would not disentangle Jakarta's chronic traffic snarls. The development of elevated toll roads will promote the uses of private cars and make the acute Jakarta's traffic congestion even worse. He argued that the budget of 40 trillion rupiahs could be used to develop a more integrated, accessible and affordable mass transportation system in Jakarta.

    In addition, Jokowi proposed low-income apartments in and surrounding commercial areas. He would like to develop integrated residential areas (permukiman terpadu) in which workers of commercial areas will live and commute every day to their workplaces in very short distances. Such residential areas will significantly reduce the commuting trips generated by employees in Jakarta.

    Jakarta

    It is clear that Jokowi understands the roots of Jakarta's chronic traffic congestion. He will promote the mass transportation system and discourage the uses of private cars. His campaign slogan of "Move People, Not Cars" is the mindset that Jakarta residents need to follow for addressing the acute Jakarta's traffic congestion. 

    I would also encourage Jakarta residents to implement as many ways as possible to alleviate traffic congestion including shuttle services, carpool matching services, and telecommuting. Jakarta residents should encourage their employers to expand their shuttle services and develop carpool matching services for their employees.Telecommuting is another way to reduce commuting by using telecommunication technologies. Employees can work outside the traditional office at remote work locations including their homes. A study in the US showed that telecommuting can reduce commuting by 10.4 percent of the labor force (Cullingworth and Caves 2009).

    Making plans is simple, but implementing and executing plans require a lot of efforts and cooperation from all stakeholders. We have good plans to address the Jakarta traffic jams and Governor Jokowi will lead the efforts to implement and execute the plans. All plans of addressing the Jakarta traffic jams will succeed only if Jakarta residents support them. Without the support from Jakarta residents, all excellent plans will become useless.


    (This article also appeared at The Jakarta Globe on October 18, 2012)





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    The Jakarta Globe reported on November 19, 2012 that surging waters following torrential rains in Jakarta killed at least one person. The floods caused structural damage to some buildings, crippled traffic and inundated many parts of Jakarta. Floods have become a threat and brought woes for Jakarta residents every year.


    Canal - Jakarta, originally uploaded by pyjama.

    In 2007, the worst floods in memory inundated about 70 percent of Jakarta, killed at least 57 people and sent about 450,000 fleeing their houses. In 2008, floods inundated most parts of Jakarta including the Sedyatmo toll road and nearly 1,000 flights in the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport were delayed or diverted and 259 were cancelled. Earlier this year, floods inundated hundreds of homes along major Jakarta waterways including the Ciliwung, Pesanggrahan, Angke and Krukut rivers and displaced 2,430 people (The Jakarta Globe, April 5, 2012).

    In the aftermath of these annual floods, the government usually focuses on releasing floodwater as quickly as possible into the sea, particularly on the development of the East Flood Canal and dredging of rivers. Similarly, Governor Joko Widodo laid out his plan to improve the East Flood Canal, the drainage in Cengkareng and Pesanggrahan and develop a reservoir for reducing the flow of the Ciliwung River (The Jakarta Globe, November 19, 2012).

    The East Flood Canal was launched in the aftermath of major floods in 2002 and reached the sea on December 31, 2009 after a very slowly progress due to the complicated land acquisitions. The East Flood Canal has been considered the most feasible means to prevent future flooding in Jakarta, but clearly cannot prevent flooding entirely. The canal, coupled with the dredging of rivers, is only able to mitigate impacts of flooding.

    Averting floods in Jakarta is quite a big challenge since Jakarta lies in a lowland area with 43 lakes and 13 rivers with a population of nearly 10 million within the city's boundaries and more than four million in neighboring areas. Two centuries ago, the Dutch colonial government, with its long experience in controlling water and drainage systems, built a canal system to protect the city's population which was then 500,000.

    The annual floods in Jakarta are strong evidence that Jakarta has not been able to sustainably accommodate its growth. Jakarta needs bold moves to prevent future flooding. For many years, new homes, commercials and office buildings have proliferated across the city and many of them have converted water catchment areas, green areas and wetlands. Land conversions from water catchment areas, green areas and wetland to urbanized areas in Jakarta and its neighboring areas must be stopped.



    neighborhood., originally uploaded by omae.

    The city administration should promote the concept of infill development within urbanized areas. Sprawl development or outward expansion of development should be discouraged. New developments in Jakarta should be directed to vacant, underdeveloped or underutilized sites rather than undeveloped land including water catchment areas, green areas and wetland. Zoning regulations (Peraturan Zonasi) should encourage the application of infill development in vacant, underdeveloped or underutilized sites. Zoning regulations that limit building heights could become regulatory barriers for infill development.

    The city administration also needs to take bold moves to expand the green areas in the city. In the 1970s, green areas made up between 40 and 50 percent of Jakarta and have been shrinking ever since. Currently, green areas in Jakarta account for less than 10 percent of the city’s total area, far below the target of 30 percent set in the 2007 Spatial Planning Law. Water catchment areas, green areas and wetlands that have been converted into urbanized areas need to be re-functionalized as non-urbanized areas. The cost of converting urbanized areas into green areas may be expensive, but such sacrifices are necessary for the future of Jakarta, including to avert floods.


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    This post was aimed to document the flood that inundated Jakarta in January 2013. Many parts of Jakarta were inundated following heavy rain on January 16, 2017. The floods killed at least 20 people and sent at least 33,502 fleeing their houses as reported by the National Disaster Mitigation Agency (BNPB) (The Jakarta Globe, January 22, 2013). 

    The floods also inundated the face of the capital of Indonesia - the Round of Hotel Indonesia and the Merdeka presidential palace. This was the first time that both areas were inundated by the annual Jakarta floods. These areas were not inundated in the previous floods. These areas were inundated because the dike of Ciliwung River under the flyover of Latuharhary collapsed. 


    Source: The Facebook page of the Jakarta Globe, accessed on May 7, 2013
    Many mass media around the world reported the Jakarta's flood in January 2013 and used the above photo of the inundated Round of Hotel Indonesia. Following the massive flooding, Jakarta Governor Joko Widodo placed the entire capital under emergency status until January 27, 2013. 

    The Merdeka presidential palace was also inundated and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono delayed his state meeting with the Visiting Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner due to the flooding. The below photo shows President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the Secretary of State Marty Natalegawa inspected the inundated Merdeka Presidential Palace on January 16, 2013.

    Following the floods, there were a number of proposals to prevent and mitigate the floods in Jakarta including the development of deep tunnel and the removal of illegal buildings in the watershed areas of Puncak in Bogor, West Java.

    The proposal of deep tunnel was proposed by Governor Joko Widodo that can also be used to address the traffic congestion in Jakarta. The proposed tunnel was estimated to cost Rp 16 trillion and will run 22 kilometers at a depth of 40 meters. The tunnel will consist of three channels including two upper channels for traffic and the lowest one for channeling away rainwater runoff and carrying utility piping. The drainage channel will empty out into Jakarta Bay. Planned entry and exit points for vehicles will be located in the Gatot Subroto area to accommodate traffic coming from the Warung Buncit and Mampang areas, as well as Tomang and Slipi Jaya (The Jakarta Globe, March 18, 2013). 

    The proposal of demolishing illegal buildings in the watershed areas of Puncak was played down by the Minister of Forestry Zulkifli Hasan. Minister Hasan argued that there are about 40,000 households living there and it's not easy to evict them. He said it would take a lengthy process of discussions and awareness campaigns to get the residents to relocate. The Jakarta Globe reported that the initial zoning allowed for development in the Halimun-Salak area of Puncak was 40,000 hectares, but 130,000 hectares have now been paved over and developed, reducing the ground’s ability to absorb rainwater runoff and increasing the amount of water flowing downstream to Jakarta (The Jakarta Globe, March 6, 2013).


    Source: The Facebook page of the Jakarta Globe, accessed on May 7, 2013


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  • 12/05/13--09:36: Building urban resilience
  • Resilience has rapidly become a popular term in many disciplines including the discipline of urban planning. In the last few years, the concept of resilience is increasingly used in urban policy and strategies. Resilience appears to be fast replacing sustainability. The concept of sustainability has been at the forefront of urban policy discourse since the Brundtland Commission of the United Nations issued the concept of sustainable development in 1987.

    Sustainability aims to minimize our impact on the environment, but has one small flaw. Sustainability puts the environment back into balance, but the way the environment behaves is difficult to predict. We are living in the environment with a heightened sense of uncertainty and unpredictability. There are many environmental events that are out of our control and we need to survive when the environment attacks us.

    Heart of Jakarta, originally uploaded by Sayid Budhi.

    Many scholars refer to C.S. Holling who coined resilience in his 1973 seminal paper on systems ecology. The word resilience stems from resilire, Latin for bounce. The Rockefeller Foundation commissioned a team to develop a comprehensive literature review of resilience and released the report in September 2011. The review focuses on three resilience frameworks including resilience for an object, a system and an adaptive system.

    Resilience for an object is bouncing back faster after stress, enduring greater stresses, and being disturbed less by a given amount of stress. Resilience for a system is maintaining system function in the event of a disturbance. Meanwhile, resilience for an adaptive system is the ability to withstand, recover from, and reorganize in response to crisis (Martin-Breen and Anderies 2011).

    How about urban resilience? I define urban resilience as the ability of urban communities to recover from disasters and disturbances in a sustainable way, maintain a good quality of life and increase its coping capacity to reduce the damages from an unpredictable disaster or disturbance. Resilient urban communities are better prepared for uncertainties and able to adapt to changing conditions.

    The World Economic Forum released its 2013 Global Risks Report and included a section of resilience in the report. It is the first Global Risk Report of World Economic Forum that discusses the global risks from the resilience perspective. The report identifies five components of national resilience and I believe these five components are applicable for the urban context.

    The components of urban resilience include robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, response and recovery. Robustness refers to the ability to absorb and withstand disaster and disturbance. Redundancy is the excess capacity to enable the maintenance of core function in the event of disasters and disturbances. Resourcefulness involves the ability to adapt and respond flexibility to disaster and disturbances and transform a negative impact into a positive one. Response means the ability to mobilize quickly in the face of disturbance. Recovery is the ability to regain normality after a disaster or disturbance. Building urban resilience refers the development of these five components in the urban system including buildings, infrastructures and communities. 

    There are two modes to build resilient urban communities including mitigation mode and adaption mode. Mitigation mode refers the intervention that is aimed to reduce the long term risk and hazards and also avoid unmanageable impacts of disasters or disturbances. Adaption mode involves the adjustment that is aimed to moderate damages in the event of disasters or disturbances or exploit beneficial opportunities and also manage unavoidable impacts of disaster or disturbances. Building urban resilience is not a short term program. It’s a long term program and requires coordination among stakeholders in the city including government agencies, private companies, and residents to prepare for, withstand and recover stronger from disaster, disruptions and chronic stresses.

    In May 2013, the Rockefeller Foundation announced the Centennial Challenge of 100 Resilient Cities. The Rockefeller Foundation received nearly 400 applications from cities around the world including thousand-year-old cities to megacities dealing with rapid urbanization.  A panel of judges including former President Bill Clinton and Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo reviewed the applications particularly on how the cities are approaching and planning for resilience and their commitment to building resilient city.

    On December 3, 2013, the panel selected the first set of 33 cities for the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Network.  The 33 selected cities include Semarang, Melbourne, New York City, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Ramalah, Rotterdam, Rome, Rio de Jainero, Mexico City and Dakar. The full list of the 33 selected cities can be found at this link. These cities have implemented innovative programs and demonstrated positive results for resilience.  For example, New Orleans had experienced in dealing with and rebounding from Hurricane Katrina and Isaac and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and learned important lessons about being a resilient city. Similarly, New York City has learned valuable lessons from Hurricane Sandy and developed programs to protect its residents from coastal flooding and sea level rise that could lead to replicable models for other coastal cities.

    Innovative programs of increasing resilience and lessons learned in recovering from disasters and catastrophes from those selected cities should be introduced to other cities for possible replication including to Indonesian cities. Jakarta and other Indonesian cities should prepare for possible catastrophic or disruptions and should develop systems to recover stronger from catastrophic or disruptions. Semarang was selected because it has innovative programs to address flush floods and tidal flooding including rainwater harvesting, vetiver grass plantation, mangrove rehabilitation and early warning system for floods and vector-borne diseases. Other Indonesian cities should learn from Semarang and other selected cities and have systems in place to recover, persist or even thrive amid disruptions.

    (This article also appeared at The Jakarta Post on December 21, 2013)




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    In September 2013, I received an invitation from the Moscow Urban Forum to submit an article on Jakarta. The Moscow Urban Forum was an international event for experts, investors, and potential partners interested in the development of Moscow and held on December 5-7, 2013. One of the outcomes of the Moscow Urban Forum is the multidisciplinary research of the periphery of megacities. More than 10 megacities were parts of the research including Jakarta. The Moscow Urban Forum has released the report of the research titled "Archaeology of the Periphery" as can be found at this link.  The report includes my article of Jakarta titled "Peripheral Pressures" on pp. 162-171. This post is the extension of that article and will be presented in the Spring 2014 Seminar Series in the Center for Southeast Asian Research (CSEAR) at the University of British Colombia in Vancouver, Canada on May 1, 2014.

    Introduction

    Jakarta is the capital of Indonesia and the largest metropolitan area in Southeast Asia with tremendous population growth and a wide range of urban problems. The overall population of the megacity of Jakarta grew in the 20th Century, from about 150,000 in 1900 to about 28 million in 2010. The megacity of Jakarta is also called Jabodetabek, taken from the initial letters of the administrative units of Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi.  The center of Jabodetabek is Jakarta, also called the Special Capital Region of Jakarta (Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta) and covers a total area of 664 square kilometers. The inner peripheries of the megacity of Jakarta include four municipalities (City of Tangerang, City of South Tangerang, City of Depok, City of Bekasi), whereas the outer peripheries of Jabodetabek include the City of Bogor, Tangerang Regency and Bekasi Regency. The megacity covers a total area of 5,897 square kilometers (Hudalah and Firman 2007).


    Skyline of Jakarta, January 2014
    Jakarta, or the Special Capital Region of Jakarta, has  ‘provincial government level’ status. The peripheries of Jabodetabek are within the jurisdiction of two provinces.  The City of Bogor, City of Depok, City of Bekasi and Bekasi Regency are within the jurisdiction of West Java Province, whereas the City of Tangerang, City of South Tangerang and Tangerang Regency are within the jurisdiction of Banten Province. The four municipalities within the inner peripheries of Jabodetabek are new municipalities founded in the 1990s and 2000s. The City of Tangerang, City of Bekasi, City of Depok and City of South Tangerang were founded in 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2008 respectively. The City of Tangerang and City of South Tangerang seceded from Tangerang Regency. Meanwhile, the City of Depok was part of Bogor Regency and the City of Bekasi seceded from Bekasi Regency.  

    Population Growth of the Megacity of Jakarta

    Jakarta has been the capital of Indonesia since the Dutch colonial era. The population of Jakarta in 1900 was about 115,000. In the first nationwide census of the Dutch colonial administration (1930), Jakarta’s population increased to 409,475. In the next ten years, the population increased to 544,823 with an annual growth rate of 3.30%. After Independence, Jakarta increased by nearly three times to 1.43 million by 1950. It increased to 2.91 million in 1960 and 4.47 million in 1970. The annual growth rates of Jakarta’s population are 10.35% and 5.36% (1950-1960 and 1960-1970 respectively).       

    Table 1 shows the population of the Megacity of Jakarta including Jakarta, the inner and outer peripheries of Jakarta, from 1980 to 2010. The Megacity of Jakarta increased from 11.91 million in 1980, 17.14 million in 1990, and 20.63 million in 2000 to 28.01 million in 2010. The megacity in 2010 was 11.79 percent of Indonesia’s total population but this population resides in less than 0.3 percent of Indonesia’s total area. The proportions of Jabodetabek’s population to the total population of Indonesia have steadily increased from 8.07%, 9.56%, to 10.0% (in 1980, 1990, and 2000 respectively).    


    Table 1

    Population of the Megacity of Jakarta in 1980-2010

    (in millions)


    Area

    1980

    1990

    2000

    2010

    Core

    6.50

    8.26

    8.39

    9.60

       Jakarta

    6.50

    8.26

    8.39

    9.60

    Inner peripheries

    n.a

    n.a

    4.93

    7.22

       City of Tangerang

    n.a

    n.a

    1.33

    1.80

       City of South Tangerang

    n.a

    n.a

    0.80

    1.29

       City of Depok

    n.a

    n.a

    1.14

    1.75

       City of Bekasi

    n.a

    n.a

    1.66

    2.38

    Outer peripheries

    5.41

    8.88

    7.31

    11.20

       City of Bogor

    0.25

    0.27

    0.75

    0.95

       Tangerang Regency

    1.53

    2.77

    2.02

    2.84

       Bekasi Regency

    1.14

    2.10

    1.62

    2.63

       Bogor Regency

    2.49

    3.74

    2.92

    4.78

    Megacity of Jakarta

    11.91

    17.14

    20.63

    28.02

                                    Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics, Firman (1997) and Cox (2011)


    Transformation of Jakarta

    The modern city of Jakarta was initiated by President Soekarno’s strong vision to build Jakarta into the greatest city possible (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). He gave Jakarta, Monas – his most symbolic new structure the 132 m high national monument, spacious new government buildings, department stores, shopping plazas, hotels, the sport facilities of Senayan that were used for the 1962 Asian Games, the biggest and most glorious mosque of Istiqlal, new parliament buildings and the waterfront recreation area at Ancol. Such constructions continued under the New Order regime that began in 1967. Under this regime, Indonesia enjoyed steady economic growth, along with a reduction in the percentage of the population living under the poverty line (Firman 1999). From 40% in 1976, the levels declined to the official level of 11.3% in 1996.  In 1996 6.9 million people in urban areas and 15.7 million people in rural areas lived under the poverty line.

    Jakarta grew rapidly during this period of the New Order regime. The investment in the property sector, including offices, commercial buildings, new town development, and highrise apartments and hotels grew substantially. Firman (1998; 1999) argued that Jakarta, by the mid-1990s, was heading towards global city status. Jakarta was the largest concentration of foreign and domestic investment in Indonesia and received US$ 32.5 billion and Rp. 68,500 billion from foreign and domestic investment respectively during the period of January 1967-March 1998 (Firman 1999).

    In the early administration of the New Order regime, some projects were completed, including the Ismail Marzuki Arts Center, industrial zones at Tanjung Priok and Pulo Gadung, that aimed to attract foreign investment, plus the unique theme park of Taman Mini Indonesia Indah. During the thirty-two years of the New Order regime, Jakarta changed considerably. A generally rapid economic growth during this period allowed Jakarta to expand its modern constructions and develop into a modern city. Firman (1998; 2000) noted that the physical development of Jakarta resulted from its functioning as a “global city” in Asia. The “global cities” in Asia include Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, Hongkong, Manila, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Singapura and Jakarta. Hundreds of new office towers, hotels and high-rise condominiums were built in many parts of the city.


    M.H. Thamrin Blvd, Jakarta. January 2014
    Murakami and her colleagues (2005) compared the urbanization stage and patterns of land use in Jakarta, Bangkok dan Manila. Using the Clark linear exponential model and the Newling quadratic exponential model, they compared the spatial distribution of population densities in those cities. They also analyzed land-use patterns by examining the mixture of urban and agricultural land use. They found that Jakarta had entered the suburbanization stage, while Manila was at early stage of suburbanization and Bangkok was at intermediate stage of suburbanization. The Golden Triangle – a new style commercial zone - was built in Thamrin-Sudirman corridor to push the urban skyline upward in response to high land costs in key areas and the convenience of the automobile (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). This zone aimed to accommodate internationally invested highrise mega-blocks; a result of the regional competition among “global cities” (Firman, 1998; Goldblum and Wong, 2000).

    Jakarta is linked with other “global cities” in a functional system built around telecommunications, transportation, services and finance. A parade of tall buildings, one after the other fill the major streets on both sides. They house the offices of Indonesian and multi-national corporations. Firman (1999) reported that total area of commercial space in Jakarta in 1978 was only 0.1 million square meters and in 1997 it reached 2.7 million square meters with nearly 90% occupancy rates. In every part of the city, modern shopping malls along with family enterprises were also built.

    The economy crisis which hit Indonesia in 1998 resulted in major disruptions of the urban development in Jakarta. Such monstrous crisis shifted Jakarta from “global city” to “city of crisis”. The crisis – commonly known in Indonesia as krismon - largely squeezed the economy of Jakarta. Domestic and foreign investment dramatically fell off. Many manufacturing and services corporations in the megacity of Jakarta closed and laid off their employees, resulting in the rapid increase of uncontrolled unemployment. In order to survive the krismon, a large number of workers shifted to become food traders or then engaged in other informal sector jobs. Street vendors –commonly known in Indonesia as pedagang kaki lim a- increased rapidly from about 95,000 in 1997 to 270,000 in 1999 (Firman, 1999). The increasing informal labor force is a distinctive characteristic of cities in developing countries since the formal sector fails to accommodate a large labor force. This shrinkage of economic activities resulted in the decrease of office space demand which dropped from 300,000 square meters in 1997 to 85,000 square meters in 1999. Similarly, the demand for high-class apartments dropped from 49,000 in December 1997, to 16,000 in February 1998. The housing market in the megacity nearly collapsed due to increasing costs of building materials and higher housing loan interest rates. Most construction projects in the periphery of Jakarta slowed down or even completely stopped (Firman, 2000).

    In order to mitigate the impact of the krismon, in July 1968 the government along with the assistance of IMF launched a variety of social safety net programs. These programs included food security, employment creation, student scholarships and block grants to schools, targeted health care subsidies, and community block grant (Sumarto, et. al., 2004). Political and economic reforms were also implemented during the recovery process. Civil unrest and political uncertainty heightened during the krismon gradually lowered during the recovery process. As of early 2005, Indonesia’s economic performance was more positive. The rate of economic growth of Jakarta was 5.26% per year over the period of 2001-2004 (Firman 2008).

    Suburbanization in the Megacity of Jakarta

    To understand the suburbanizationin the megacity of Jakarta, it is essential to recognize the socio-economic dualism pervading Indonesian urban society. The manifestations of this dualism are the presence of the modern city and the kampung city in urban areas. The kampung,‘village’ in Indonesian, is associated with informality, poverty, and the retention of rural traditions within an urban setting. Firman (1999) argues the existence of kampungs and modern cities reflect spatial segregation and socio-economic disparities.


    Kampung and the modern city of Jakarta, January 2014
    The growing numbers of migrants to Jakarta and poor Jakarta natives have produced new squatter kampungs on the periphery of Jakarta (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). Many constructions in the central city also caused some residents of kampungs to be evicted and relocated to the periphery (Silver, 2008). The periphery also attracted migrants because of its improved infrastructures and facilities in (Goldblum and Wong, 2000). Since 1950, Jakarta has attracted people from all parts of Java and other Indonesian islands. The flood of migrants came to Jakarta for economic reasons as Jakarta offered the hope of employment. The 1961 census showed only 51% of the city’s population was actually born in Jakarta (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). And many times, Jakarta officials tried to control migration by declaring the city closed; new migrants were not allowed entry. However, these attempts proved useless; a large number of migrants ignored the law.

    Leaf (1994) has identified the rapid growth of suburban enclave housing in Jakarta during early 1990s. The residential enclave for narrowly targeted moderate and high-income families characterized Jakarta’s suburban area (Firman, 1998; Leaf, 1994). Located on the periphery of the city, these settlements were built in automobile-accessible areas with various high-quality amenities such as modern golf courses. High-income families in the central city also moved from the city in search of better living quality (Goldblum and Wong, 2000). The high cost of houses and the need for automobiles restricted low-income families from the suburban housing market. One in five families in Jakarta’s suburbs owned an automobile (Leaf, 1994). Leaf (1994) has argued that suburbanization in Jakarta was a direct outcome of at least two policies: the subsidized housing finance program and the municipal permit system for land development. These policies have most benefited developers strongly linked with the New Order Regime. Half of the land development permits were given to 16 development firms. The other half was distributed amongst the other 167 development firms (Leaf, 1994).

    In addition to residential zones, the periphery of Jakarta is also made up of specialized zones of commercial and industrial enterprises. These areas complement the other districts of Jakarta: the central business districts on Thamrin-Sudirman corridor, the government offices around Medan Merdeka, the international seaport of Tanjung Priok, and the growing network of freeways. Since the end of the 1980s, no new industrial parks have been developed in Jakarta (Hudalah et al 2013). Initiated by a collaborative project of Bumi Serpong Damai in the early 1980s, the periphery of Jakarta was also the location of several new towns. The first new town of Bumi Serpong Damai was planned for an eventual population of 600,000 in a total area of 6,000 hectares; a project developed by several private developers and led by the largest private developer – the Ciputra Group. Other new towns in the peripheries of Jakarta include Bukit Jonggol Asri, Pembangunan Jaya, Lippo City, Cikarang Baru, Tigaraksa, Kota Legenda, Kota Cileungsi, Royal Sentul, Bintaro Jaya, Lido Lakes Resort, Gading Serpong, Modernland, Kota Citra Raya and Alam Sutera dan Kedaton (Firman 1998; Silver 2008).

    In a number of these new towns, the State Housing Provider Agency (Perumnas) joined with private developers to assure some housing was targeted for low and moderate-income families (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). Most of the new towns offered relatively few employment opportunities. Their initial concept was to create self-contained communities but this was barely implemented. Instead, the new towns became “bedroom suburbs for city-bound commuters” (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). The new towns were still heavily dependent on the central city (Firman, 1999; Silver 2008) and the development of large-scale housing projects intensified the daily interaction between the fringe areas and the central city of Jakarta. This worsened the traffic problems in metropolitan Jakarta. The development of industrial zones in the peripheries of Jakarta also indicated a spatial restructuring that shifted manufacturing from the central city to the periphery. Firman (1998) reported that the central city attracted disproportionate investment in service industries, trade and hotel, and restaurant construction. The peripheries attracted most of the industrial construction; these include textiles, apparel, footwear, plastics, chemicals, electronics, metal products and foods (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). In the peripheries of the megacity of Jakarta, agricultural areas and forests were massively converted into industrial estates, large-scale subdivisions and new towns (Firman 1999; Silver 2007). Within 10 years, 20 new towns emerged in the megacity of Jakarta and converted 16.6 thousand hectares of rural land (Winarso and Firman 2002, p. 488).

    The massive development on the outskirts of the megacity of Jakarta resulted from a series of deregulation and de-bureaucratization measures enacted by the Suharto government in the 1980s (Winarso and Firman 2002, p. 488). The subsidized housing finance program and municipal permit system for land development also contributed to policies that have most benefited some developers strongly linked to the New Order regime (Leaf, 1994). Winarso and Firman (2002) revealed almost all large developers were well connected to the President Suharto’s family and inner circle including his daughters, sons, brother, in-laws and close friends. The connection to the Suharto family and inner circle became signifcant; closeness to the first family helped the large developers expand their business. Interlinking also occurred among the large developers through cross-shareholding, shared directorships and joint ventures; procees which turned potential competitors into collaborators and created oligopolistic types of land and housing markets.

    Continuing with the suburbanization; this wasalso caused by the development of three highways stretching from Jakarta to the peripheries - the Jagorawi toll road, the Jakarta-Cikampek toll road, and the Jakarta-Merak toll road (Henderson and Kuncoro 1996). The development of private industrial parks in the peripheries naturally followed the development of these highways (Hudalah et al 2013).  Private industrial parks in the peripheries range from 50 to 1,800 hectares and on average the size is about 500 hectares (Hudalah et al 2013); major industrial centers are located in Cikupa-Balaraja of Tangerang Regency and Cikarang of Bekasi Regency. The industrial center of Cikarang with a total industrial land area of nearly 6,000 hectares is the largest planned industrial center in Southeast Asia (Hudalah and Firman 2012).

    Problems and Challenges in Jakarta and Its Peripheries

    Jakarta megacity has experienced a tremendous population growth and faced a wide range of urban problems in the last few decades. Two major problems are traffic congestions and floods. Despite several programs to alleviate traffic congestion and flooding, the severity of traffic and flooding in Jakarta and its peripheries has not decreased.

    Floods in Jakarta
    Floods have become a threat and bring increasing woes for Jakarta residents every year.In 2007, the worst floods in memory inundated about 70% of Jakarta, killed at least 57 people and sent about 450,000 fleeing their houses. In 2008, floods inundated most parts of Jakarta including the Sedyatmo toll road and nearly 1,000 flights in the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport were delayed or diverted with 259 were cancelled. In 2012, floods inundated hundreds of homes along major Jakarta waterways including the Ciliwung, Pesanggrahan, Angke and Krukut rivers and displaced 2,430 people (The Jakarta Globe, April 5, 2012). In January 2013, many parts of Jakarta were inundated following heavy rain and killed at least 20 people and sent at least 33,502 fleeing their houses as reported by the National Disaster Mitigation Agency (BNPB) (The Jakarta Globe, January 22, 2013). In the aftermath of these annual floods, the government usually focuses on releasing floodwater as quickly as possible into the sea, particularly around the development of the East Flood Canal and dredging of rivers. Similarly, Governor Joko Widodo laid out his plan to improve the East Flood Canal, the drainage in Cengkareng and Pesanggrahan and develop a reservoir for reducing the flow of the Ciliwung River (The Jakarta Globe, November 19, 2012).  The East Flood Canal was launched in the aftermath of major floods in 2002 and reached the sea on December 31, 2009 after very slowly progress due to complicated land acquisitions. This canal was considered the most feasible means to prevent future flooding in Jakarta, but clearly cannot prevent flooding entirely. The canal, coupled with the dredging of rivers, is only able to mitigate impacts of flooding. 
    Mampang Prapatan, South Jakarta. January 2014
    However annual flooding is not the only threat to Jakarta’s sustainability; land subsidence has become a major threat and the exploitation of groundwater is one of the contributing factors that continued for many years. Land subsidence in Jakarta was first identified by researchers when the Sarinah bridge at Jalan M.H. Thamrin was found cracked in 1978 (Djaja, et. al., 2004). Since then, the measurement of land subsidence in Jakarta has been conducted and the rate of land subsidence has been increasing over years, particularly in the northern part of the city. In addition, the Jakarta Mining Agency reported variances over a 12-year period, from 1993 to 2005; the largest rate of land subsidence occurred in Central Jakarta. The above sea-level height of Central Jakarta was 3.42 meters in 1993. This dropped by 102 cm in 2005. The height of North Jakarta was only 1.46 meters above sea level in 2005, dropping from 2.03m in 1993. During the same period, West Jakarta, East Jakarta and South Jakarta have sunk by 2.11, 11.45 and 28.46 centimeters respectively (Jakarta Post, 28 April 2007).

    The Jakarta Mining Agency data shows: 80% of the city’s land subsidence is caused by building particularly high-risk towers; 17% by groundwater exploitation and 3% by natural causes (Jakarta Post, 23 August 2007). Due to limited piped water supply, the majority of Jakarta’s population has to rely on groundwater for their water needs. The Agency estimated 66,000 gallons of water were extracted from the Jakarta's land every year. Clearly such intensive groundwater withdrawal accelerates land subsidence. A more recent study from Bandung Institute of Technology found that Jakarta is sinking at a rate of 10 cm per year (The Jakarta Globe, April 24, 2010). The study identified coastal areas in North Jakarta including Muara Kapuk and Ancol experiencing the highest rate of subsidence due to extensive development on the relatively young and porous soil beneath. It also indicated about 5,100 hectares of land in North Jakarta would be submerged in 2020 and another 6,000 hectares in 2050, if no action was taken to mitigate land subsidence (The Jakarta Post, February 7, 2011).

    Floods in the Peripheries of Jakarta
    Floods are still a constant annual threat for residents of Jakarta’s peripheries. The residents of Cireundeu, Ciputat and Rempoa of the City of South Tangerang experienced floods every year; areas inundated by flooding from the Pesanggrahan River (The Jakarta Post, October 8, 2013). The residents of Jatirasa, Pondok Gede, Kemang Ivy, Deltamas, and Pekayon of the City of Bekasi also suffered from floods due to the collapse of the Bekasi River’s embankment (The Jakarta Post, February 6, 2013). Residents of Beji and Kemirimuka of the City of Depok experienced annual floods due to the Kawin River (The Jakarta Post, January 15, 2013) after heavy rainfall,  also then flooding homes in the Bukit Sawangan Indah and Villa Pamulang of the City of Depok (The Jakarta Post, February 14, 2013). The Tangerang Regency’s Public Works Agency  recorded that 32 areas in Tangerang Regency surrounding the Cisadane River were vulnerable to flooding after continuous rainfall (The Jakarta Post, October 5, 2010).

    The total flooded areas and the severity of flooding in the peripheries of Jakarta is still less than those in Jakarta. The severity of flooding in Jakarta is due to the location of Jakarta; located in a lowland area with 43 lakes and 13 rivers. Meanwhile, the peripheries of Jakarta are located in higher areas. The tributaries and basin areas of all rivers in Jakarta are in the peripheries of Jakarta. Thus Jakarta’s flooding is strongly related with the sustainability of the Jakarta’s peripheries. In the last few decades, industrial estates, large-scale subdivisions and new towns have proliferated in the peripheries of Jakarta, many of them converted water catchment areas, green areas and wetlands. Such land conversions have led to increased severity of flooding. Former Jakarta Governor, Sutiyoso, blamed deforestation and overbuilding in the peripheries of Jakarta which were supposed to be water catchment/flood plain areas as the reasons for the disasters (Jakarta Post, 3 February 2007).This conversion of water catchment areas into urban zones in peripheral areas is clearly one of the contributing factors to the land subsidence, exacerbated by decreasing water catchment areas both in Jakarta and the outskirts of Jakarta. This reduces the volume of water that cann be absorbed in the ground to recharge the groundwater. The mismatch between the intensive groundwater withdrawal and recharge of groundwater also adds significantly to land subsidence and needs to be prevented. Water catchment areas should be protected toallow more water to sink into the ground and replenish the groundwater. Reducing the use of groundwater and protecting water catchment areas will also decelerate land subsidence and increase the sustainability of Jakarta.

    Traffic congestion
    Jakarta is estimated to lose US$3 billion a year because of traffic congestion which can’t be separated from the high growth rate of vehicle ownership (9 to 11 percent per year), unsupported by road development (less than 1 percent a year). Motorcycles are ubiquitous and can be acquired with a down payment of as little as $30. People who live in the outskirts of Jakarta can save as much as 30% of their transportation costs using motorcycles to work rather than public transport. The daily jams in Jakarta are getting worse; the peripheries are a “bedroom suburb” for the daily commuters of Jakarta, the center of government and corporate offices, commercial and entertainment enterprises. The economy of Jakarta dominates its peripheral areas. In the daytime, the total population in Jakarta is much more than its population in the nighttime; the number of daily commuters in Jakarta is estimated 5.4 million (Suara Pembaruan, March 9, 2011).


    Mampang Prapatan, South Jakarta. January 2014
    Commuters from the peripheries primarily used three highways including the Jagorawi toll road connecting Jakarta and the southern peripheries, the Jakarta-Cikampek toll road connecting Jakarta and the eastern peripheries and the Jakarta-Merak toll road connecting Jakarta and the western peripheries. Most commuters go to Jakarta to work in government and corporate offices, study in universities, receive high quality medical attention in the hospitals, and/or go for entertainment and cultural activities.  The acute traffic congestion has also prompted President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to revisit the idea of the capital relocation out of Jakarta. Relocating the capital out of Jakarta could reduce urbanization and the rate of car ownership in Jakarta and its surrounding areas, but it will not completely address the traffic congestion in Jakarta. The current public transportation systems have not been able to alleviate the acute traffic congestion; it is likely that Jakarta needs a Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) or also popularly known as Metro, in order to address this  problem. Jakarta is the largest city in the world without a ‘metro’. 

    Most metropolitan areas in the world with the population of over 10 million have operated metros for years. New York City opened the first underground line of its subway in 1904 and since then the subway has been the backbone of New York City transportation system. Two major cities in Japan, Tokyo and Osaka built their metros in 1927 and 1933 respectively. The Tokyo Metro is the world’s most extensive rapid transit system with more than eight million passengers daily. The second largest city in the world, Mexico City, has had a metro since 1969 and now the Mexico City Metro is the second largest metro system in North America after the New York City subway. Two major cities in China, Beijing and Shanghai opened their metro systems in 1971 and 1995 respectively. Major cities in Southeast Asia with smaller populations than Jakarta have also had their metro systems for years, including Manila (1984), Singapore (1987), Kuala Lumpur (1995) and Bangkok (2004).

    However the new roads will only undermine the efforts to develop a mass transportation system in Jakarta. The development of new roads can never catch up to the growth rate of vehicle ownership. A new highway or a widened road only alleviates traffic congestion for a short period of time. After a few years, any new or widened highway fills with traffic that would not have existed if the highway had not been built, a phenomenon called induced demand.Because of induced demand, neither building new roads nor widening existing roads are viable long-term solutions to traffic congestion.

    The main idea behind developing a mass transportation system, including the TransJakarta busway and the monorail and Mass Rapid Transit projects, is to reduce the number of motorists and motorcyclists on Jakarta’s streets. Drivers would be expected to use the mass transportation and reduce traffic, whereas new roads only attract more motorists. Not only would elevated roads stimulate induced demand and thus worsen traffic congestion, they could also jeopardize the livability of neighborhoods along them.

    Planning Efforts to Address Urban Problems in the Megacity of Jakarta

    Clearly managing the megacity of Jakarta with a total area of 5,897 square kilometers and more than 28 million people has been a very challenging task. The megacity covers three provincial governments including the Jakarta Special Capital Region, West Java and Banten. Urban development in the Megacity of Jakarta is under the control and direction of the central government (Firman, 2008).

    The Cooperating Body of Jabodetabek Development
    In 1975, the Provincial Government of West Java and the Jakarta Special Capital Region established the BKSP (Cooperating Body of Jabodetabek Development) to coordinate plan, implement and monitor development in the megacity of Jakarta. The establishment of BKSP was reinforced by Decree No. 125  - Minister of National Planning - in 1984 (Firman 2008); the BKSP has become theforum of coordination among three provincial governments. However, the BKSP does not have any authority over the developments in the megacity of Jakarta. The authority lies with each provincial and local government in the area. The BKSP is powerless and ineffective in coordinating development programs in the megacity of Jakarta. Programs of regional transportation and flooding mitigation will require a solid coordination among all provincial and local governments. It is clearly a major challenge to address the urban problems  if the role of the BKSP is weak in coordinating the programs. Firman (2008) argued that establishing a single authority for the megacity of Jakarta would not be possible due to the strong political tensions among provincial governments.

    Transportation Projects
    In order to address traffic congestion, two flagship projects are underway including the development of Cilamaya Seaport and the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) project. The Cilamaya Seaport is located outside of the Jabodetabek, but is connected with the Jakarta-Cikampek toll road. This planned seaport is located in Karawang Regency.  All shipping activities of industrial parks in the megacity are currently using the Tanjung Priok port in Jakarta. The Cilamaya Seaport is designed to mitigate further traffic congestion caused by heavy traffic flowing from the eastern parts of the megacity to the Tanjung Priok port. This will be a new transportation hub for the megacity’s industrial parks. The MRT project would become the most expensive public projects in Jakarta’s history, but it is the answer to address acute traffic congestions in Jakarta.

    For at least 20 years, the proposed MRT has been under discussion by the Jakarta administration and the government of Indonesia. Activists and non-governmental watchdogs have seen the MRT proposal as a possible bonanza for corrupt politicians and contractors (Economist, 4 February 2010). Eventually, the government secured a $1.6 billion loan agreement with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 2009 for funding. Vice President Boediono also asked the JICA to expedite the design and construction of MRT project; the first tract of the MRT project was to be completed in 2016 (The Jakarta Post, 20 October 2010). The construction of the MRT project began on October 10, 2013. Governor Joko Widodo launched the flagship project in a groundbreaking ceremony at Dukuh Atas, Central Jakarta (The Jakarta Globe, October 11, 2013).

    One MRT train will consist of six cars and be able to transport a maximum of 1,200 passengers per trip. The MRT Jakarta will operate 16 trains and transport 1.5 million passengers a day. The first MRT tract will connect Lebak Bulus, South Jakarta and the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle with six underground stations, seven elevated stations and a capacity of 173,000 passengers per day (The Jakarta Globe, October 11, 2013).

    Lessons from the Megacity of Jakarta

    Let us allow oursleves a summary. The megacity of Jakarta is home to 28 million people. Nearly two-thirds of the population live in the peripheral areas, still highly dependent on the center of the megacity. They commute to the center for most of their needs including jobs, schools, medical, entertainments, etc. The main infrastructures that connect the center and the peripheries are three highways including the Jagorawi, the Jakarta-Cikampek and the Jakarta-Merak toll roads. There are very limited public transportation infrastructures connecting the peripheral areas and the center of the megacity of Jakarta. For years, traffic congestion has become a chronic urban problem. Unless there are a reliable, accessible, and affordable public transportation modes that connect the center and peripheral areas of the megacity of Jakarta, the traffic congestions in the megacity of Jakarta will not be resolved.

    Jakarta lies in a lowland area with 13 rivers. All tributaries and basin areas of these 13 rivers are located in the peripheries of the megacity, strongly associated with the floods in Jakarta. Industrial parks and new towns were built in the peripheries of Jakarta and many of them have converted water catchment areas, green areas and wetlands. Such land conversions have affected the severity of flooding in Jakarta. Annual flooding in Jakarta is strong evidence that rapid urbanization in Jakarta must be reduced. As long as Jakarta remains the primary growth machine of the nation, the economic growth of Jakarta will be strongly associated with the pace of Indonesia's economic growth, and will correspond to rapid urbanization in Jakarta. In addition, rapid urbanization in Jakarta was generated by an influx of migrants from other parts of the nation, particularly from poor regions of Java Island. During 1995-2005 the average number of people who migrated to the peripheral areas of Jakarta was 1.6 million people per year. Poverty in rural areas of Java became a factor that pushed people from rural areas to urban ones. There is an inextricable link between the rapid urbanization in Jakarta and poverty in Java's rural areas. Alleviating rural poverty in Java will address not only the problems of the rural poor, but also reduce the pressures in and on Jakarta and its peripheries.

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    Joko Widodo was sworn in as Indonesia’s seventh president on October 20th in Jakarta and succeeded Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who stepped down after serving two five-year terms. Mr. Widodo, popularly known by nickname Jokowi, is the first Indonesian president not to have emerged from the military or political elite. He was born and raised in a slum area in a river bank in Solo, Central Java Province. Jokowi is the son of a carpenter and grew up to be a furniture businessman. He entered politics in 2005 when he became mayor of his hometown Solo.


    Source: The Facebook page of Joko Widodo, October 26, 2014
    Jokowi was twice elected mayor of Solo and then governor of Jakarta in 2012. He was elected for second term in 2010 with more than 90% of the votes. He was popular among voters due to his people-oriented policies and ability to empathize with the poor. Jokowi has successfully transformed Solo to be a more livable city and rebranded Solo as the Spirit of Java.  

    Jokowi addressed urban issues in Solo including street vendors and acute traffic jams with a unique and innovative way. Most street vendors in Indonesian cities engage in unregulated, disordered and uncontrolled activities and could cause urban blight. They are a nuisance and obstruct public spaces without paying any rent. Most Indonesian cities used repressive measures to evict street vendors from urban parks or other public spaces.


    In 2005, Mayor Jokowi successfully relocated 989 street vendors from the elite urban monument park of Banjarsari to Klitikan traditional market. He was not the first mayor to try to restore the park that was blighted by unorderly street vendors. He persuasively convinced the street vendors about a plan to restore the monument park of Banjarsari, and offered the street vendors a new place for their activities in Klitikan traditional market. After seven months of negotiations, the street vendors agreed to relocate their businesses to Klitikan traditional market. The city administration waived the business permits and license fees and only asked the street vendors to pay Rp. 6,000 (US$ 0.50) per day for the rent. The Solo city administration had calculated the payments from the street vendors would pay off the city spending approximately Rp. 9.8 billion (US$ 816,000) for building Klitikan traditional market in eight-and- a- half years. In the meantime, the monument park of Banjarsari has been restored as a beautiful and pedestrian friendly monument park.


    After the successful relocation of the street vendors from the monument park of Banjarsari, the Solo city administration replicated the program to other locations frequented by street vendors including Manahan stadium, Langen Bogan and Mayor Sunaryo Street. The Solo city administration has also renovated several traditional markets including Nusukan, Kembalang, Sidodadi, Gading, and Ngarsapura.


    Mayor Jokowi also introduced bus rapid transit services to address the traffic problems in Solo. His mantra of addressing the city’s traffic chaos is “Move People, Not Cars”. He understands that the correct way of addressing the city’s traffic congestion is not building more roads, but developing mass transportation. He also used this mantra during his campaign for the Jakarta’s governor in 2012. Jokowi developed double decker buses and rail-buses services in Solo. Solo became the first Indonesian city that implemented railbus services.



    Railbus Batara Kresna in Solo, Central Java Source: Solo Pos
    His success in Solo quickly captured national attention and prompted the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle to name him as a candidate for Jakarta governor in 2012. Jokowi and his running mate Basuki Purnama Tjahaja offered his vision of a “New Jakarta” aiming to address many acute urban problems in Jakarta including traffic jams, floods, slum areas, poverty, thugs, access to health care and education, and street vending. They won the election with 2,472,130 votes or 53.82% of the total votes.  

    In less than two years as the Governor of Jakarta, Jokowi earned praise for his approaches of addressing chronic urban problems in Jakarta particularly traffic jams, floods, slums and street vending. Unlike the previous Jakarta governor, Jokowi openly opposed the development of elevated toll roads because he believed such roads would not disentangle Jakarta’s chronic traffic congestion. Instead, Jokowi expanded the TransJakarta busway’s routes and restarted a monorail project that had been delayed for decades. Jokowi also introduced the electronic road pricing (ERP) and offered free double-decker buses in several Jakarta’s main thoroughfares. Most importantly, Jokowi succeeded where three previous governors had failed, in developing a mass rapid transit (MRT). The construction of the MRT project began on October 10, 2013. The first MRT track will connect Lebak Bulus, South Jakarta and the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle, Central Jakarta with six underground stations, seven elevated stations and a capacity of 173,000 passengers per day.


    Busway of TransJakarta in Mampang, South Jakarta. Source: Author's collection
    The success of the street vendor relocation in Solo was replicated by Jokowi in Tanah Abang, Jakarta. Hundreds of street vendors in Tanah Abang caused the horrendous traffic jams at the biggest textile market in Southeast Asia. He offered the vendors to use the Blog G building for their economic activities. After months of negotiation with the street vendors, 968 street vendors were relocated to the Blog G building. Jokowi won praise as the street vendor relocation cleared the traffic jams in the Tanah Abang area. Street vendors in Sunda Kelapa, Pasar Minggu and Kota Tua were also relocated by the city administration to designated buildings nearby.

    Jakarta lies in a lowland area with 13 rivers and floods have become a threat and bring increasing woes for Jakarta residents every year. Jokowi understood the roots of the problem and attacked them in many ways. In June 2013, Governor Jokowi signed an agreement with the World Bank for the dredging project. The project used US$150 million to dredge 11 rivers and two dams in Jakarta including the Cakung River, the Sunter River, Angke River and the Ciliwung River.


    Jokowi also successfully relocated squatters occupying a number of Jakarta’s riverbanks and reservoirs to a number of low-cost apartments nearby. The relocations made way for the development of inspection roads as an access point for dredging equipment. Jokowi was aware that the conversion of water catchment areas, green areas and wetland had been also the Jakarta’s floods. During his time as governor, Jokowi restored several lakes and reservoirs including Ria-Rio reservoir, Pluit dam, Cengkareng Lake, and Sunter Lake. Jokowi also built a new public park, a jogging tract, amphitheater and seating for relaxing in the west side of the Pluit dam. In less than two years, Jokowi also restored and developed several new city parks including Semanggi Park, BMW Park, Ramah Anak Salam Park, Tebet Park, Penjaringan Park, Tugu Tani Park, Casablanca Park, and Tanah Abang Park.


    All tributaries and basin areas of the 13 rivers in Jakarta are located in the peripheries of Jakarta and they are strongly associated with the floods in Jakarta. Jokowi coordinated with nine neighboring cities and regencies and offered Rp. 45 billion (US$ 3.75 million) to finance flood mitigation programs in 2014. In February 2014, Governor Jokowi attended a tree-planting ceremony with Bogor Regent Rachmat Yasin at the upstream area of the Ciliwung River in Bogor Regency. The ceremony marked the beginning of the plantation of 40,000 trees across Bogor Regency. The Jakarta administration also acquired 107 hectares of land in Bogor regency to build two new reservoirs while it is the responsibility of the central government to build the reservoir. The reservoirs will act as a water catchment area and mitigate the impact of floods in Jakarta.


    In Jakarta, most poor residents live in spontaneous informal settlements referred to as kampung. Kampungs are scattered throughout the city and have substandard infrastructure, small plots of land for each dwelling and low quality of building structure and materials. Jokowi introduced an innovative program called Kampung Deret that builds low-rise apartment blocks for very low-income residents in Jakarta’s kampungs. This new program was launched in October 2013. The program aims to create a house and an environment that adhered to ideal health standards which will improve the lives of its residents. The city government provided a budget of 54 million rupiahs (US$4,500) for each housing unit which was disbursed to the residents in three phases, with a consultant to mediate the process. Residents are responsible in overseeing the construction and are allowed to renovate their own spaces with the given budget.



    Kampung Deret in Petogogan, South Jakarta. Source: the Jakarta Post
    The first Kampung Deret project was inaugurated by Governor Joko Widodo on April 3, 2014. This project replaced the semi-permanent and substandard houses on the riverbanks in Petogogan, South Jakarta. The project built 124 units of two-story decent apartment blocks for the residents who used to live the area as squatters. The project also improved the drainage system and developed a park in the neighborhood. The project was also aimed to mitigate the floods in Petogogan subdistrict since this area was frequently flooded during the rainy season. In 2014, the city administration has been completing other Kampung Deret projects in 74 locations in Jakarta.

    In less than a decade, Jokowi completed an improbable ascent from the mayor of his home city with a population of a half million to the governor of bustling Indonesia’s capital and finally the president of the world’s fourth-most populous country. Not only did his strong urbanist credentials transform Solo and Jakarta to be more livable places but also contribute to his ascent to the top job in Indonesia. The people of Indonesia will witness if his urbanist credentials could also address numerous challenges of Indonesia including reviving the country’s sluggish rate of economic growth for the next five year of his term. 



    References:
    1. Rukmana, Deden. (2014). Peripheral Pressure: Jakarta. Archaeology of the Periphery of Megacities. Roger Connah (Ed.). Moscow: Strelka Press. pp. 158-167
    2. Rukmana, Deden. (2011). Street Vendor and Planning in Indonesian Cities. Planning Theory and Practice 12(1): 138-144
    3. The Jakarta Globe. November 1, 2013
    4. The Jakarta Globe. April 1, 2014
    5. The Jakarta Post, September 2, 2013
    6. The Jakarta Post. January 6, 2014 
    7. The Jakarta Post, February 5, 2014




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    On November 5, 2012, The Jakarta Globe reported that the Jakarta administration plan to provide permanent areas for street vendors. The Jakarta Deputy Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama had discussed this idea with the chairman of the Jakarta chapter of the Indonesian Street Vendors Association (APKLI). The Jakarta APKLI and the Jakarta administration plan to provide permanent areas in malls, traditional markets, schools and offices for street vendors to operate their businesses.

    The Jakarta APKLI estimated about 300,000 street vendors operating their businesses in Jakarta. The plan is to resettle the street vendors in permanent areas gradually. The street vendors will not be charged with rental fees in the first year or two and begin pay installment after that period.



    kakilima, originally uploaded by yuna lee.

    The prominent cases of persuasive street vendor relocations are in the city of Solo. In 2005, the newly elected mayor, Joko Widodo, relocated 989 street vendors from the elite urban monument park of Banjarsari to Klitikan traditional market (Tempo 2008). Mayor Jokowi, as the mayor is popularly known, persuasively convinced the street vendors about a plan to restore the monument park of Banjarsari, and offered the street vendors a new place for their activities in Klitikan traditional market. After seven months of negotiations, the street vendors agreed to relocate their businesses to Klitikan traditional market. The city administration waived the business permits and license fees and only asked the street vendors to pay Rp. 6,000 (US$ 0.60) per day for the rent. The Solo city administration had calculated the payments from the street vendors would pay off the city spending approximately Rp. 9.8 billion (US$ 980,000) for building Klitikan traditional market in eight-and- a- half years. In the meantime, the monument park of Banjarsari has been restored as a beautiful and pedestrian friendly monument park (The Jakarta Post 2008). 

    After the successful relocation of the street vendors from the monument park of Banjarsari, the Solo city administration replicated the program to other locations frequented by street vendors including Manahan stadium, Langen Bogan and Mayor Sunaryo Street. The Solo city administration has also renovated several traditional markets including Nusukan, Kembalang, Sidodadi, Gading, and Ngarsapura (Kompas 2009). The street vendor relocations to the traditional market can also be seen as the transformation of the street vendors from the informal sector to the formal sector. The success of Mayor Jokowi’s approach of street vendor relocations has been also replicated in other Indonesian cities.

    At the metropolitan scale, new spatial plans are required to recognize and accommodate the informal sector. The draft 2030 Jakarta spatial plan is a good example of this, recognizing the informal sector in the metropolitan area of Jakarta as a distinctive land use designation (DKI Jakarta 2010) for the first time. This means the plan specifically accommodates informal sector activities by designating space for small-scale enterprises in offices, trade, services and industrial areas. These spaces are integrated with those for the formal sectors. Each city district (Central Jakarta, West Jakarta, East Jakarta, North Jakarta and South Jakarta) has several areas designated for informal sector activities.

    While neither the Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 nor the guideline for the urban spatial plan making process (PermenPU 17/PRT/M/2009) provide a definition of the informal sector, the draft 2030 Jakarta spatial plan does by specifying types of activities including street vendors, small food home industry and other small scale industries that are located in residential areas.

    Spatial planning in Indonesia has a long history of poor implementation and of simply being ineffective. This does not appear to have changed. During the Suharto regime regulations were interpreted liberally and restrictions were deemed flexible by central government to benefit Suharto’s extended network including the interests of large developers (Dharmapatni and Firman 1994). No sanctions were ever imposed against violations of the former Spatial Planning law (24/1992), rendering this ineffective (Firman 1997). Since the Reformasi, spatial planning laws are often violated or overlooked by local authorities to increase development, and therefore the income and tax base, of their locality. Many local authorities are seen to behave like “little kings” (Firman 2008). The enforcement of spatial planning law, then, is still weak at ensuring the availability of urban space for street vendors.

    Street vendors are a critical part of the Indonesia economy. They are not groups who have failed to enter the economic system in urban areas, but are one of the modes of urban transformation inseparable from urban economies and urban development.

    Within planning, then, the informal sector should be seen as a mode of urbanization that connects various economic activities and space in urban areas. It requires an understanding that the informal sector comprises an important part of the economic structure. The provision of the informal sector in the draft 2030 Jakarta spatial plan is expected to allocate designated urban spaces to street vendors and integrate them with the formal sectors. This is potentially part of a new recognition of the importance of informality in Indonesian cities. Yet to make it work, the new spatial planning laws and instruments must be enforced to ensure designated urban spaces for street vendors are respected.

    Without strong law enforcement, the Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 will be unable to transform the spatial planning practice in Indonesia into a more democratic and accountable one and ensure the availability of urban space for street vendors.

    References

    Dharmapatni, I. A. I. and Firman, T. (1994). The challenges to sustainable development in Jakarta Metropolitan Region. Habitat International 18(3): 79-94

    DKI Jakarta. (2010). Draft 2030 Jakarta spatial plan. Available at http://www.rtrwjakarta2030.com/wp-content/plugins/downloads-manager/upload/Raperda.pdf

    Firman, T. (1997). Land conversion and urban development in the Northern Region of West Java, Indonesia. Urban Studies 34(7): 1027-1046

    Firman, T. (2008). In search of a governance institution model for Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) under Indonesia’s new decentralization policy: Old problem, new challenges. Public Administration and Development 28: 1-11

    Rukmana, Deden. (2011). Street Vendor and Planning in Indonesian Cities. Planning Theory and Practice 12(1): 138-144
    Tempo (2008). Joko Widodo, walikota Surakarta wali kaki lima (Joko Widodo, Mayor of Surakarta mayor of street vendors) 22 December 2008.

    The Jakarta Post (2008). Joko “Jokowi” Widodo: Changing the face of Surakarta. (2008). 29 October 2008.

    The Jakarta Post (2010) Vendors pay up to Rp. 2m in illegal fees. 30 August 2010.




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    On February 9, 2015, my newest article was published by International Planning Studies and available online here. The article title is "The change and transformation of Indonesian spatial planning after Suharto's New Order Regime: The case of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area". The New Order Regime enacted the first law on spatial planning - the Spatial Planning Law 24/1992. The new system of Indonesian government after the fall of the New Order Regime enacted a new spatial planing law - the Spatial Planning Law 26/2007. The article examines the extent to which the change and transformation of spatial planning practices has take place in the Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA). The data sources for the article include federal and local spatial planning documents and interviews with ten people including planners and academicians. This blog post provides a description of the Spatial Planning Laws 24/1992 and 26/2007 and a summary of the changes of spatial planning practice in the JMA.

    The Spatial Planning Law 24/1992 

    In response to the growing need for coordinating the issues of spatial plans implementation, in November 1989, the Indonesia government formed a coordinating team of national spatial planners (Keppres 57/1989) which was led by the Minister of National Planning. This team was assigned to develop a set of guidelines for implementing spatial plans. The coordinating team of spatial plan implementation also prepared a spatial planning bill which then was passed by the Indonesian parliament in October 1992 and became the first Indonesian spatial planning law, The Spatial Planning Law 24/1992.

    Spatial planning is defined by the Spatial Planning Law 24/1992 as plan-making process (proses perencanaan tata ruang), plan implementation (pemanfaatan ruang), and development control (pengendalian pemanfaatan ruang). The provision of the Spatial Planning Law 24/1992 includes the guidelines of the plan-making process, plan implementation and development control for national, provincial and local levels.



    The Spatial Planning Law 24/1992 stipulates the hierarchical spatial planning in Indonesia consisting of national spatial plan (RTRW Nasional), provincial spatial plans (RTRW Propinsi) and district spatial plans (RTRW Kabupaten and RTRW Kotamadya).  All levels of government are required to make spatial plans for directing development in their respective regions. The spatial plan periods of each level of government are different. The periods of the national spatial plan, provincial spatial plans and district spatial plans are 25 years, 15 years and 10 years respectively. All levels of spatial plans shall be evaluated every 5 years.


    The Spatial Planning Law 26/2007

    The fundamental institutional changes in Indonesia following the fall of the New Order Regime also affected the Spatial Planning Law 24/1992. This law was considered to be no longer relevant with new institutional settings, particularly with the new decentralization laws. This law was also poorly implemented and considered to be ineffective. The Spatial Law 24/1992 had no sanction provisions for spatial plan violations.

    The Indonesian parliament passed the bill of spatial planning in April 2007 and replaced the Spatial Planning Law 24/1992. The new law, the Spatial Planning Law 26/2007, contains some provisions that are not included in the previous law. In accordance with the new decentralization laws, the Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 stipulates explicitly the authority of provincial governments (pemerintah propinsi) and of district governments (pemerintah kabupaten and pemerintah kota) in spatial planning. Such provision was not stipulated in the previous spatial planning law. The provincial and district governments have a broader authority in spatial planning. The provincial or district governments can stipulate new components in their spatial plan that are not stipulated in the higher level of spatial plans .

    The planning periods of national spatial plans (RTRW Nasional), provincial spatial plans (RTRW Propinsi) and district spatial plans (RTRW Kabupaten and RTRW Kotamadya) in the Spatial Plan 26/2007 differ from those in the Spatial Plan 24/1992. The planning periods of each level of governments are 20 years. The changes of planning periods were made to be consistent with the National Development and Planning System Law 25/2004. The Law 25/2004 stipulates that each level of government is required to prepare a long term development plan (RPJP). The planning periods of RPJP in each level of government are 20 years. The spatial plans and RPJP of each level of government become the long term guidelines for the government leaders in each level (president, governors, and mayors or regents) to govern in their respective jurisdictions.

    The hierarchy of spatial plans and long term development plans according to the Law 26/2007 and the Law 25/2004 is presented in Figure 2. Long term development plans (RPJPs) and spatial plans (RTRWs) in each level of government can complement each other. If the RPJP of province (RPJP Propinsi) or RPJP of district (RPJP Kabupaten and Kota) precedes their respective RTRW, the RPJP will provide long term development guidelines for the RTRW. If the RTRW of province (RTRW Propinsi) or RTRW of district (RTRW Kabupaten and Kota) precedes their respective RPJP, the RTRW will provide long term spatial development guidelines for the RPJP. In the meantime, the RTRW of provinces or districts according to the Law 24/1992 did not have any guidelines from the long term development plans but only from the higher level of spatial plans (RTRWs) .


    The Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 also stipulates the spatial planning for islands (RTR Islands).  The central government is responsible for RTR Islands. As of January 2014, six draft RTR islands including RTR Java and Bali Islands, RTR Sumatera Island, RTR Sulawesi Island, RTR Kalimantan Island, RTR Maluku and RTR Papua have been completed and are under review by the Cabinet Secretariat for the approval by the President of Indonesia. The spatial planning for islands is a new provision in the Law 26/2007 and was not stipulated in the Spatial Planning Law 24/1992.

    The new spatial law also takes into account the rapid urbanization in metropolises in Indonesia particularly in the Jakarta Metropolitan Area. The concepts of metropolitan area and megapolitan area are introduced in the new law. Such concepts are not included in the previous spatial planning law. A metropolitan area is defined as an urban area with a population of at least 1 million people. The Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 defines a megapolitan area as two or more adjoining metropolitan areas that have a functional relationship.

    One of the important provisions of the Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 is the requirement of at least 30% of urban areas for open spaces. The open spaces can be public and private open spaces. More specifically, public open spaces account for at least 20% of urban areas. In addition, this law stipulates that forest areas must account for at least 30% of river stream areas. Such provision was not included in the previous spatial planning law.

    The Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 has one new principle of the spatial planning that was not included in the previous law . The principle of accountability is included in the new law presumably to correspond with the enthusiasm of Indonesian people for a more transparent and accountable system of government. The new law also stipulates the minimal standard of services in spatial planning. Such provision is to ensure a good quality of basic services of spatial planning for the Indonesian people. This is a response to the dissatisfaction of the Indonesian people over the poor quality of services from the government during the New Order Regime.

    The new spatial law provides some new ways for enhancing the development control including zoning regulation (peraturan zonasi), planning permits, implementation of incentive and disincentive and imposing sanctions. The incentives could be tax cuts, compensation, cross subsidy, planning permit deregulation, and awards. The disincentives include higher taxes, the limitation of infrastructure, imposing compensation and penalty. The implementation of incentive and disincentive could be from the central government to local governments (province, kabupaten and kota), from local government to other local governments and from governments to community.

    Another important provision of the Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 is the sanction provision for spatial plan violations. The sanctions for spatial plan violations include administrative sanctions and criminal sanctions. This law stipulates nine types of administrative sanctions including written warning, temporary activity termination, temporary service termination, location closure, permit revocation, cancellation, building removal, land use reconversion, and administrative charges. The criminal sanctions in this law include imprisonments up to 15 years and penalties up to Rp. 5,000,000,000.00 (approximately US$ 500,000).

    The Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 also validates the importance of public participation in spatial planning. The new law provides more detailed regulations than the previous spatial planning law including rights, obligations and the forms of public participation in spatial planning. Such provisions correspond with the more participatory system of government after the fall of the New Order Regime.


    The Changes of Spatial Planning Practices 

    After the end of the New Order regime, spatial plan violations are mostly associated with local governments that exploit their assets and natural resources for generating more local revenues. The more democratic government following the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime had no impact on spatial plan violations. The provision of sanctions for spatial plan violations has not been fully enforced. The provision of zoning regulations has not been supported by zoning inspectors to effectively enhance the development control in Indonesian cities. The transformation of spatial planning practice toward a more democratic and accountable one as a result of the enactment of the new spatial planning law is not an easy and instant process.

    The implementation of the new spatial planning law in the JMA involves three factors including hindrances, opportunities and forces as shown in the table below.

    Table: Implementation factors of spatial planning practices in the JMA




    The transformation of Indonesia into a more democratic government created opportunities for producing an effective spatial planning. However, a more decentralized government also created hindrances for an effective spatial planning implementation in the JMA. The ineffectiveness of spatial planning in Indonesian including the JMA is also associated with the centralized and arbitrary political culture from the New Order Regime and the clientelism governance culture that still pervade Indonesian communities.

    Reference:
    Rukmana, Deden. (2015). The change and transformation of Indonesian spatial planning after Suharto's New Order regime: The case of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area. International Planning Journal. DOI: 10.1080/13563475.2015.1008723

    _______________________
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    Indonesia, with a population of over 250 million, has been experiencing rapid urbanization in the last few decades. This rapid urbanization has caused many problems in Indonesian cities. The issue of housing provision for the urban poor in many cities become more complicated. A majority of the urban poor cannot afford to buy housing provided by either the State Housing Provider Agency (PERUMNAS) or private developers due to their low and unstable income. This condition forces them to various individual solutions including self-built inappropriate houses and squatting in slums and squatter settlements (Sudarmo 1997; Tunas and Peresthu 2010).


    In Indonesian cities, most poor residents live in spontaneous informal settlements referred to as kampung. Kampungs are scattered throughout the city and have substandard infrastructure, small plots of land for each dwelling and low quality of building structure and materials. Most of the dwellings in kampungs are constructed gradually by the residents from permanent and non-permanent materials depending largely on what the residents can afford (Tunas and Peresthu 2010). Poor kampung residents are marginalized urban residents that push their way to occupy state land such as disposal sites, riverbanks, and railway tracks and private unoccupied land and illegally construct their dwellings (Winayanti and Lang 2004).

    Indonesia has been implementing three housing policies including self-help housing policy such as the Kampung Improvement Program (KIP), Community-based Housing Development (P2BPK) and Self-help Housing Assistance (BSPS); the PERUMNAS Program which is the national program for public housing development; and the cross subsidy housing policy (Tunas and Peresthu 2010; Minnery et al 2013). This post discusses all three housing policies and the transformation of Indonesia’s housing policies after the fall of Suharto’s authoritative regime. The discussion also includes the housing finance, the interplay of the state and the market in housing outcome and the extent to which the three housing policies have addressed the housing provision for the urban poor in Indonesia. 


    Transformation and Democratization of the Indonesian Government


    Indonesia proclaimed its independence from the Dutch in August 1945 and has experienced a period of revolutionary struggle for independence (1945-1949), a period of democratic liberalism and parliamentarism (1950-1957) and a period of authoritarian rules under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (1959-1965) and the New Order Regime (1966-1998). 
    The New Order Regime led by General Suharto was established in 1966 in the wake of the abortive communist coup of 30 September 1965. President Sukarno was accused of being involved in the coup since he refused to condemn the Indonesian Communist Party (Anwar 2005). A year after the failing coup, President Sukarno resigned and then Suharto took power and started his authoritarian government for more than thirty years.

    The MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly) and the DPR (Parliament) were nothing more than a rubber stamp for the Suharto government. Political participation was restricted and the electoral system was modified in favor of the continuation of the Suharto government. Such political restriction and electoral system were justified as necessary for stability and economic development. The Suharto government was able to crush down all oppositions and ban all political activities from universities. Media censorship was imposed and the critics of the government were imprisoned or economically and socially marginalized (Anwar 2005).


    Under the New Order Regime, Indonesia had enjoyed steady economic growth. Economic growth was accompanied by a reduction in the percentage of the population living under the poverty line (Firman 1999). From 40% in 1976, the levels declined to the official level of 11.3% in 1996.  In 1996 6.9 million people in urban areas and 15.7 million people in rural areas lived under the poverty line. 
    The economic development also led the emergence of a new middle class and eventually the proliferation of non-governmental organizations, policy advisory institutions and think tanks. These NGOs provided policy advocacy and legal aids to communities and also played an important role in reducing the dominance of the state over society.

    Serious economic and monetary crises hit many Asian countries; in July 1997 and Indonesia experienced the worst impact of the crisis (Anwar 2005; Firman 2002; Winarso and Firman 2002). The failure of the New Order regime to address the impacts of the economic and monetary crisis led to massive protests and riots in many places. President Suharto eventually resigned on 21 May 1998 and it ended his authoritarian rule after 32 years in power.


    The fall of the New Order regime bring a change in government but also, more importantly, led to a new era of reformasi, or reform that dismantles the authoritarian political structure and replaces it with a more pluralistic and accountable system of government. The reformasimovement also seeks to get rid of economic monopolies, fight corruption, collusion and nepotism and promote accountable and clean government (Anwar 2005).


    The reformasi movement witnessed the liberalization of political parties’ establishment and their participation in elections. After Suharto’s New Order regime, political activities were liberalized and the freedoms of speech and association were fully assured (Nomura 2007). The Indonesian parliament passed a new law on regional autonomy (The Regional Autonomy Law 32/2004) and a new law on fiscal decentralization (The Fiscal Decentralization Law 33/2004). In the new regional autonomy law, the head of provincial government and the head of district are directly elected by the people rather than by the local councils. In addition, the provincial government is authorized to coordinate the district governments.


    The Regional Autonomy Law 32/2004 abolishes the hierarchy between center, provincial and district governments. Most of the administrative affairs including spatial planning, health, education, public works, and housing are transferred from the central government to the local government. The central government remains responsible for five affairs including defense, international affairs, fiscal and monetary affairs, justice and religious affairs.


    The new laws on regional autonomy and fiscal decentralization offer a shift of several government functions and responsibilities from central to local government and create a greater role of the local governments, including Provincial, Districts (Kabupaten) and Municipalities (Kota), in several important functions. These new laws have the potential for making housing provision urban planning and development in Indonesia more locally managed (Firman 2003; 2008).


    The main provision of the new Decentralization Law involves the sources of the local government’s income including its own income (PADS), an equalization grant (dana perimbangan) which replaces the central government grant to lower level government, and a special allocation which is granted by the central government to the selected districts or provinces on the basis of their special needs. The local government is also entitled to revenue sharing from land and building taxes and natural resource utilization.


    Reformasi also witnessed two other fundamental government changes: the abolition of the military (ABRI) presence in the parliament (Law 22/2003) and the direct presidential election. The national police (POLRI) was separated from ABRI and the police is fully responsible for the internal security. The military was renamed from ABRI to Tentara National Indonesia (TNI) and focused only on the national defense.


    After the fall of the New Order Regime, there have been four amendments to the Indonesian Constitution. The People’s Consultative Assembly made these amendments in its annual assembles from 1999 to 2002. The president and vice president hold their positions for a five-year period and afterwards can be re-elected for only another five-year period as stipulated in the first amendment. The direct presidential election is the result of the third amendment in November 2001.




    Transformation of the Indonesian Housing Policies

    One of the amendments to the Indonesian constitution after the fall of the New Order regime is a new provision of housing in a decent and healthy neighborhood (Amendment of 1945 Constitution, Article 28H) for Indonesian citizens. Every Indonesian citizen is entitled to housing in a decent and healthy community. The amendment was made during the plenary session of the People’s Consultative Assembly in August 2000.


    The New Order regime enacted the first law on housing and settlement areas in 1992. The Housing and Settlement Areas Law 4/1992 set the ground rules for housing provision and settlement areas in Indonesia and reflected the authoritarian rule of the New Order regime. The new system of government in Indonesia after the fall of the New Order regime enacted a more democratic and accountable institutional setting. The Housing and Settlement Areas Law 4/1992 was no longer relevant with the new system of government. The new Housing and Settlement Areas Law was enacted in January 2011 and replaced the Housing and Settlement Areas Law 4/1992.


    The new Housing and Settlement Areas Law 1/2011 reflects the new system of government in Indonesia, particularly the new decentralization laws and the enthusiasm of Indonesian people for a more transparent and accountable system of government. This new law stipulates some provisions that are not included in the Housing and Settlement Areas Law 4/1992.


    The Housing and Settlement Areas Law 1/2011 have a few new principles of the housing provision that were not included in the previous law including welfare, nationalism, collaboration, harmony, and integration. These new principles is included in the new law presumably to correspond with the enthusiasm of Indonesian people for a more transparent and accountable system of government.


    The Housing and Settlement Areas Law 1/2011 provides a legal framework to advance the housing provision for low-income residents (Mungkasa 2012). The new Housing and Settlement Areas Law stipulates the housing subsidy and assistances for low-income residents. The government is mandated to assist low-income residents in tax incentives, permits insurances, land and public utilities provisions, and land title registrations.


    The Housing and Settlement Areas Law stipulates the provincial and local governments have a greater level of responsibility and authority on the housing provision than the central government does (Mungkasa 2012). The provincial and local governments have the authority to collect housing data, empower housing stakeholders, coordinate the usage of environment-friendly technology and design, and provide lands for housing. 


    The Housing and Settlement Areas Law 1/2011 also provides the provision of addressing slum areas. The provincial and local governments are mandated to identify and delineate slum areas, prevent the expansion of slum areas and upgrade the quality of life in slum areas. According to the Article 97 of the Housing and Settlement Areas Law 1/2011, the upgrading of slum areas includes restoration, revitalization and resettlement of slum areas. 


    Five types of housing are identified in the Housing and Settlement Areas Law 1/2011 including commercial housing, public housing, self-built housing, special housing and state housing. Commercial housing is built by developers for profit. Public housing is housing units built for the poor. Self-built housing is housing units built by residents individually or collectively with other residents. Special housing is housing units built for a special purpose. State housing is housing units owned and operated by the government. Special and state housings are built by the government.


    Another important provision of the Housing and Settlement Areas Laws 1/2011 is the sanction provision for housing provision violations. The sanctions for housing provision violations include administrative sanctions and criminal sanctions. This law stipulates nineteen types of administrative sanctions such as written warning, revocation of building permit, revocation of business license, order of houses demolition, and closure of the location. These administrative sanctions were not stipulated in the previous law. The criminal sanctions in the new law include imprisonments up to 5 years and penalties up to Rp. 50,000,000,000.00 (approximately US$ 416,666.67). The criminal sanctions in the previous law were imprisonments up to 2 years and penalties up to approximately US$ 1,666.67.  


    Indonesian Housing Policies


    This section discusses housing policies in Indonesia including self-help housing, public housing, and the segmentation of housing market policies. According to the National Indonesian Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS), the dominant form of housing production in Indonesia is self-built housing which accounted for more than 70% of houses produced between 2002 and 2007 (Monkkonen 2013; Mungkasa 2012). The dominance of self-built housing in Indonesia is primarily due to the dynamic informal housing sector in Indonesia (Crane et al 1997; Leaf 1993; Struyk et al 1990).


    The informal housing sector in Indonesia takes place mostly in Indonesian kampungs (Leaf 1993; Tunas and Peresthu 2010). Kampung is unplanned, incrementally developed areas and frequently associated with slums (Winarso 2010). Informal and self-built housing in Indonesian kampungs constitutes the majority of new housing starts in Indonesia (Monkkonen 2013). More than forty percent of new houses in the Metropolitan Jakarta between 2002 and 2007 were self-built. 


    Self-help Housing


    The informal housing sector or self-help housing has become an integral part of the urban landscape in many developing countries including Indonesia. Such informal settlements also accommodate millions of urban poor people without access to public housing (Biderman et al 2008; Brueckner and Selod 2009; Tunas and Peresthu 2010). Indonesian kampungs also house most the poor people in Indonesian cities with a number of urban features including high density, poor living conditions, and poor infrastructure and public facilities (Tunas and Peresthu 2010; Winayanti and Lang 2004).


    Indonesia has been implementing three self-help housing policies including the Kampung Improvement Programme (KIP), the Community-based Housing Development program (P2BPK), and the Self-help Housing Assistance (BSPS). The KIP was launched in 1969 by the Governor of Jakarta, then Ali Sadikin to upgrade living conditions in Jakarta’s kampungs. The KIP was the world’s first urban slums upgrading project and funded by the World Bank until 1982 (Juliman and Durrendon 2006). The program was to ensure the retention and improvement of existing housing stock and to provide serviced sites for poor families for constructing new housing for themselves using self-help methods (Silver 2008; Tunas and Peresthu 2010).


    The KIP undertook the upgrading of roads and footpaths, improved drainage, enhanced water supply, sanitation, and solid waste disposal, and the building of schools and local health clinics (Garr 1989; Tunas and Peresthu 2010; Winayanti and Lang 2004). In the 1980s, the KIP was reconfigured into the Community Infrastructure Program as part of the Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development Programme (IUIDP). The new KIP consisted of three approaches including the improvement of physical quality (Bina Lingkungan), the improvement of quality of life (Bina Manusia) and the improvement of the economy (Bina Usaha) (Silver 2007; Tunas and Peresthu 2010).


    The community-based housing development or Pembangunan Perumahan Bertumpu pada Komunitas (P2BPK), is a housing provision program that promotes informal and community-based housing delivery. This program encourages active participation of communities in mobilizing resources including finance and labor to lower housing costs. P2BPK was inspired by a project sponsored by UNCHS and UNDP in 1988. 


    The Ministry of Public Housing launched the Self-help Housing Assistance, known as BSPS for initials in Bahasa Indonesia, in 2006 (Heripoerwanto 2012). The BSPS is aimed to assist low-income households in urban and rural areas in Indonesia. The Ministry of Public Housing Regulation 14/2011 stipulates three scopes of the BSPS including the development of new houses, the improvement of house quality, and the development of public infrastructure and utilities. The types of assistance include cash assistance and building materials.


    The Ministry of Public Housing Regulation 14/2011 also stipulates the BSPS recipient criteria including Indonesian citizens, living below the poverty line, married, owning a land title and having a bank account. The number of built or improved housing units and built public infrastructure and utilities by the BSPS in Indonesia increased from 3,550 in 2006 to 16,403 units in 2011 (Heripoerwanto 2012).


    Public Housing


    The public housing program in Indonesia started in the 1950s when a few government ministries and housing cooperative created by local governments built low-cost housings. This approach generated a handful of new housing units and only targeted to civil service corps (Silver 2008). Following a National Housing Workshop in 1974, the Government of Indonesia established three key institutions to address housing problems including the National Housing Authority (Badan Kebijaksanaan Perumahan Nasional) which is responsible for formulating the national housing policy, the PERUMNAS Corporation which is responsible for providing low-cost housing in Indonesian urban areas; and the State Savings Bank (Silver 2007; Tunas and Peresthu 2010; UN Habitat 2008).


    The PERUMNAS program is the national public housing programme run by the PERUMNAS Corporation. The program is supported and subsidized by the State Savings Bank, known as BTN for initials in Bahasa Indonesia. The BTN first offered loans for house purchase in 1976 and in the 1980s became central to the housing finance market particularly for low- and middle-income households. Two-thirds of the BTN’s lending funds derived from the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Indonesia at rates well below market levels (Lee 1996). 


    The PERUMNAS program through the BTN offered loans up to 20 years with low interest rates of 8.5% to 14% with a 10% down payment (Tunas and Peresthu 2010). The program is aimed to provide low-cost housing units for low- and middle-class-income households with a monthly income of less than Rp. 1.5 million or US$125. The PERUMNAS program built housing units on different size lots from 18 square meters to 36 square meters. The dimensions of the house are based on the minimum requirements for individual space, good lighting and air circulation. The PERUMNAS program also offers a ready-to-build land parcel on different size lots from 54 square meters to 72 square meters for people who prefer to build a house on their own way (Tunas and Peresthu 2010).


    Those who are eligible for loans from the BTN are those who have formal collateral (Sastrosasmita and Amin 1990). About eighty percent of BTN borrowers are government employees. Civil servants can provide formal collateral and are considered better risks. Those who are working in informal sectors and cannot show any formal collateral are not eligible for loans from the PERUMNAS program.  


    Cross Subsidy


    The Government of Indonesia through three ministries including the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Public Housing and the Ministry of Public Works issued a joint decree of the socially integrated housing policy (Lingkungan Hunian Berimbang) on November 16, 1992. The policy is a cross subsidy program and an instrument for balancing segmentation in the housing market and linking the growing number of high end houses to provision of more low-cost houses (Silver 2008; Yuniati 2013).


    The socially integrated housing policy has two main objectives including producing more affordable houses and encouraging more socially integrated housing development through mixed-income residential areas (Mungkasa 2013; Tunas and Darmoyono 2014; Yuniati 2013). This policy commonly referred to as 1:3:6 policy requires developers of luxury housing to build three medium and six low-cost housing units for every unit of luxury house they built (Silver 2008; Tunas and Darmoyono 2014).


    The policy stipulates that low-cost housing units should be built on the same site as medium and luxury housing units. However, in practice this policy has not been fully enforced (Widoyoko 2007). Enforcement of this policy was difficult because the policy was only a ministerial decree and it was commonplace for the low-cost units to be built after the luxury and medium housing units were completed (Mungkasa 2013; Silver 2008). The developers of a luxury waterfront community of Pantai Indah Kapuk, North Jakarta built more than 1,000 luxury and medium housing units before they even began their work on low-cost apartments. Due to the fiscal crisis, the developers discontinued the development of low-cost apartments (Silver 2008). In addition, many developers built luxury and medium housing units first and built low-cost housing units later on different sites (Tunas and Darmoyono 2014).


    The 1:3:6 policy was not easy to implement. In most cases, the developers negotiated the housing compositions with local governments and even replaced low-cost housing units with public facilities and infrastructure development. The developers had no longer obligations to provide low-cost housing units (Tunas and Darmoyono 2014). The Ministry of Public Housing identified only five housing projects that fully implemented the 1:3:6 policy including Telaga Kahuripan in Bogor Regency (750 ha), Bukit Semarang Baru in Semarang Regency (1,250 ha), Bukit Baruga in Makassar (1,000 ha), Driyorejo in Gresik Regency, and Kurnia Jaya in Batam (100 ha) (Mungkasa 2013).


    Due to an ineffective implementation of the 1:3:6 policy, the Minister of Public Housing amended the cross subsidy policy in May 2012. The new policy of cross subsidy (The Minister of Public Housing Regulation 10/2012 stipulates that developers are required to build two medium and three low-cost housing units for every unit of luxury house they build. The sites of low-cost housing units should also account for a minimum of 25% of the total residential project areas.  



    Reference:

    Anwar, Dewi Fortuna. 2005. ‘The Fall of Suharto: Understanding the Politics of the Global. In, Francis Loh Kok Wah and Joakim Ojendal (eds). Southeast Asian responses to globalization: restructuring governance and deepening democracy. Singapore: NIAS Press.

    Crane, Randall. Daniere, Amrita. And Harwood, Stacy. 1997. ‘The contribution of environmental amenities to low-income housing: a comparative study of Bangkok and Jakarta’ Urban Studies 34: 1495-1500.
    Firman, Tommy. 1999. ‘From “global city” to “city of crisis”: Jakarta Metropolitan Region under economic turmoil’. Habitat International 23(4): 447-466
    Firman, Tommy. 2002. ‘Urban development in Indonesia, 1990-2001: from the boom to the early reform era through the crisis’. Habitat International 26: 229-249

    Firman, Tommy. 2003. ‘Potential impacts of Indonesia’s fiscal decentralization reform on urban and regional development: towards a pattern of spatial disparity’. Space and Polity 7(3): 247-271

    Firman, Tommy. 2008. ‘In search of a governance institution model for Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) under Indonesia’s new decentralization policy: Old problem, new challenges’. Public Administration and Development 28: 1-11

    Leaf, M. 1994. Legal authority in an extralegal setting: the case of land rights in Jakarta, Indonesia. Journal of Planning, Education and Research 14(1): 12-18.
    Leaf, M., 1993. Land rights for residential development in Jakarta: the colonial roots of contemporary urban dualism. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 17, 477-491.

    Lee, Michael. 1996. ‘The Evolution of Housing Finance in Indonesia: Innovative Responses to Opportunities’. Habitat International, 20(4): 583-594

    Monkkonen, Paavo. 2013a. ‘Housing deficits as a frame for housing policy: demographic change, economic crisis and household information in Indonesia’ International Journal of Housing Policy, 13 (3): 247-267.
    Monkkonen, Paavo. 2013b. ‘Urban land-use regulations and housing markets in developing countries: evidence from Indonesia on the importance of enforcement’ Land Use Policy 34: 255-264.

    Mungkasa, Oswar. 2013. ‘Catatan Kritis tentang Hunian Berimbang’. HUD Magazine 4: 18-21.

    Nomura, Ko. 2007. ’Democratisation and environmental non-governmental organizations in Indonesia’. Journal of Contemporary Asia 37(4): 495-517

    Rukmana, Deden. 2005. ‘Empowerment and Housing Provision for Urban Poor’. Journal of Environmental, Cultural, Economic & Social Sustainability 1(1): 62-71
    Silver, Christopher. 2008. ‘Planning the Megacity: Jakarta in the Twentieth Century’. New York: Routledge
    Struyk, R.J., Hoffman, M.L., Katsura, H.M., 1990. The market for shelter in Indonesian Cities. The Urban Institute, Washington, DC.
    Sudarmo, Sri Probo. 1997. ‘Recent Development in Indonesian Urban Development Strategy’. In Rod Burgess, Marisa Carmona and Theo Kolstee (eds), The Challenge of Sustainable Cities: Neoliberalism and Urban Strategies in Developing Countries. London: Zed Books 

    Tunas, Devisari and Andrea Peresthu. 2010. ‘The Self-help Housing in Indonesia: The Only Option for the Poor?’ Habitat International, 34: 315-322
    Tunas, Devisari and Laksmi Darmoyono. 2014. ‘Indonesian Housing Development amidst Socioeconomic Transformation‘ in Jonn Doling and Richard Ronald (eds), Housing East Asia: Socioeconomic and Demographic Challenges, pp. 91-115. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan

    UN Habitat, 2003. Slums of the world: the face of urban poverty in the new millennium? UN Habitat, Nairobi, Kenya.

    UN Habitat. 2008. ‘The Role of Government in the Housing Market’. Nairobi: UN-Habitat

    Winarso, Haryo and Tommy Firman. 2002. ‘Residential land development in Jabotabek, Indonesia: triggering economic crisis?’ Habitat International 26: 487-506
    Winarso, Haryo. 2010. Urban dualism in the Jakarta Metropolitan Area. In A. Sorensen and J. Okata (eds.), Megacities: Urban Form, Governance and Sustainability. pp. 163-190. Springer.

    Winayanti, Lana and Heracles Lang. 2004. ‘Provision of Urban Services in an Informal Settlement: A Case Study of Kampung Penas Tanggul, Jakarta’, Habitat International, 28: 41-65

    World Bank. 2011. Indonesia Urbanization Review. The World Bank, Washington, DC.





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    Flood in Kampung Muara. Photo courtesy of Bunga Sirait. Flick

    This post was published by Middle East Institute on January 7, 2016. Following is the link to the article: http://www.mei.edu/content/map/flood-governance-jakarta-role-community-based-organizations-mitigating-annual-floodsIn case of the link is not available, I copied the article as you can find below. Thank you.

    Batavia, the colonial capital of the Dutch East Indies in the first half of the 20th century, was a small urban area of approximately 150,000 residents. In the second half of the 20th century, Batavia became Jakarta, the capital of independent Indonesia. Today, Jakarta is a megacity of 28 million residents and is the largest and one of the most dynamic metropolitan areas in Southeast Asia; it is also beset with most of the urban problems experienced throughout the region. The increasing intensity of annual flooding is a major concern that has plagued Jakarta over the past two decades. In 2007, the worst floods in memory inundated about 70 percent of the city, killing at least 57 people and causing about 340,000 to flee their homes.[1] Moreover, the estimated annual damage due to flooding in Jakarta is approximately USD 321 million.[2]

    The fall of Indonesia’s New Order regime in 1999 spurred the process of democratization and decentralization.[3] Flood governance is a relevant topic to decentralization efforts in Jakarta, as local governments still lack full power as well as the means to implement effective flood policy. This article discusses flood governance in Jakarta and examines the role of community-based organizations in mitigating annual floods.

    Mitigating Annual Floods in Jakarta

    Jakarta’s geographic location makes it prone to flooding: the city lies in a lowland area through which 13 rivers flow; as a lowland area, high tides in the coastal area have also generated floods.[4] All tributaries and basin areas of these rivers cross the provincial administrative regions of West Java and of Jakarta and cut across the local jurisdictional boundaries of Bogor, Tangerang, Bekasi, and Depok.

    Jakarta experienced severe flooding as early as 1893.[5] All floods in Jakarta in the first half of the 20th century were due to high rainfall and the breaking of dikes and dams. In order to mitigate the floods, the Dutch colonial administration established the Department of Public Works (Departement van Burgelijke Openbare Werken) in 1918 and built the West Flood Canal in 1922.[6] However, the flooding cycle in Jakarta changed from one flood every 3 to 5 years in the first half of the 20th century to once per year since the 1970s.[7]

    Flooding has had critical impact on the infrastructure and population of Jakarta. In 2008, floods inundated most parts of Jakarta including the Sedyatmo toll road; and nearly 1,000 flights in the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport were delayed or diverted while 259 were cancelled. In 2012, floods submerged hundreds of homes along major Jakarta waterways, including the Ciliwung, Pesanggrahan, Angke and Krukut rivers, and displaced 2,430 people. In January 2013, many parts of Jakarta were inundated following heavy rain; and, as reported by the National Disaster Mitigation Agency (BNPB), the ensuing floods killed at least 20 people and sent at least 33,502 fleeing their homes.[8]

    In the aftermath of these annual floods, the government normally attempts to dredge the rivers and release floodwater as quickly as possible into the sea via the East Flood Canal.[9] Construction of the East Flood Canal began in the aftermath of major floods in 2002, and reached the sea on December 31, 2009 after very slow progress due to the complicated land acquisitions. The East Flood Canal has been considered the most feasible means to prevent future flooding in Jakarta, but clearly cannot prevent flooding entirely.

    The government also pursued implementation of flood management infrastructure such as the Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project/Jakarta Emergency Dredging Initiative (JUFMP/JEDI) and initiated a program to improve discharge and retention capacity of streams and floodplains.[10] Yet, despite these efforts to alleviate flooding, the severity of flooding in many parts of Jakarta has not decreased.

    Recent flood management approaches recognize the importance of community-based coping capacities and adaptation strategies. Thus far, government responses to flooding in Jakarta have lacked public participation, particularly in land acquisition and environmental management. Despite democratization and decentralization measures that began after 1999, no inclusive government or community empowerment has been developed in Jakarta’s neighborhoods.[11]

    Flood Governance and NGOs in Jakarta

    In order to coordinate disaster management, including floods, the Government of Indonesia established the National Disaster Management Coordinating Board (Bakornas) in 1979. This national body provides central coordination with support from 13 ministries and the Armed Forces. Bakornas formulates disaster management policy including prevention, mitigation, rescue, rehabilitation, and reconstruction, and coordinates disaster management before, during, and after disaster[12]. Interagency disaster task forces were also created at the provincial level (Satkorlak), the district level (Satlak), and the sub-district level (Satgas).[13]

    The end of the New Order regime marked the transfer of various authorities and responsibilities from the central government to local governments, including provincial, districts, and municipalities.[14] The Regional Autonomy Law 32/2004 and the fiscal Decentralization Law 33/2004 stipulated that the local governments have powers and responsibilities in all government administrative sectors except for foreign policy, security and defense, monetary and fiscal matters, and justice and religious affairs. These two laws have the potential for making urban planning and development in Indonesia more locally managed.[15]

    Nevertheless, flood governance in Indonesia, particularly in Jakarta, remains a severe issue for the local governments due to lack of authority and existence of slums and squatter settlements along riverbanks. Despite the stipulations from the Regional Autonomy Law 32/2004, the local governments do not have full power to mitigate and manage floods. The central authorities still govern the largest and most flood-prone river in Jakarta, the Ciliwung River. The Ministry of Environments and Forestry maintains the responsibility for the upper watershed of the Ciliwung River, and the Ministry of Public Works has the authority to improve the river’s discharge and retention capacity.

    The slums and squatter settlements along Jakarta’s riverbanks also complicate flood management efforts.[16] The residents of Jakarta’s riverbanks are the most vulnerable to flooding and the potential for flood damage.[17] Yet, they have developed deep distrust of local politicians over the years and will not follow their safety advice or accept their material support. They also feel comfortable with and are accustomed to the flooding and will continue to use their pragmatic coping strategies.[18]

    Indonesia’s democratic transformation after the fall of the New Order regime sparked the growth of social movements and non-government organizations (NGOs). Padawangi and Douglass identified several NGOs on the Ciliwung River that serve residents of Ciliwung riverbank including Ciliwung Merdeka, Telapak, Kota Kita, Yayasan Tanggul Bencana Indonesia, Plan Indonesia, Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Jakarta, and several community initiatives such as Komunitas Ciliwung and Gerakan Ciliwung Bersih.[19]

    Negotiating with riverbank residents to relocate to a safer place has been a big issue for the Jakarta city administration. The city administration has proposed the relocation of riverbank residents as a flood mitigation measure since the 1980s, but it has failed to materialize. The lack of financial support and public resistance to the evictions has been blamed as reasons of the initiative’s failure.

    Some NGOs have offered alternative on-site resettlement to riverbank residents who have resisted eviction. For example, Ciliwung Merdeka worked with the residents of Ciliwung riverbank and sought their input for on-site resettlement proposals and convinced skeptical residents about the benefits of multi-story housing. The residents were fearful of losing their current accommodations and livelihoods and were biased against multi-story housing. Ciliwung Merdeka held weekly meetings with the Ciliwung riverbank residents since October 2012 and discussed the plan on how to make a more habitable and secure environment.

    Ciliwung Merdeka also negotiated with the Jakarta city administration to obtain a waiver of spatial planning regulations that require all buildings be located at least 164 feet from the river. The Jakarta city administration approved the request and asked the settlement to move back at least 20 feet from the riverbank. The area was to build a road[20] to allow fire trucks to pass 13 feet from the riverbank and allow a 7-foot demarcation for green space.[21]

    Based on input from the residents and the advice of a group of experts, Ciliwung Merdeka presented the proposal of Kampung Susun (elevated villages) to the Jakarta city administration. In response, the Jakarta city administration asked Ciliwung Merdeka to additionally provide a health care facility, a mosque, and schools.[22] The Jakarta city administration eventually approved the proposal of Kampung Susun on September 16, 2015, and the development project is expected to begin in 2016.[23]

    Trash management poses another issue for flood mitigation efforts. While Jakarta’s resident produce 6,300 tons of garbage per day, only 5 percent of it is recycled. The immense amount of garbage that builds up along Jakarta’s riverbanks and canals causes additional flooding, and exacerbates sanitation concerns that arise during floods. This reality has encouraged NGOs to push for strengthened recycling measures. 

    Ciliwung Merdeka also had established a Compost House to recycle organic waste from residents of three kampungs (villages) along Ciliwung riverbank including Kampung Melayu, Kampung Pulo and Bukit Duri.[24] Squatters living in three kampungs along Ciliwung riverbank received around 10 Rupiah per every kilogram of organic trash they collected.[25] The recycling program was also intended to raise residents’ awareness about the importance of trash management and discourage dumping in the Ciliwung River.

    NGOs have also played a critical role in flood response. During floods, Ciliwung Merdeka’s rescue and relief efforts have often proven to be faster than those of the government. The residents were able to maintain flood rescue and relief efforts on their own.[26]They succeeded in moving their possessions and electronic equipment to higher ground and evacuating children and the elderly to mosques.[27]

    Conclusion

    Flood governance in Jakarta is a complicated issue, especially since it also entails dealing with the existence of slums and squatter settlements in riverbanks. The 350,000 residents of Jakarta’s riverbanks are vulnerable to floods but have low trust in the government. They are also accustomed to dumping trash into the river. The role of NGOs is very important in managing and mitigating floods in many ways: they empower and collaborate with residents in order to improve the living environment; mediate communication between the local government and residents; and also educate residents about the importance of trash management and community-led rescue efforts.

    An effective flood mitigation and management in Indonesia particularly in megacities such as Jakarta requires a strong community participation particularly from the riverbank residents. The residents of slums and squatter settlements in riverbanks are the players of the informal sector who play an important role in the process of urban transformation in Indonesian cities including Jakarta. Flood governance in Jakarta will not succeed without the empowerment and the participation of the riverbank residents. The government needs to work alongside NGOs to promote public participation in community-based coping capacities / adaptation strategies.

    Flood governance in Indonesian cities will also require a transfer responsibility of governing watersheds and rivers from the central government to the local governments. The latter need to have full power to govern the rivers in their respective areas. Despite the stipulations from the Regional Autonomy Law 32/2004, the central authorities still have full power to govern the largest and most flood-prone river in Jakarta and maintains the responsibility for the upper watershed of the Ciliwung River. The central government needs to empower the local governments in governing rivers and the watersheds.

    Reference



    [1]The flood occurred from the prolonged and heavy rain in a two-week period from January 28, 2007 to February 2, 2007. Liu et al. (2007). Regional frequency analysis of extreme rainfall events in Jakarta. Natural Hazards 75: 1075-1104.

    [2] Y. Budiyono, J. Aerts, J., Brinkman, M.A.  Marfai, and P. Ward, “Flood risk assessment for delta mega-cities: A case study of Jakarta,” Natural Hazards 75 (2015), pp. 389-413.

    [3] Deden Rukmana, “The change and transformation of Indonesian spatial planning after Suharto’s New Order regime: The case of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area,”International Planning Studies 20:4 (2015), pp. 350-370.

    [4] M.A. Marfai, A.B. Sekaranom, and P. Ward, “Community responses and adaptation strategies toward flood hazard in Jakarta, Indonesia,” Natural Hazards 75 (2015), pp. 1127-1144.

    [5] Restu Gunawan, Gagalnya sistem kanal: Pengendalian banjir Jakarta dari masa ke masa (The failure of canal systems: The history of flood management in Jakarta) (Jakarta: Penerbit Kompas, 2010).

    [6] Ien Aje, Banjir di Jakarta Tempo Doeloe (The early years of floods in Jakarta)(2013), https://www.facebook.com/notes/ien-aje/banjir-di-jakarta-tempo-doeloe/10151331859093444.

    [7] Gunawan (2010) reported the floods in 1970, 1972, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977. The flood in January 1976 sent about 29,000 fleeing their houses. The next big floods occurred in May 1980 and December 1981 that displaced 27,000 people and 200,000 people respectively. The December 1981 flood also killed 9 people (Gunawan 2010).

    [8] Deden Rukmana, “The Megacity of Jakarta: Problems, challenges and planning efforts,” Indonesia Urban Studies, March 2014,http://indonesiaurbanstudies.blogspot.com/2014/03/the-megacity-of-jakarta-problems.html.

    [9] L. T. Tambun and Nirmala Ronna, “Jokowi: I am not a God who can solve flooding instantly”. The Jakarta Globe, November 19, 2012.http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/archive/jokowi-im-not-a-god-who-can-s...

    [10] Rita Padawangi and Mike Douglass, “Water, water everywhere: Toward participatory solutions to chronic urban flooding in Jakarta,” Pacific Affairs 88:3 (2015), pp. 517-550.

    [11] Roanne Van Voorst, “Formal and informal flood governance in Jakarta,” Habitat International, August 23, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.08.023.

    [12] Bakornas is still in effect and has coordinated and handled emergency relief operations including earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, volcano eruptions, plane crashes, etc. Bakornas was reorganized in January 2005 after their poor coordination and management on the emergency relief operations during the tsunami and earthquake in Aceh in December 2004.

    [13] Roanne Van Voorst, “Formal and informal flood governance in Jakarta,” Habitat International, August 23, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.08.02.

    [14] Deden Rukmana, “The change and transformation of Indonesian spatial planning after Suharto’s New Order regime: The case of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area,”International Planning Studies 20: 4 (2015), pp. 350-370.

    [15] Tommy Firman, “In search of a governance institution model for Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) under Indonesia’s New Decentralization Policy: Old problem, new challenges,” Public Administration and Development 28 (2008), pp. 1-11.

    [19] Rita Padawangi and Mike Douglass, “Water, water everywhere: Toward participatory solutions to chronic urban flooding in Jakarta,” Pacific Affairs 88:3 (2015), pp. 517-550.

    [20] Road construction in Jakarta is the responsibility of the city government.

    [21] Rulistia, N.D. “Changing slums into multistory kampong”. The Jakarta Post, November 3, 2012. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/11/03/changing-slums-multistory-...

    [22] Wardhani, D.A. “Ahok reopens dialogue, revives ‘kampung susun’ idea”. The Jakarta Post, September 21, 2015.http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/09/21/ahok-reopens-dialogue-revi...

    [23] Belarminus, R. “Ahok setujui gagasan Kampung Susun dari Ciliwung Merdeka (Governor Ahok approves the idea of Kampung Susun from Ciliwung Merdeka)”.The Daily Kompas, September 26, 2015,http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2015/09/26/21295451/Ahok.Setujui.Gagasan.Kampung.Susun.dari.Ciliwung.Merdeka.

    [24] Rita Padawangi and Mike Douglass, “Water, water everywhere: Toward participatory solutions to chronic urban flooding in Jakarta,” Pacific Affairs 88:3 (2015), pp. 517-550.

    [25] Adh. “Ciliwung riverbank residents to start ‘cash for trash’ project”. The Jakarta Post, March 23, 2009. http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/03/23/ciliwung-riverbank-residen...

    [26] Rita Padawangi and Mike Douglass, “Water, water everywhere: Toward participatory solutions to chronic urban flooding in Jakarta,” Pacific Affairs 88:3 (2015), pp. 517-550.


    [27] M.A. Marfai, A.B. Sekaranom, and P. Ward, “Community responses and adaptation strategies toward flood hazard in Jakarta, Indonesia,” Natural Hazards 75 (2015), pp. 1127-1144.




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    In September 2016, I received an invitation from an editor of Velvet Cell Journal to submit an article about  Jakarta. This journal is a blog of the Velvet Cell publisher. The Velvet Cell published photo books that explore urban fabrics including architecture, space and societal structure. Previously, I received a book from the Velvet Cell titled "Jakarta: Modern Interventions and Minor Improvisations" by photographer Isidro Ramirez. I found the book very interesting. I enjoyed every single photo of Jakarta in the book. Those photos capture the challenges of living in Jakarta very well. 
    The editor of Velvet Cell Journal asked me to write an article about Jakarta that could accompany the focus of Isidro's book which is the difficulties associated with the living in Jakarta, an overpopulated city that is expanding very fast. 
    Below is the article that I prepared for them. The article was posted on October 27, 2106 and can be found here.

    Not only is Jakarta the largest metropolitan area in Southeast Asia, it is also the most dynamic, though beset with most of the urban problems experienced in twentieth first century Southeast Asia. Jakarta has been the capital of Indonesia since the Dutch colonial era and the economic, commercial and transportation hub of the nation. The population of Jakarta in 1900 was about 115,000. After Independence, Jakarta increased by nearly three times to 1.43 million by 1950. It increased to 2.91 million in 1960 and 4.47 million in 1970. Table below shows the population of Jakarta and the inner and outer peripheries of Jakarta, from 1980 to 2010. The Megacity of Jakarta or popularly known as Jabodetabek increased from 11.91 million in 1980, 17.14 million in 1990, and 20.63 million in 2000 to 28.01 million in 2010. The megacity in 2010 was 11.79 percent of Indonesia’s total population but this population resides in less than 0.3 percent of Indonesia’s total area.


    Table 

    Population of the Megacity of Jakarta in 1980-2010

    (in millions)


    Area

    1980

    1990

    2000

    2010

    Core

    6.50

    8.26

    8.39

    9.60

       Jakarta

    6.50

    8.26

    8.39

    9.60

    Inner peripheries

    n.a

    n.a

    4.93

    7.22

       City of Tangerang

    n.a

    n.a

    1.33

    1.80

       City of South Tangerang

    n.a

    n.a

    0.80

    1.29

       City of Depok

    n.a

    n.a

    1.14

    1.75

       City of Bekasi

    n.a

    n.a

    1.66

    2.38

    Outer peripheries 

    5.41

    8.88

    7.31

    11.20

       City of Bogor

    0.25

    0.27

    0.75

    0.95

       Tangerang Regency

    1.53

    2.77

    2.02

    2.84

       Bekasi Regency

    1.14

    2.10

    1.62

    2.63

       Bogor Regency

    2.49

    3.74

    2.92

    4.78

    Megacity of Jakarta

    11.91

    17.14

    20.63

    28.02


                                    Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics, Firman (1997) and Cox (2011)

    Rapid urbanization in the megacity of Jakarta caused a wide range of urban problems in the last few decades. Two major problems are traffic congestions and floods. Jakarta is estimated to lose US$3 billion a year because of traffic congestion which can’t be separated from the high growth rate of vehicle ownership. The daily jams in Jakarta are getting worse. Motorcycles are ubiquitous and can be acquired with a down payment of as little as $30. The motorcycle ownership grew from 1.62 million in 2000 to 7.52 million in 2010 and 13.08 million in 2014. People who live in the outskirts of Jakarta can save as much as 30% of their transportation costs using motorcycles to work rather than public transport.


    Nearly two-thirds of the population live in the peripheral areas of Jakarta commute to the center for most of their needs including jobs, schools, medical, entertainments, etc. Unless there are a reliable, accessible, and affordable public transportation modes that connect the center and peripheral areas of the megacity of Jakarta, the traffic congestions in the megacity of Jakarta will not be resolved. Most metropolitan areas in the world with the population of over 10 million have operated metros or mass rapid transits for years. Jakarta is the largest city in the world without a metro. Jakarta just started the construction of MRT in September 2015. The completion of MRT in Jakarta in the next few more years is expected to reduce the traffic congestion in Jakarta.

    Jakarta lies in a lowland area with 13 rivers. All tributaries and basin areas of these 13 rivers are located in the peripheries of the megacity, strongly associated with the floods in Jakarta. Industrial parks and new towns were built in the peripheries of Jakarta and many of them have converted water catchment areas, green areas and wetlands. Such land conversions have affected the severity of flooding in Jakarta. Floods have become a threat and bring increasing woes for Jakarta residents every year.
    In 2007, the worst floods in memory inundated about 70% of Jakarta, killed at least 57 people and sent about 450,000 fleeing their houses. In 2012, floods inundated hundreds of homes along major Jakarta waterways and displaced 2,430 people. In 2013, many parts of Jakarta were inundated following heavy rain and killed at least 20 people and sent at least 33,502 fleeing their houses. In 2015, the flood inundated many parts of the Megacity of Jakarta and caused an estimated losses of $234 million. In August 2016, eight sub-districts in South Jakarta and East Jakarta were flooded affecting 10,538 households. Annual flooding in Jakarta is strong evidence that rapid urbanization in Jakarta must be reduced.
    As long as Jakarta remains the primary growth machine of the nation, the economic growth of Jakarta will be strongly associated with the pace of Indonesia's economic growth, and will correspond to rapid urbanization in Jakarta. Indonesia will need to create more urban centers to reduce the burdens of Jakarta. In addition, rapid urbanization in Jakarta was generated by an influx of migrants from other parts of the nation, particularly from poor regions of Java Island. Poverty in rural areas of Java became a factor that pushed people from rural areas to urban ones. Alleviating rural poverty in Java will address not only the problems of the rural poor, but also reduce the pressures in and on Jakarta and its peripheries. 


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    I was invited to give a lecture at the Yale Indonesia Forum Dialogue on April 21, 2017. The other guest lecture was M. Chatib Basri, a former Indonesian Minister of Finance. On the following day, Mr. Basri and I also attended the 16thNorthwestern Conference on Indonesia. The theme of the dialogue and conference was “A Nation in Dysfunction: Discourses on Corruption in Indonesia”. A total of five scholars presented their papers in the conference. They offered an insightful analysis of the case of corruptions in various aspects in Indonesia. The presentations revealed some distressing issues of corruption, but offered some recommendations for rectifying the issues.

    I enjoyed my time in the dialogue and the conference. It’s a well-organized event and I would like to commend the event organizers for running a successful event. Below is my presentation at the Yale Indonesia Forum Dialogue

    The reformationmovement in Indonesia sought to get rid of economic monopolies, fight corruption, collusion, and nepotism and promote accountable and clean government (Anwar 2005; Nomura 2007). The new system of government after the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime enacted a more democratic and accountable institutional setting. One of the new regulations is the transfer of various authorities and responsibilities from central government to local government. Such a transfer creates powerful local government and leads to rampant corruption in city and provincial governments. 



    All photos credit: Amanda Anggita, Yale University
    The keynote speakers and the conference organizers of the Yale Indonesia Forum Dialogue

    This article discusses corruption in the local government level and focus on spatial planning cases. Corruption in spatial planning in city and provincial governments creates hindrances for creating inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable cities in Indonesia as mandated by the New Urban Agenda of the UN HABITAT. Spatial planning is defined by the Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 as plan-making process, plan implementation and development control. The corruption in each component of spatial planning procedure is discussed and the cases of spatial planning violations are presented. Some recommendations of eradicating corruption in spatial planning are also offered in the article.


    Spatial Planning Laws in Indonesia

    The increases of economic growth and foreign investments in Indonesia as the results of the deregulation measures in the 1980s had substantially increased the demand for lands, particularly in the Jakarta Metropolitan Areas (Firman and Dharmapatni 1994; Firman 1998). The increasing demand for lands had also resulted in various problems of implementing spatial plans.


    In response to the growing need for coordinating the issues of spatial plans implementation, in November 1989, the Indonesia government formed a coordinating team of national spatial planners (Keppres 57/1989) which was led by the Minister of National Planning. This team was assigned to develop a set of guidelines for implementing spatial plans. The coordinating team of spatial plan implementation also prepared a spatial planning bill which then was passed by the Indonesian parliament in October 1992 and became the first Indonesian spatial planning law, The Spatial Planning Law 24/1992.


    Spatial planning is defined by the Spatial Planning Law 24/1992 as plan-making process (proses perencanaan tata ruang), plan implementation (pemanfaatan ruang), and development control (pengendalian pemanfaatan ruang). The provision of the Spatial Planning Law 24/1992 includes the guidelines of the plan-making process, plan implementation and development control for national, provincial and local levels.



    The attendees, keynote speakers and organizers of the Yale Indonesia Forum Dialogue

    The Spatial Planning Law 24/1992 stipulates the principles of the spatial planning in Indonesia including integrity, sustainability, effectiveness, efficiency, compatibility, harmony, openness, equality, justice, and legal protection.  The rights, obligations and participation of the people in the spatial planning are also stipulated in the Spatial Planning Law 24/1992. The people have the right to know the spatial plan, participate in the plan-making process and receive just compensation when their property is acquired for public uses. The detailed regulation on the rights, obligation and participation of the people in spatial planning was issued in December 1996 (Peraturan Pemerintah (National Regulation) 69/1996). This regulation was the first detailed regulation enacted by the Indonesian government from the Spatial Planning Law 24/1992.


    The fundamental institutional changes in Indonesia following the fall of the New Order Regime also affected the Spatial Planning Law 24/1992. This law was considered to be no longer relevant with new institutional settings, particularly with the new decentralization laws. This law was also poorly implemented and considered to be ineffective. The Spatial Law 24/1992 had no sanction provisions for spatial plan violations.


    The Directorate General of Spatial Planning prepared the bill of spatial planning and actively participated in the deliberation for nearly two years with the Indonesian parliament. The Indonesian parliament passed the bill of spatial planning in April 2007 and replaced the Spatial Planning Law 24/1992. The new law, the Spatial Planning Law 26/2007, contains some provisions that are not included in the previous law. In accordance with the new decentralization laws, the Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 stipulates explicitly the authority of provincial governments (pemerintah provinsi) and of district governments (pemerintah kabupaten and pemerintah kota) in spatial planning. The provincial and district governments have a broader authority in spatial planning. The provincial or district governments can stipulate new components in their spatial plan that are not stipulated in the higher level of spatial plans.


    The planning periods of national spatial plans (RTRW Nasional), provincial spatial plans (RTRW Propinsi) and district spatial plans (RTRW Kabupaten and RTRW Kotamadya) in the Spatial Plan 26/2007 differ from those in the Spatial Plan 24/1992. The planning periods of each level of governments are 20 years. The changes of planning periods were made to be consistent with the National Development and Planning System Law 25/2004. The Law 25/2004 stipulates that each level of government is required to prepare a long term development plan (RPJP). The planning periods of RPJP in each level of government are 20 years. The spatial plans and RPJP of each level of government become the long term guidelines for the government leaders in each level (president, governors, and mayors or regents) to govern in their respective jurisdictions.



    The Sixteenth Northeastern Conference on Indonesia at Yale University on April 22, 2017
    One of the important provisions of the Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 is the requirement of at least 30% of urban areas for open spaces. The open spaces can be public and private open spaces. More specifically, public open spaces account for at least 20% of urban areas. In addition, this law stipulates that forest areas must account for at least 30% of river stream areas. Such provision was not included in the previous spatial planning law.


    The Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 also stipulates the minimal standard of services in spatial planning. Such provision is to ensure a good quality of basic services of spatial planning for the Indonesian people. This is a response to the dissatisfaction of the Indonesian people over the poor quality of services from the government during the New Order Regime. The quality of basic services has not improved under the new system of government in Indonesia. Many local governments do not even know how to efficiently and effectively manage their resources for providing basic needs and improving public services in their localities (Firman 2002; Firman 2004; Silver 2005).


    The new spatial law provides some new ways for enhancing the development control including zoning regulation (peraturan zonasi), planning permits, implementation of incentive and disincentive and imposing sanctions. The incentives could be tax cuts, compensation, cross subsidy, planning permit deregulation, and awards. The disincentives include higher taxes, the limitation of infrastructure, imposing compensation and penalty. The implementation of incentive and disincentive could be from the central government to local governments (province, kabupaten and kota), from local government to other local governments and from governments to community.


    Another important provision of the Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 is the sanction provision for spatial plan violations. The sanctions for spatial plan violations include administrative sanctions and criminal sanctions. This law stipulates nine types of administrative sanctions including written warning, temporary activity termination, temporary service termination, location closure, permit revocation, cancellation, building removal, land use reconversion, and administrative charges. The criminal sanctions in this law include imprisonments up to 15 years and penalties up to Rp. 5billions (approximately US$ 500,000).


    The Practice of Spatial Planning

    During the New Order regime, almost all large developers were well connected to the President Suharto’s family and inner circle. Winarso and Firman (2002) revealed almost all large developers were well connected to the President Suharto’s daughters, sons, brother, in-laws and close friends. The connection to the Suharto’s family and inner circle became an important factor for the developers to develop their businesses. The closeness to the first family helped the large developers to expand their business. These interlinks also occurred among the large developers through cross-shareholding, shared directors, and joint ventures. The interlinks turned potential competitors into collaborators and created oligopolistic types of land and housing markets.


    Many development decisions made in the JMA were in favor of the proposed developments from the developers who often bribed the authorities and the local governments. The spatial plan was poorly implemented.



    The Sixteenth Northeastern Conference on Indonesia at Yale University on April 22, 2017
    The discretion of the planning authority was an important factor in the implementation of spatial planning in Indonesia. Regulations stipulated in the spatial plans (RTRWs) were interpreted loosely and restrictions were considered flexible by the planning authority in the local government level (Cowherd 2005, p. 182). The local governments were also under pressure from the political elite influences and the developers to circumvent spatial plans. This explains why the implementation of spatial planning in Indonesia, in many cases, led to corruption and unfairness.


    Cowherd (2005, p. 183) revealed that only some eight percent of the land permitted for housing in the province of West Java was in compliance with the spatial plans. The spatial planning was made to accommodate new development rather than to control undesirable development as confirmed in the following interview with a planner:

    The economic growth and the expansion of employment are more important than the enforcement of spatial plans. The enforcement of spatial plan is so weak that spatial plans have simply been ineffective. Spatial plans were frequently prepared to accommodate the interest of developers rather than to plan for more sustainable areas and communities. For example, the spatial plans in Purwakarta and Karawang Regencies in 1995 were prepared to accommodate the interest of the Bukit Indah City developers (R. Sutriadi, personal communication, 5 September 2011). 


    The alterations to the statutory spatial plan were very often made when the proposals from the developer were not recommended in the statutory spatial plan. Furthermore, the large developers were also allowed to prepare a new spatial plan then approved by the government (Winarso and Firman 2002).


    President Suharto used his extraordinary powers to circumvent planning and exempted the megaprojects of his family, friends and business partners from both spatial plans and free-market competition (Cowherd 2005, p. 183). The case of Kapuknaga Beach Tourism Development in the mid-1990s provides a testament to the use of political elite influences, particularly those of President Suharto, in the violation of spatial plans. A consortium of large developers planned to develop the 8,000 hectares of Kapuknaga, a coastal area in the northern part of the JMA, through land reclamation.


    Regardless of these laws and regulations that protect the Kapuknaga area from land use change, the 8,000 hectares of Kapuknaga Beach Tourism Development was approved by the Presidential Decree 73/1995, and the Governor of West Java was appointed as the chair of the Kapuknaga Development Board (Firman 1999, p. 1039; Wijayanti 1998).


    There was also a controversial plan proposed by Bambang Trihatmodjo, son of the former President Suharto, to develop a new town of Bukit Jonggol.  The 30,000 hectares of Bukit Jonggol was approved by the Presidential Decree 1/1997for a possible new Indonesian capital. The size of this new town was almost equal to that of Indonesia’s second largest city, Surabaya (Firman 1997, p. 1037). This area was critical to the water supply of Jakarta and the control of downstream flooding.


    The Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 was enacted in a more transparent and accountable system of government. The central government has never issued a presidential decree for approving any gigantic project that violates spatial plans.  Nevertheless, the central government still interfered, through several ministries, in local decision-making including local spatial plan decisions.


    A recent case in the Senayan Area showed the Jakarta city administration cannot regulate the areas which are fully controlled by the central government. The central government through the State Secretariat (Kantor Sekretariat Negara) leased the 11.2 hectare, unused Taman Ria amusement park in Senayan Area to PT. Ariobimo Laguna Perkasa, a developer that planned to transform the unused amusement park into a shopping mall. The project drew reactions from some members of the House of Representatives who opposed the conversion of the area into a shopping mall (Tempo Interaktif, 19 July 2010).


    The Jakarta spatial plan 2000-2010 and the draft Jakarta spatial plan 2010-2030 designated the area of the unused amusement park as green areas. The project of a shopping mall in the area is a violation of the Jakarta spatial plans by the developer with the support from the central government. The central government through the State Secretariat has full authority over the area and disregarded the Jakarta spatial plan when they leased the area to the developer. This case clearly shows the Jakarta city administration cannot enforce the spatial plans when the area is fully controlled by the central government.


    In the local government level, the violations of spatial plans were more rampant than ever. Spatial plan violations before the reformasiare mostly associated with the central government’s power, particularly with President Suharto’s extraordinary powers that benefited his family, friends and business partners. In contrast, spatial plan violations after the reformasi are mostly associated with local governments that use their decentralized powers and exploit their natural resources more intensively, as the interview excerpt below shows:

    The decentralized powers have created powerful mayors and regents. They are no longer afraid of their respective governors and the governors are no longer afraid of the Minister of Home Affairs. The spatial plan violations are even worse when the local authorities rent or sell the local assets such as parks and historic buildings to the developers for generating more local revenues (D. Priatmodjo, personal communication, 25 July 2010).


    The Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 stipulates the requirement of at least 30% of urban areas for open spaces, but such a provision is poorly implemented, particularly by local governments. In the 1970s, green areas made up between 40 and 50 percent of Jakarta and have been shrinking ever since (Silver 2007). Green areas in Jakarta in 2009 account for only 9.3 percent of the city's area (Rukmana 2009).

    The proportions of green areas in the Jakarta spatial plans decreased from 27.6 percent in Rencana Induk Djakarta (Djakarta Master Plan) 1965-1985 and 26.1 percent in Rencana Umum Tata Ruang Jakarta (Jakarta Spatial Plan) 1985-2005 to 13.94 percent in Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Jakarta (Jakarta Spatial Plan) 2000-2010 (Rukmana 2008). The newer spatial plan accepted the decreases of green areas and validated the violations of the previous spatial plans (Steinberg 2007). The decreases of green areas in the three Jakarta spatial plans strongly indicate the spatial plan violations.


    The Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 provides the sanction provision for spatial plan violations but the government failed to impose sanctions against the conversion of green areas in the Jakarta Metropolitan Area.  The spatial plans were all but ignored by the Jakarta city administration. The enforcement of spatial plans has been so weak and no sanctions have been imposed to spatial plan violations including the Jakarta city administration and the developers who convert the green areas into new homes, condominiums, malls, hotels, commercials and office buildings. 


    One of Indonesia’s prominent NGOs, WALHI, has identified at least 5 areas designated as green areas in the Jakarta spatial plan 1985-2005have been converted into malls, commercials, hotels and residential areas (Khalid 2009). These five areas include Kelapa Gading (3,182 acres), Pantai Kapuk (2,053 acres), Sunter ( 3,605 acres), Senayan (689 acres), and Tomang (172 acres). The converted uses in each area can be seen in Table 1. The Jakarta spatial plan 2000-2010 accepted the conversion of those five areas and validated the violations of the Jakarta spatial plan 1985-2005 (Joga and Antar 2007). As many other spatial plan violation cases, there was no sanction imposed against the Jakarta Administration for allowing those conversions.




    The Indonesian National Agency of Land Affairs (BPN) issued the maps of land use conformity with the spatial plans for all provinces in 2007. In Jakarta, non-conformity lands were found in many parts of the area particularly in the southwest and northeast parts of Jakarta. Spatial planning violations and unconformity are evidence of corruption in spatial planning.


    Spatial planning is one of the important keys to create inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable cities. Spatial planning is an important urban intervention for achieving sustainable urban development. The corruption in spatial planning occurred in all stages of spatial planning (plan making process, plan implementation, and development control) and it will impede sustainable urban development.


    Eradicating corruption in spatial planning is a precondition for achieving sustainable urban development. I would offer some ways of eradicating corruption in spatial planning as follows:

    1.       Increase public participation and transparency during the plan making process

    Public participation has become a key element of planning activity in developed countries over the last decades (Laurian and Shaw 2009). The public should be involved in every step of the plan making process in order to increase the legitimacy of the plan. Public participation is also a way of increasing community empowerment and capacity building. Public participation will promote transparency, inclusiveness and fairness in the plan making process. Transparency will minimize rooms for corruptions and corrupt behavior.

    2.       Empower citizens and non-government organizations

    Public participation will promote the consideration of all concerned and affected citizens. Public participation can increase public awareness of local issues including spatial plans in the local level. The awareness of local issues from the empowered citizen and non-government organizations is very important and can strive to achieve sustainable urban development and reduce corruptions and corrupt behavior from the city administrators.

    3.       Offer training to more urban planners with a deep knowledge of inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable cities

    Urban planners need to understand that corruption is the roots of urban issues including annual floods and acute traffic jams. Inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable cities will not be achieved without efforts of eradicating rampant corruptions in spatial planning. In order to prevent the spatial plan violations, technical and legal training and adequate operational budget for spatial plan inspections should be offered to the officials in the lowest level of government including sub-district (kecamatan) and neighborhood (kelurahan) levels (R. Munir, personal communication, 11 July 2011). Capacity building of the government officials in the lowest level of government is an important key to enforcing spatial plans in Indonesian cities. This important key is not stipulated in the Spatial Planning Law 26/2007.

    4.       Promote access to spatial planning information

    Spatial plans are the public information. All residents must have access to spatial plans. Residents should be able to access any information concerning zoning and other land use regulations in their areas. The informed residents will promote the level of public participation in the plan making process and raise the legitimacy of the spatial plans.

    5.       Enforce spatial plan laws

    The poor spatial plan enforcement is a result of the absence of zoning regulations and zoning inspections. Zoning regulation is one of four new provisions in the Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 for enhancing the development control. Zoning regulation is the main reference for the issuance of land use permit in Indonesian cities, but such new provision was not supported by the provision of zoning inspectors. The Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 stipulates the role of Penyidik Pegawai Negeri Sipil (PPNS) who is expected to investigate any spatial plan violations. However, most planning departments in Indonesian cities do not have zoning inspectors or PPNSs. The lack of zoning inspectors is one of the causes of spatial plan violations and rampant corruptions in spatial planning in Indonesian cities. 

    6.       Discretionary vs. regulatory planning system

    The Spatial Planning Law 26/2007 is an application of regulatory planning system. Some benefits and costs were found in the regulatory planning system. It’s going to be a new study that compares and contrasts these two planning systems in Indonesia. Nevertheless, the application of discretionary planning system could potentially reduce rooms for corruptions and corrupt behavior in spatial planning in Indonesia.


    References:

    Anwar, Dewi Fortuna. (2005). The fall of Suharto: understanding the politics of the global. In Southeast Asian responses to globalization: restructuring governance and deepening democracy. Wah, Francis Loh Kok and Joakim Ojendal (Eds.). Singapore: NIAS Press.

    Cowherd, Robert. (2005). Does planning culture matter? Dutch and American models in Indonesian urban transformations. In Comparative Planning Culture. Bishwapriya Sanyal (Ed.). New York and London: Routledge

    Firman, Tommy. (2008). In search of a governance institution model for Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) under Indonesia’s new decentralization policy: Old problem, new challenges. Public Administration and Development 28: 1-11

    Firman, Tommy. (2004). New town development in Jakarta Metropolitan Region: a perspective of spatial segregation. Habitat International  28: 349-368

    Firman, Tommy. (2003). Potential impacts of Indonesia’s fiscal decentralization reform on urban and regional development: towards a pattern of spatial disparity. Space and Polity 7(3): 247-271

    Firman, Tommy. (2002). Urban development in Indonesia, 1990-2001: from the boom to the early reform era through the crisis. Habitat International 26: 229-249

    Firman, Tommy. (1999). From “global city” to “city of crisis”: Jakarta Metropolitan Region under economic turmoil. Habitat International 23(4): 447-466

    Firman, Tommy. (1998). The restructuring of Jakarta metropolitan area: A “global city” in Asia. Cities 16(2): 69-82

    Goldblum, Charles, and Wong, Tai-Chee. (2000). Growth, crisis and spatial change: A study of haphazard urbanization in Jakarta, Indonesia. Land Use Policy 17: 29-37.

    Hadiz, V.R. (2004). Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist Perspective. Development and Change 35(4): 697-718.

    Hudalah, Delik and Johan Woltjer. (2007). Spatial planning system in transitional Indonesia. International Planning Studies 12(3): 291-303

    Joga, Nirwono and Yori Antar. (2007). Komedi lenong: Satire ruang terbuka hijau. Jakarta: Gramedia.

    Khalid, Khalisah. (2009). The green space area’s policy and eviction urban poor in Jakarta: Case study of the eviction Clean Humane Prestigious Park (BMW).

    Koresawa, Atsushi and Josef Konvitz. (2001). In Towards a new role of spatial planning. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Paris: OECD Publishing.

    Laurian, Lucie and Mary Margaret Shaw. (2009). Evaluation of public participation: The practices of certified planners. Journal of Planning Education and Research 28(3): 293-309

    Leaf, Michael. (1994). The suburbanization of Jakarta: A concurrence of economics and ideology. Third World Planning Review 16(4): 341-356.

    Larsson, Gerhard. (2006). Spatial planning systems in Western Europe. Washington, DC: IOS Press

    McLeod, R. (1999). Postscript to the survey of recent development: on causes and cures for the rupiah crisis. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 33(3): 35-52

    Nasution, A. (1993). Reforms of the financial sector in Indonesia. Indonesia Quarterly 12: 284-310

    Nomura, Ko. (2007). Democratisation and environmental non-governmental organizations in Indonesia. Journal of Contemporary Asia 37(4): 495-517

    Nyman, Mikaela. (2006). Democratising Indonesia: The challenges of civil society in the era of reformasi. Copenhagen: Nias Press

    Rukmana, Deden, (2015). The change and transformation in Indonesia spatial planning after Suharto's New Order Regime: The case of the Jakarta Metropolitan Area. International Planning Studies 20(4): 350-370
    Rukmana, Deden. (2009). A city without social justice: Jakarta needs more green spaces, but not at the expense of the poor. Inside Indonesia. http://www.insideindonesia.org/edition-98/a-city-without-social-justice

    Rukmana, Deden. (2008). Decreasing green areas in Jakarta. The Jakarta Post. March 17, 2008.

    Silver, Christopher. (2007). Planning the megacity: Jakarta in the twentieth century. London and New York: Routledge.

    Silver, Christopher (2005). Do the donors have it right? Decentralization and changing local governance in Indonesia in Globalization and Urban Development. Richardson, H. and Bae, C.C. (Eds.). Berlin Heidelberg: Springer.

    Steinberg, Florian. (2007). Jakarta: Environmental problem and sustainability. Habitat International 31(3-4): 354-365

    Tempo Interaktif, 19 July 2010
    Wijayanti, Laksmi. (1998). Environmental planning in Indonesia: The linkage between spatial planning and environmental impact assessment. Thesis. Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

    Winarso, Haryo and Tommy Firman. (2002). Residential land development in Jabotabek, Indonesia: triggering economic crisis? Habitat International 26: 487-506
    Yeh, Anthony Gar-on and Fulong Wu. (1999). The transformation of the urban planning system in China from a centrally-planned to transitional economy. Progress in Planning 51(3): 167-252




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    I was one of the keynote speakers of the 2016 International Conference on Science, Infrastructure Technology and Regional Development (ICoSITeR) hosted by the Sumatera Institute of Technology on September 28-29, 2016 in Bandar Lampung, Indonesia. The conference organizer asked me to submit my paper for the inclusion in the conference proceeding.
    Below is my paper submitted to the conference organizer for the inclusion in the 2016 ICoSITeR proceeding. The paper was submitted on May 9, 2017. 
    Introduction
    Jakarta is the capital of Indonesia and the largest metropolitan area in Southeast Asia with tremendous population growth, land use change and new town and industrial estate development. The overall population of the Jakarta region grew in the 20th Century, from about 150,000 in 1900 to about 30 million in 2014. This paper discusses urbanization and suburbanization in the megacity of Jakarta and analyzes the extent to which rapid urbanization in Jakarta has contributed to the need for sustainable transportation policies in Jakarta. The development and expansion of Mass Rapid Transit are documented and the use of private vehicles and the development of elevated toll roads and bike lanes also critically analyzed.


    Population Growth of the Metropolitan Region of Jakarta
    Jakarta has been the capital of Indonesia since the Dutch colonial era. The population of Jakarta in 1900 was about 115,000. In the first nationwide census of the Dutch colonial administration (1930), Jakarta’s population increased to 409,475. In the next ten years, the population increased to 544,823 with an annual growth rate of 3.30%. After Independence, Jakarta increased by nearly three times to 1.43 million by 1950. It increased to 2.91 million in 1960 and 4.47 million in 1970. The annual growth rates of Jakarta’s population are 10.35% and 5.36% (1950-1960 and 1960-1970 respectively). 
                  Table 1 shows the population of the metropolitan region of Jakarta including Jakarta, the inner and outer peripheries of Jakarta, from 1980 to 2010. The Megacity of Jakarta increased from 11.91 million in 1980, 17.14 million in 1990, and 20.63 million in 2000 to 28.01 million in 2010. The megacity in 2010 was 11.79 percent of Indonesia’s total population but this population resides in less than 0.3 percent of Indonesia’s total area. The proportions of Jabodetabek’s population to the total population of Indonesia have steadily increased from 8.07%, 9.56%, to 10.0% (in 1980, 1990, and 2000 respectively).  
        

    Table 1. Population of the Metropolitan Region of Jakarta in 1980-2010 (in millions)


    Area

    1980

    1990

    2000

    2010

    Core

    6.50

    8.26

    8.39

    9.60

       Jakarta

    6.50

    8.26

    8.39

    9.60

    Inner peripheries

    n.a

    n.a

    4.93

    7.22

       City of Tangerang

    n.a

    n.a

    1.33

    1.80

       City of South Tangerang

    n.a

    n.a

    0.80

    1.29

       City of Depok

    n.a

    n.a

    1.14

    1.75

       City of Bekasi

    n.a

    n.a

    1.66

    2.38

    Outer peripheries

    5.41

    8.88

    7.31

    11.20

       City of Bogor

    0.25

    0.27

    0.75

    0.95

       Tangerang Regency

    1.53

    2.77

    2.02

    2.84

       Bekasi Regency

    1.14

    2.10

    1.62

    2.63

       Bogor Regency

    2.49

    3.74

    2.92

    4.78

    Megacity of Jakarta

    11.91

    17.14

    20.63

    28.02

                                    Sources: Rukmana (2014) 


    Transformation of Jakarta

    The modern city of Jakarta was initiated by President Soekarno’s strong vision to build Jakarta into the greatest city possible (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). He gave Jakarta, Monas – his most symbolic new structure the 132 m high national monument, spacious new government buildings, department stores, shopping plazas, hotels, the sport facilities of Senayan that were used for the 1962 Asian Games, the biggest and most glorious mosque of Istiqlal, new parliament buildings and the waterfront recreation area at Ancol.

    Such constructions continued under the New Order regime that began in 1967. Under this regime, Indonesia enjoyed steady economic growth, along with a reduction in the percentage of the population living under the poverty line. Jakarta grew rapidly during this period of the New Order regime. During the thirty-two years of the New Order regime, Jakarta changed considerably. A generally rapid economic growth during this period allowed Jakarta to expand its modern constructions and develop into a modern city. Hundreds of new office towers, hotels and high-rise condominiums were built in many parts of the city.

    The massive development on the outskirts of the megacity of Jakarta resulted from a series of deregulation and de-bureaucratization measures enacted by the Suharto government in the 1980s (Winarso and Firman 2002, p. 488). The subsidized housing finance program and municipal permit system for land development also contributed to policies that have most benefited some developers strongly linked to the New Order regime (Leaf, 1994). Winarso and Firman (2002) revealed almost all large developers were well connected to the President Suharto’s family and inner circle including his daughters, sons, brother, in-laws and close friends. The connection to the Suharto family and inner circle became significant; closeness to the first family helped the large developers expand their business. Interlinking also occurred among the large developers through cross-shareholding, shared directorships and joint ventures; procees which turned potential competitors into collaborators and created oligopolistic types of land and housing markets.

    Continuing with the suburbanization; this was also caused by the development of three highways stretching from Jakarta to the peripheries - the Jagorawi toll road, the Jakarta-Cikampek toll road, and the Jakarta-Merak toll road (Henderson and Kuncoro 1996). The development of private industrial parks in the peripheries naturally followed the development of these highways (Hudalah et al 2013).  Private industrial parks in the peripheries range from 50 to 1,800 hectares and on average the size is about 500 hectares (Hudalah et al 2013); major industrial centers are located in Cikupa-Balaraja of Tangerang Regency and Cikarang of Bekasi Regency. The industrial center of Cikarang with a total industrial land area of nearly 6,000 hectares is the largest planned industrial center in Southeast Asia (Hudalah and Firman 2012).


    Jakarta’s Transportation Problems

    The urbanization and suburbanization in Jakarta are strongly associated with the traffic congestion in Jakarta. Jakarta is estimated to lose US$3 billion a year because of traffic congestion which can’t be separated from the high growth rate of vehicle ownership (9 to 11 percent per year), unsupported by road development (less than 1 percent a year).

    Motorcycles are ubiquitous and can be acquired with a down payment of as little as $30. The number of registered motorcycles in Jakarta grew exponentially from 2000 to 2010 as seen in Figure 1. The trend of the motorcycles growth will continue until a more sustainable transportation policy is implemented.

    People who live in the outskirts of Jakarta can save as much as 30% of their transportation costs using motorcycles to work rather than public transport. The daily jams in Jakarta are getting worse; the peripheries are a “bedroom suburb” for the daily commuters of Jakarta, the center of government and corporate offices, commercial and entertainment enterprises. The economy of Jakarta dominates its peripheral areas. In the daytime, the total population in Jakarta is much more than its population in the nighttime; the number of daily commuters in Jakarta is estimated 5.4 million.




    The economy of Jakarta dominates its peripheral areas. In the daytime, the total population in Jakarta is much more than its population in the nighttime; the number of daily commuters in Jakarta is estimated 5.4 million. The level of services of public transportation in Jakarta is not reliable and accessible. People who live in the outskirts of Jakarta can save as much as 30% of their transportation costs using motorcycles to work rather than public transport.
    Commuters from the peripheries primarily used three highways including the Jagorawi toll road connecting Jakarta and the southern peripheries, the Jakarta-Cikampek toll road connecting Jakarta and the eastern peripheries and the Jakarta-Merak toll road connecting Jakarta and the western peripheries. Most commuters go to Jakarta to work in government and corporate offices, study in universities, receive high quality medical attention in the hospitals, and/or go for entertainment and cultural activities.  The current public transportation systems have not been able to alleviate the acute traffic congestion; it is likely that Jakarta needs a Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) or also popularly known as Metro, in order to address this problem. Jakarta is the largest city in the world without a ‘metro’.

    Most metropolitan areas in the world with the population of over 10 million have operated metros for years. New York City opened the first underground line of its subway in 1904 and since then the subway has been the backbone of New York City transportation system. Two major cities in Japan, Tokyo and Osaka built their metros in 1927 and 1933 respectively. The Tokyo Metro is the world’s most extensive rapid transit system with more than eight million passengers daily. The second largest city in the world, Mexico City, has had a metro since 1969 and now the Mexico City Metro is the second largest metro system in North America after the New York City subway. Two major cities in China, Beijing and Shanghai opened their metro systems in 1971 and 1995 respectively. Major cities in Southeast Asia with smaller populations than Jakarta have also had their metro systems for years, including Manila (1984), Singapore (1987), Kuala Lumpur (1995) and Bangkok (2004).


    The Need for Sustainable Transportation Policies in Jakarta

    Rapid urbanization in Jakarta has contributed to the need for sustainable transportation policies in Jakarta. The growth of registered vehicles in response to the growth of population in Jakarta and its peripheral areas has caused acute traffic congestions in Jakarta. This section will offer several ideas of sustainable transportation policy including reducing private vehicle uses, promoting bike lanes, and the development of MRT.



    Reducing private vehicle uses

    There are several possible solutions to eradicate traffic congestion problems and one of them is the reduction of private vehicle uses. The New York Times reported a suburb town without cars in Germany. Streets in this upscale town are completely car-free except the main thoroughfare and a few streets on edge of the town. The residents of this town are still allowed to own cars, but parking is relegated to two large garages at the edge of the development.

    The Vauban town, is located on the outskirt of Freiburg, near the French and Swiss borders and home to 5,500 residents. The residents are heavily dependent on the tram to downtown Freiburg and many of them take to car-sharing when longer excursions are needed. Seventy percent of Vauban's families have no cars. They do a lot of walking and biking to shops, banks, restaurants, schools and other destinations that are interspersed among homes. The town is long and relatively narrow and provides an easy walking access to the tram for every home.

    Creating places with more compact design, more accessible to public transportation and less driving is the envision of urban planners in the 21st century. The Vauban town is an exemplar of the 21st century urban design in response to the threats of greenhouse gas emission and global warming and the dwindling oil supply. The Vauban's urban design is the extension of the New Urbanism. The New Urbanism is a school of urban design arose in the U.S. in the early 1980s. This school of urban design promotes several key principles including walkability and connectivity, mixed land uses, and high density. There have been many the New Urbanist towns in several countries, but cars still fill the streets of these towns.

    The Vauban town provides an example of the possibility of creating city without cars. The walkable and mixed-land-uses urban design, easy access to public transportation and excellent public transportation system as demonstrated in the Vauban town are the components for creating city without cars.

    Cars are still a luxury item for many Indonesian families. Many urban residents, particularly those live in kampung kota, do not own cars and are used to living without cars. Streets (gang) in Indonesia's kampung kota are too narrow for cars and the residents are used to walking and biking to their destinations. Kampung kotas are located in the center of urban areas and relatively accessible to public transportations. In reference to the New Urbanism concept, the Indonesia's kampung kota has implemented the principles of walkability and high density.

    Indonesian planners need to appreciate the existence of kampung kota in terms of lacking driving needs. Kampung kota residents will be less likely to have a demand for cars when their neighborhoods are accessible to public transportations and the streets in their neighborhoods remain narrow. Kampung kota residents need to remain lack of driving needs for reducing the car ownership rate in urban areas including Jakarta. For new developments in suburb areas, Indonesian planners can emulate the success of the Vauban town. Driving needs are profoundly affected by the urban design and the high access to public transportation. It makes sense to envision and is not all impossible to create a city without cars.


    Promoting Bike Lanes

    Many metropolitans in the world have developed dedicated bicycles lanes for years. Cities in developed countries, particularly in Europe, have integrated bicycle lanes into their transportation network systems. Those cities such as Amsterdam, Paris, Berlin, Copenhagen and Barcelona have been developed as bike-friendly cities. Safe and extensive bike route networks, promotion of pro-cyclist policies, and a bike culture have taken places in those cities. Cyclists in those cities are not second class residents and can safely ride their bicycles as the main mode for their daily commute to their workplaces. Copenhagen is an example of European bike-friendly city where about a third of workforce in this city commute to the office by bike.
                 The first Jakarta’s dedicated bike lane stretching from Ayodia Park to Blok M was inaugurated in May 2011. It should be considered as a breakthrough in solutions for acute traffic congestion in Jakarta. The development of dedicated bicycle lanes is a good move from the Jakarta administration for promoting the use of bicycle as an alternative transportation mode. If the Jakarta city administration could encourage more motorists to shift to using bicycle to work, the city’s chronic traffic woes could be eventually reduced.
    The first dedicated bike lane in Jakarta is only a small step in developing Jakarta as a bike-friendly city. There are many challenges for Jakarta to be a bike-friendly city. The Jakarta city administration needs to have a strong commitment to build more dedicated bike lanes and integrate them with the city transportation network system. Dedicated bike lanes should be part of the city transportation network system and designed to accommodate the need of residents’ mobility in the city. It is very essential to connect dedicated bike lanes with mass transportations including the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT).

    It’s not easy to build more dedicated bike lanes if the Jakarta city administration still focuses on building more elevated inner-city toll roads as the solution of addressing the chronic traffic woes in Jakarta. It is also important to note that the first dedicated bike lane was not initiated by the Jakarta city administration but the Indonesian Bicycle Community (Komite Sepeda Indonesia) that donated as much as 500 million rupiahs to build the bike lane. The Jakarta city administration needs to change the mindset of the possible solution for the chronic traffic congestion in the city. The solution is not building more roads, but reducing the use of cars through improving and expanding the use of mass transportations and bicycles.

    Another big challenge for bike lanes in Jakarta is the lack of law enforcement. The Jakarta city administration should strictly enforce the dedicated bike lanes for cyclists. The dedicated bike lane cannot be used as parking spots and a lane for motorcyclists. A few days after the inauguration of the bike lane stretching from Ayodia Park to Blok M, the lane was overwhelmed by private cars, pubic minivans and three-wheeled vehicles bajaj. A number of private cars were also parking in the lane (The Jakarta Post, 27 May 2011). Without strict law enforcement, the dedicated bike lane will not be an effective way to reduce the Jakarta’s traffic woes and will only be a failed initiative.

    Despite the challenges for bike lanes in Jakarta, the inauguration of the Jakarta’s first bike lane should be seen as a promising way of alleviating the acute traffic problems in Jakarta. I hope that the inauguration of the Jakarta’s first bike lane could be the milestone for the Jakarta city administration in changing the mindset of how to address the chronic traffic problems in Jakarta. It is not building more toll roads but reducing the use of cars through encouraging more motorists to shift to cyclists or mass transportation riders.


    Discouraging Elevated Roads

    The development of new roads will never catch up to the growth rate of vehicle ownership. A new highway or a widened road only alleviates traffic congestion for a short period of time. After a few years, any new or widened highway fills with traffic that would not have existed if the highway had not been built, a phenomenon called induced demand. Because of induced demand, neither building new roads nor widening existing roads are viable long-term solutions to traffic congestion.



    The new roads will also undermine the efforts to develop a mass transportation system in Jakarta. The main idea of developing a mass transportation system, including the TransJakarta busway and the monorail and Mass Rapid Transit projects, is to reduce the number of motorists and motorcyclists on Jakarta’s streets. Drivers would be expected to use the mass transportation and reduce traffic, but new roads would only attract more motorists.

    Not only would elevated roads stimulate induced demand and thus worsen traffic congestion, they could also jeopardize the livability of neighborhoods along them. In many cities in other countries, such as Seoul, New Orleans, San Francisco and New York City, elevated freeways have negatively affected livability. At the same time, in many developed countries, we have seen a shift in urban planning from enhancing mobility toward promoting livability.

    The Cheonggyecheon freeway was completed in 1977 and was seen a as a symbol of modernization and industrialization in South Korea after the war with the North. This elevated freeway was built above a 5.8-kilometer stream flowing through downtown Seoul. By 2000, the area was considered the most crowded and noisy part of the city and became an eyesore for residents.

    In July 2003, the then-mayor of Seoul and the current president of South Korea, Lee Myung-bak, launched a project to tear down the Cheonggyecheon freeway and revitalize the surrounding area. During the demolition process, the city administration developed public transportation systems, including Bus Rapid Transit lines. Today, the Cheonggyecheon area has been revitalized and is one of Seoul’s main tourist areas.

    In 1973, New York City’s West Side elevated highway collapsed and was never repaired but replaced by a surface boulevard of West Avenue. Similarly, two elevated freeways in San Francisco, Embarcadero and Central Freeways, were badly damaged by the Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989. The San Francisco city administration decided not to rebuild the elevated freeways, but replaced them with surface boulevards. The conversion of elevated freeways in both New York City and San Francisco did not cause traffic havocs. The traffic switched to the boulevards, nearby street or mass transit (James and Norquist 2010). Furthermore, a team of researchers from the UC Berkeley (Cervero, Kang, and Shively 2009) found that the conversion of elevated Embarcadero and Central Freeways with boulevard has stimulated reinvestment in the neighborhoods along the freeways without seriously sacrificing transportation performance. More recently, the residents of New Orleans have decided not to rebuild the damaged elevated expressway caused by the Hurricane Katrina, but replace it with an oak-lined boulevard (James and Norquist 2010).

    The conversion of elevated freeways to surface boulevards in Seoul, New York City, San Francisco or New Orleans is evidence of a paradigm shift from a focus on expediting the movement of automobile to a focus on increasing the livability of neighborhoods. The livability of neighborhoods should be prioritized over the increase of mobility. Jakarta needs to learn from what has happened in Seoul, New Orleans, San Francisco or New York City regarding the elevated freeways. Not only is the proposed six elevated toll road projects the solution for the traffic congestion in Jakarta, but also they could cause the decline of livability of neighborhoods along the elevated toll roads. The Jakarta city administration should revisit their decision to build the new elevated toll roads and instead they should focus their efforts on building mass transportation systems in alleviating transportation problems in Jakarta.



    The Development of Mass Rapid Transit

    In order to address traffic congestion, two flagship projects are underway including the development of Cilamaya Seaport and the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) project. The Cilamaya Seaport is located outside of the Jabodetabek, but is connected with the Jakarta-Cikampek toll road. This planned seaport is located in Karawang Regency.  All shipping activities of industrial parks in the megacity are currently using the Tanjung Priok port in Jakarta. The Cilamaya Seaport is designed to mitigate further traffic congestion caused by heavy traffic flowing from the eastern parts of the megacity to the Tanjung Priok port. This will be a new transportation hub for the megacity’s industrial parks. The MRT project would become the most expensive public projects in Jakarta’s history, but it is the answer to address acute traffic congestions in Jakarta.



    For at least 20 years, the proposed MRT has been under discussion by the Jakarta administration and the government of Indonesia. Activists and non-governmental watchdogs have seen the MRT proposal as a possible bonanza for corrupt politicians and contractors (Economist, 4 February 2010). Eventually, the government secured a $1.6 billion loan agreement with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 2009 for funding. Vice President Boediono also asked the JICA to expedite the design and construction of MRT project; the first tract of the MRT project was to be completed in 2016 (The Jakarta Post, 20 October 2010). The construction of the MRT project began on October 10, 2013. Governor Joko Widodo launched the flagship project in a groundbreaking ceremony at Dukuh Atas, Central Jakarta (The Jakarta Globe, October 11, 2013).

    One MRT train will consist of six cars and be able to transport a maximum of 1,200 passengers per trip. The MRT Jakarta will operate 16 trains and transport 1.5 million passengers a day. The first MRT tract will connect Lebak Bulus, South Jakarta and the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle with six underground stations, seven elevated stations and a capacity of 173,000 passengers per day.


    Conclusion

    The growth of registered vehicles in response to the rapid urbanization has caused acute traffic congestions in Jakarta. The Jakarta administration needs to find sustainable transportation policies to address the transportation problems in Jakarta. The development of MRT could be viable solutions to alleviate the acute traffic jams in Jakarta. The main idea behind developing a mass transportation system, including the TransJakarta busway and the monorail and Mass Rapid Transit projects, is to reduce the number of motorists and motorcyclists on Jakarta’s streets. Drivers would be expected to use the mass transportation and reduce traffic, whereas new roads only attract more motorists. Jakarta needs to discourage the development of elevated roads that will stimulate induced demand and thus worsen traffic congestion. Elevated roads will jeopardize the livability of neighborhoods along them.

    In addition, Jakarta will need to promote bike lanes and reduce the use of private vehicle. Jakarta needs to encourage the development and usage of the smartphone apps on its two-way ability to locate, coordinate and orchestrate both passengers and vehicles and encourage more biking and walking for its residents. Jakarta will also need to implement other innovative sustainable transportation policies including carpool matching services, shuttle services, telecommuting and downzoning and better parking management in downtown areas.


    References:

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    Cowherd, Robert. (2005). Does planning culture matter? Dutch and American models in Indonesian urban transformations. In Comparative Planning Culture. Bishwapriya Sanyal (Ed.). New York and London: Routledge

    Cybriwsky, Roman and Ford, Larry R. (2001). City profile: Jakarta. Cities 18(3): 199-210.

    Economist, 4 February 2010

    Ernst, J. (2005). Initiating bus rapid transit in Jakarta, Indonesia. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, (1903), 20-26.

    Firman, Tommy and Ida Ayu Indira Dharmapatni. (1994). The challenges to sustainable development in Jakarta Metropolitan Region. Habitat International 18(3): 79-94

    Firman, Tommy. (1997). Land conversion and urban development in the Northern Region of West Java, Indonesia. Urban Studies 34(7): 1027-1046

    Firman, Tommy. (1998). The restructuring of Jakarta Metropolitan Area: A “global city” in Asia. Cities 15(4): 229-243.

    Firman, Tommy. (1999). From “global city” to “city of crisis”: Jakarta Metropolitan Region under economic turmoil. Habitat International 23(4): 447-466.

    Firman, Tommy. (2002). Urban development in Indonesia, 1990-2001: from the boom to the early reform era through the crisis. Habitat International 26: 229-249

    Firman, Tommy. (2003). Potential impacts of Indonesia’s fiscal decentralization reform on urban and regional development: towards a pattern of spatial disparity. Space and Polity 7(3): 247-271

    Firman, Tommy. (2004). New town development in Jakarta Metropolitan Region: A perspective of spatial segregation. Habitat International 28(3): 349-368.

    Firman, Tommy. (2008). In search of a governance institution model for Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) under Indonesia’s new decentralization policy: Old problem, new challenges. Public Administration and Development 28: 1-11

    Hadiz, V.R. (2004). Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist Perspective. Development and Change 35(4): 697-718.

    Henderson, Vernon. (2003). The urbanization process and economic growth: The so-what question. Journal of Economic Growth 8:47-71

    Hudalah, Delik and Johan Woltjer. (2007). Spatial planning system in transitional Indonesia. International Planning Studies 12(3): 291-303

    Hudalah, Delik and Tommy Firman. (2011). Beyond property: Industrial estates and post-suburban transformation in Jakarta Metropolitan Region. Cities 29: 40-48

    Hudalah, Delik, Dimitra Viantari, Tommy Firman, and Johan Woltjer. (2013). Industrial land development and manufacturing deconcentration in Greater Jakarta. Urban Geography 1-22.

    James, C. and Norquist, J. (2010). Tearing down an expressway to restore a community. http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2010/08/tearing_down_an_expressway_to.html

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    Rukmana, Deden. (2014). Peripheral Pressures: Jakarta. Archeology of the Periphery of Megacities. Roger Connah (Ed.). Moscow: Strelka Press. Pp. 158-167

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    Steinberg, Florian. (2007). Jakarta: Environmental problem and sustainability. Habitat International 31(3-4): 354-365

    The Jakarta Globe, October 11, 2013

    The Jakarta Post, 20 October 2010

    The Jakarta Post, 27 May 2011

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    On August 20, 2014, I received an email from the book review editor of Journal of Planning Education & Research (JPER) who invited me to review a new book titled Jakarta: Drawing the City Near by AbdouMaliq Simone. It's my pleasure to accept the invitation. I received the book from the JPER and started reading it. After some delays, I finally completed and submitted the review of the book to the book review editor in May 2017. 



    This book review is my fourth book review for academic journals and my third book review on Indonesian cities. My previous book reviews are as follows:
    • Rukmana, Deden. (2016). Urban Sustainability: A Global Perspective by Igov Vojnovic. Journal of Planning Education and Research 36(1): 132-134
    • Rukmana, Deden. (2011). The Appearances of Memory: Mnemonic Practices of Architecture and Urban Form in Indonesia by Abidin Kusno. Pacific Affairs 84(2): 399-401
    • Rukmana, Deden. (2008). Planning the Megacity: Jakarta in the Twentieth Century by Christopher Silver. Journal of the American Planning Association 74(2): 263-264.
    My review of Jakarta: Drawing the City Near  has been published by the JPER and available online on August 24, 2017 at this linkI am pleased to share my review of this book in this blog as you can find below.


    In the first half of the twentieth century, Batavia, the colonial capital of the Dutch East Indies, was a small urban area of approximately 150,000 residents. In the second half of the twentieth century, Batavia became Jakarta, the capital of independent Indonesia. Jakarta is now a megacity of twenty-eight million residents and is the largest and one of the most dynamic metropolitan areas in Southeast Asia. It is also beset with most of the urban problems experienced throughout the region.


    Jakarta: Drawing the City Near offers new perspectives and critical analyses of the urbanization process in Jakarta. Abdoumaliq Simone’s main thesis is how urban residents live with uncertainty and have emerged as active players in the urbanization process. Based on a multiyear ethnographic study in three central city districts of Jakarta, Simone sheds light on how the city affects its residents. He argues that Jakarta has many modes of existence but does not exist unless its residents are able to see and feel it.


    This book explores the ambiguity of Jakarta’s physical and social landscape and the way of life of its residents, focusing on Jakarta’s urban common. Simone’s main thesis posits that cities, including Jakarta, are filled with ironies and deceptions, but that residents seem to find ways to make things work.


    This book continues and complements other excellent studies on Jakarta’s contemporary development issues, particularly Kusno (2010) and Silver (2007). It is a pleasure to read, intellectually stimulating, and logically organized. A variety of figures also supplement the narrative in the book. The book is organized into five chapters that cover four unique concepts that illuminate Jakarta’s urbanization trajectory (near-South, Urban Majority, Devising Relations, and Endurance) and one innovative policy. In the introduction, Simone revisits previous studies of Jakarta on various aspects, including land use planning, living conditions, economic and political events, and religions. Then, he introduces the four concepts that shed light on how Jakarta’s urbanization trajectory has affected its residents, including living conditions and everyday struggles.


    Chapter 1 introduces the “near-South,” offering a new perspective of major metropolitan areas of the Global South that is neither the developed North nor the underdeveloped South. Simone focuses on nearness rather than on the distinction between the North and the South. The near-South does not only simply mean the proximity of these cities to the underdeveloped South, but also the proximity to the conditions of cities elsewhere. His emphasis is on “the way cities feel, their impact on all of the senses, as well as an intuitive knowledge” (26).


    In chapter 2, Simone discusses the concept of urban majority in more detail and defines the urban majority as urban residents who are neither strictly poor nor middle class. They live within a highly differentiated “in-between” who make up the majority of urban residents. He argues that in some cities in the Global South, including Jakarta, the urban majority is an actual majority. The urban majority include nurses, shopkeepers, transportation workers, teachers, and police officers. They live in central cities and suburban diverse districts characterized by economic activities. The notion of incrementalism is also important for the urban majority. They are able to transform urban spaces through incremental activities.


    In chapter 3, Simone discusses the concept of devising relations and explores the relationships between residents and “non-living things” in Jakarta. He argues that the close proximity and intensities of residents and “non-living things” does not necessarily guarantee relations. He applies different metaphors such as “the lure,” “the hinge,” “captivation,” and “hodgepodge landscape” to illustrate the dynamic relations between residents and urban spaces in Jakarta and examines how Jakarta follows the trajectory of Global urbanization.


    Chapter 4 offers the concept of endurance that draws on the dynamic processes of the urban majority that lives in Jakarta’s urban spaces and deals with uncertainties, including unexpected dangers and opportunities. This concept explores the continuation of efforts by residents to discover and reach each other. Communities and institutions endure to constantly link distinct entities into a common purpose and also point to the breaks and frictions for working together. Simone posits that endurance is “the willingness to suspend something familiar in order to engage something unexpected” (213–14).


    In chapter 5, Simone concludes with innovative policies and ways to shape the future of urban development. He discusses the need for maximizing the use value of urban space, the privatization and industrialization of development devices such as land, water, or energy, and the concretization of development rights, that is, maintaining substantial areas of green space and creating a denser urban area through systematic in-fills of new housing. He suggests increasing integration and involvement of residents’ views and aspirations to run the city and make the city work. Communities and institutions should be visible and intelligible during the policy-making process.


    In sum, Simone offers an intriguing analysis of the trajectory of urbanization and everyday struggles of the residents in Jakarta from his rich ethnographic stories. His deep knowledge of other parts of the Global South, particularly African cities, makes his analysis more stimulating and well conceived. He compares and contrasts Jakarta with other cities of the Global South in a variety of aspects of urban development. Such analysis is unique and will contribute significantly to the literature of urban studies and development, not only in the Indonesian context but in the Global South. In this book, Simone also uses such terms as “near-South” (23), “pluri-district” (72, i.e., the residential areas that function as complex machines to produce economic opportunities), the urban majority (83), and “endurance” (209), which could apply to cities in other parts of the Global South.


    I found many compelling discussions in the book, particularly those on Jakarta’s contemporary development, including the development of new towns, megaprojects, mass-produced housing projects for lower middle income people, and traditional markets, and on Jakarta’s social issues including tawuran (violence) and preman (thug).


    Despite its many virtues, the book does not discuss the most acute problem in Jakarta, that is, traffic congestion, which affects everyday struggles of Jakarta’s residents and which is estimated to cost US$3 billion per year, caused by the high growth rate of car and motorcycle ownership (9 to 11 percent per year), facilitated by the ease of ownership. For example, in order to take out a loan for a motorcycle, a popular and affordable mode of transport to commute from the suburbs to the city center, the borrower only needs a down payment of $30, resulting in severe congestion.


    A somewhat minor issue is that the author uses the abbreviated term dekel (democratically elected districtwide village committee). Instead, he should have used the term Dewan Kelurahan.The committee was established in October 2000 by Jakarta’s provincial law 5/2000 but was replaced in November 2010 by law 5/2010. The new term of democratically elected districtwide village committee in Jakarta according to Jakarta’s provincial law 5/2010 is Lembaga Musyawarah Kelurahan (LMK).



    Nevertheless, this book is carefully researched and provides detailed descriptions and analyses of living in contemporary Jakarta. The author enriches the discussions with a literature review of relevant topics, which give a good theoretical background, in most parts of the book. Anyone with a scholarly interest in the urbanization process of cities in the Global South should read this book which may be a very useful reference for urban researchers who focus on the Global South.



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    The number of urban population in Indonesia increased significantly from 101.3 million in 2000 to 137.6 million in 2015. This rapid urbanization has caused many problems including the lack of housing for the urban poor. Most poor residents of Indonesian major cities particularly Jakarta live in informal housing settlements. They live in self-built inappropriate houses and squatting in slums and squatter settlements. They are marginalized urban residents that push their way to occupy state land such as disposal sites, riverbanks, and railway tracks and private unoccupied land and illegally construct their dwellings. 


    Kampung Deret in Petogogan, South Jakarta
    Housing provision for the urban poor in informal housing settlements is also one of many agendas for Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan. During his campaign, Anies said he would not evict the residents in informal housing settlements and would instead build vertical and layered housing (rumah lapis) for them on their land. The idea of rumah lapis is not a new idea in the literature of upgrading housing settlement for the urban poor. To some extent, I would argue that the Rumah Lapis program is a replication of the Kampung Deret program that was initiated by then Jakarta Governor Joko Widodo in October 2013.

    The Kampung Deret program replaced substandard, unsafe and unhealthy housing units in the Jakarta’s informal housing settlements with permanent housing units. The program gained considerable support from among the poor in Jakarta’s informal housing settlements. The program built nearly 4,500 permanent housing units for the urban poor in Jakarta in less than a year. Despite the support from the Jakarta’s urban poor, the Jakarta city administration discontinued the Kampung Deret program at the end of 2014, citing the lack of financial support from the Jakarta city council and the legal issue of the lands occupied by the urban poor.  

    The idea of rumah lapis and kampung deret is rooted from John Turner’s seminal book Housing by People: Towards Autonomy in Building Environments. Turner (1977) arguedthat housing was not only a commodity but also a process or activity and the establishment of desirable housing standards was absurd. Slum clearance programs only moved substandard houses to new places particularly the urban periphery

    There was no need to demolish slums because they were part of the solution. John Turner’s idea of “self-help” was used to implement the strategy of upgrading for improving and consolidating the existing homes of slum dwellers. He identified that perceived security of tenure would result in the progressive upgrading of slums through individual and community self-help. In situ upgrading represents an incremental improvement to the delivery of housing (Mistro and Hensher 2009). In situ upgrading aims to minimize the number of slum dwellers that are relocated to another site and it will reduce the extent of disruption to social and economic networks of slum dwellers.


    Kampung Deret in Petogogan, South Jakarta in July 2015

                    One of the primary requirements of the Kampung Deret program was the legality of land tenure. Dwellers of Jakarta’s kampungs needed to show the evidence of formal or semi-formal land tenure to be eligible for the Kampung Deret program. The Jakarta city administration would grant land titles to the Jakarta’s kampungs dwellers with informal land tenure if they had settled on the same portion of the land for more than 20 years. The Kampung Deret program assisted Jakarta’s kampung dwellers to obtain land titles and housing certificates. The Kampung Deret program received significant support from Jakarta’s kampung residents because the program offered them land titles.

    The Jakarta city administration was able to give the kampung dwellers legal title to the lands they occupy in the first few cases of Kampung Deret program but they failed to sustain the effort due to the complicated process of land titling. The Kampung Deret program was finally discontinued because the Jakarta city administration was not able to identify kampung dwellers who occupy the land with legal land title.

    The Jakarta city administration identified the location of the Kampung Deret program that set out to be a residential area by the Jakarta’s Spatial Plan 2030. The Jakarta’s Housing and Building Office identified at least 392 kampungs that could be considered slums but many of them were not qualified for the Kampung Deret program such as residents of Bukit Duri because their area was zoned as green areas by the Jakarta’s Spatial Plan 2030.

    The planning process of the Kampung Deret program started with the collaboration between the neighborhood leaders and the city officials. The neighborhood leaders and the city officials identified the residents of the selected neighborhoods who meet the requirements of the Program. The priority was given to the residents who lived in detached semi-permanent houses on flood prone areas, unhealthy areas or very dense areas. The Jakarta city administration appointed the program consultants as the facilitator of the program. The program consultants were paid the Jakarta city administration.

    The consultants were assigned to assist the beneficiaries in every stage of the Kampung Deret program. They were also assigned to mediate the design and housing construction process and work closely with the program beneficiaries. The program beneficiaries were responsible to find and rent a temporary place while their housings are being upgraded or built. The housing construction or upgrading process was about three months. The housing construction in the Kampung Deret program was efficient because the program used the standardized and fabricated building materials or popularly known as Rumah Instan Sederhana Sehat (RISHA).

    Land tenure legalization is not a solution to the upgrading housing settlement for Jakarta’s kampung dwellers. It is not legal land title, but rather the perception of security of tenure that is most important for the sustainability of the Kampung Deret program. The security of land tenure can be given to Jakarta’s kampung dwellers by the tolerance and discretion of Jakarta’s spatial plan. The Jakarta’s spatial plan needs to integrate Jakarta’s kampungs into the formal and legal system. 

    The approach of menata tanpa menggusur (upgrading without displacement) is the key ingredient of the Kampung Deret program. In situ upgrading was appealing to Jakarta’s kampung dwellers. In situ upgrading in the Kampung Deret program reduced disruptions to social and economic networks of the urban poor.

    Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan should develop the idea of Rumah Lapis program from the Kampung Deret program. The strengths and weaknesses of the Kampung Deret program that was implemented from October 2013 until the end of 2014 should be fully examined by the Jakarta city administration in developing the Rumah Lapis program. Upgrading housing settlement in Jakarta’s informal housing settlements also needs a broader development strategy to combat poverty and inequality. In order to be effective, the Rumah Lapis program or other upgrading housing settlement program must be incorporated into a community development strategy that addresses employment, transportation, education, health services and access to formal financial institution. 


    (An edited version of this article appeared at The Jakarta Post on December 30, 2017)



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    This post is one of the chapters in the book titled "The Routledge Companion to the Suburbs" edited by Bernadette Hanlon and Thomas J. Vicino. The book was published by the Routledge in September 2018. You can find the book in the Routledge link here. The chapter on Jakarta was written by Fikri Zul Fahmi, Tommy Firman and myself. Tommy Firman is  professor of Regional Planning at the Bandung Institute of Technology and Fikri Zul Fahmi is assistant professor of Urban and Regional Planning at the Bandung Institute of Technology, Indonesia.





    Suburbanization in Asia: A focus in Jakarta

    By Deden Rukmana, Fikri Zul Fahmi and Tommy Firman


    Introduction

    Jakarta is the capital of Indonesia and the largest metropolitan area in Southeast Asia with tremendous population growth, land use change and new town and industrial estate development. The overall population of the Jakarta region grew in the 20th Century, from about 150,000 in 1900 to about 30 million in 2014. The metropolitan region of Jakarta is also called Jabodetabek, taken from the initial letters of the administrative units of Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi.  The center of Jabodetabek is Jakarta, also called the Special Capital Region of Jakarta (Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta) and covers a total area of 664 square kilometers. The inner peripheries of the metropolitan region of Jakarta include four municipalities (City of Tangerang, City of South Tangerang, City of Depok, City of Bekasi), whereas the outer peripheries of Jabodetabek include the City of Bogor, Tangerang Regency and Bekasi Regency. The metropolitan region of Jakarta covers a total area of 5,897 square kilometers (Hudalah and Firman 20011).

    Jakarta, or the Special Capital Region of Jakarta, has ‘provincial government level’ status. The peripheries of Jabodetabek are within the jurisdiction of two provinces.  The City of Bogor, City of Depok, City of Bekasi and Bekasi Regency are within the jurisdiction of West Java Province, whereas the City of Tangerang, City of South Tangerang and Tangerang Regency are within the jurisdiction of Banten Province. The four municipalities within the inner peripheries of Jabodetabek are new municipalities founded in the 1990s and 2000s. The City of Tangerang, City of Bekasi, City of Depok and City of South Tangerang were founded in 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2008 respectively. The City of Tangerang and City of South Tangerang seceded from Tangerang Regency. Meanwhile, the City of Depok was part of Bogor Regency and the City of Bekasi seceded from Bekasi Regency.

                This chapter will examine the extent to which the Jakarta region has transformed from a concentric and radial pattern urban structure to an early stage of post-suburbanization with an emerging fragmented structure of peripheral areas. The evolution of new towns and industrial estates in the peripheries of the Jakarta region will be discussed. The chapter will focus on the nature of suburban growth in the Jakarta region and the policies and plans to contain or influence patterns of the suburbanization. 


    Population Growth of the Metropolitan Region of Jakarta

    Jakarta has been the capital of Indonesia since the Dutch colonial era. The population of Jakarta in 1900 was about 115,000. In the first nationwide census of the Dutch colonial administration (1930), Jakarta’s population increased to 409,475. In the next ten years, the population increased to 544,823 with an annual growth rate of 3.30%. After Independence, Jakarta increased by nearly three times to 1.43 million by 1950. It increased to 2.91 million in 1960 and 4.47 million in 1970. The annual growth rates of Jakarta’s population are 10.35% and 5.36% (1950-1960 and 1960-1970 respectively).

                Table 1 shows the population of the metropolitan region of Jakarta including Jakarta, the inner and outer peripheries of Jakarta, from 1980 to 2010. The Megacity of Jakarta increased from 11.91 million in 1980, 17.14 million in 1990, and 20.63 million in 2000 to 28.01 million in 2010. The megacity in 2010 was 11.79 percent of Indonesia’s total population but this population resides in less than 0.3 percent of Indonesia’s total area. The proportions of Jabodetabek’s population to the total population of Indonesia have steadily increased from 8.07%, 9.56%, to 10.0% (in 1980, 1990, and 2000 respectively).   


    Table 1

    Population of the Metropolitan Region of Jakarta in 1980-2010

    (in millions)


    Area

    1980

    1990

    2000

    2010

    Core

    6.50

    8.26

    8.39

    9.60

       Jakarta

    6.50

    8.26

    8.39

    9.60

    Inner peripheries

    n.a

    n.a

    4.93

    7.22

       City of Tangerang

    n.a

    n.a

    1.33

    1.80

       City of South Tangerang

    n.a

    n.a

    0.80

    1.29

       City of Depok

    n.a

    n.a

    1.14

    1.75

       City of Bekasi

    n.a

    n.a

    1.66

    2.38

    Outer peripheries

    5.41

    8.88

    7.31

    11.20

       City of Bogor

    0.25

    0.27

    0.75

    0.95

       Tangerang Regency

    1.53

    2.77

    2.02

    2.84

       Bekasi Regency

    1.14

    2.10

    1.62

    2.63

       Bogor Regency

    2.49

    3.74

    2.92

    4.78

    Megacity of Jakarta

    11.91

    17.14

    20.63

    28.02

                                    Sources: Rukmana (2014)


    Transformation of Jakarta

    The modern city of Jakarta was initiated by President Soekarno’s strong vision to build Jakarta into the greatest city possible (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). He gave Jakarta, Monas – his most symbolic new structure the 132 m high national monument, spacious new government buildings, department stores, shopping plazas, hotels, the sport facilities of Senayan that were used for the 1962 Asian Games, the biggest and most glorious mosque of Istiqlal, new parliament buildings and the waterfront recreation area at Ancol.

    Such constructions continued under the New Order regime that began in 1967. Under this regime, Indonesia enjoyed steady economic growth, along with a reduction in the percentage of the population living under the poverty line. Jakarta grew rapidly during this period of the New Order regime. The investment in the property sector, including offices, commercial buildings, new town development, and highrise apartments and hotels grew substantially. Jakarta, by the mid-1990s, was heading towards global city status. Jakarta was the largest concentration of foreign and domestic investment in Indonesia and received US$ 32.5 billion and Rp. 68,500 billion from foreign and domestic investment respectively during the period of January 1967-March 1998 (Firman 1999).

    In the early administration of the New Order regime, some projects were completed, including the Ismail Marzuki Arts Center, industrial zones at Tanjung Priok and Pulo Gadung, that aimed to attract foreign investment, plus the unique theme park of Taman Mini Indonesia Indah. During the thirty-two years of the New Order regime, Jakarta changed considerably. A generally rapid economic growth during this period allowed Jakarta to expand its modern constructions and develop into a modern city. Hundreds of new office towers, hotels and high-rise condominiums were built in many parts of the city.

    The Golden Triangle – a new style commercial zone - was built in Thamrin-Sudirman corridor to push the urban skyline upward in response to high land costs in key areas and the convenience of the automobile (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). This zone aimed to accommodate internationally invested highrise mega-blocks; a result of the regional competition among “global cities” (Firman, 1998; Goldblum and Wong, 2000). Jakarta is linked with other “global cities” in a functional system built around telecommunications, transportation, services and finance. A parade of tall buildings, one after the other filled the major streets on both sides. Theyhoused the offices of Indonesian and multi-national corporations.




    The economy crisis which hit Indonesia in 1998 resulted in major disruptions of the urban development in Jakarta. Such monstrous crisis shifted Jakarta from “global city” to “city of crisis”. The crisis – commonly known in Indonesia as krismon - largely squeezed the economy of Jakarta. In order to survive the krismon, a large number of workers shifted to become food traders or then engaged in other informal sector jobs. Street vendors –commonly known in Indonesia as pedagang kaki lima- increased rapidly from about 95,000 in 1997 to 270,000 in 1999 (Firman, 1999).
    This shrinkage of economic activities resulted in the decrease of office space demand which dropped from 300,000 square meters in 1997 to 85,000 square meters in 1999. Similarly, the demand for high-class apartments dropped from 49,000 in December 1997, to 16,000 in February 1998. The housing market in the megacity nearly collapsed due to increasing costs of building materials and higher housing loan interest rates. Most construction projects in the periphery of Jakarta slowed down or even completely stopped (Firman, 2004).

    In order to mitigate the impact of the krismon, in July 1998 the government along with the assistance of IMF launched a variety of social safety net programs. Political and economic reforms were also implemented during the recovery process. Civil unrest and political uncertainty heightened during the krismon gradually lowered during the recovery process.

    As of early 2005, Indonesia’s economic performance was more positive. The rate of economic growth of Indonesia was 5.73% per year over the period of 2004-2008. The positive Indonesia’s economic growth resulted in an increased number of construction projects in Jakarta including malls, apartments and office buildings. Winarso (2010) reported twelve malls and shopping centers in Jakarta built between 2004 and 2006 including Pondok Indah Mall, Jakarta City Center, Senayan City, Cityloft Retail, Grand Indonesia, Pacific Place, Pasar Senen, Plaza Indonesia, Blok M Square, Shopping Center Gandaria, Kemang Village and Kota Casablanca. The land area of malls in Jakarta increased from 1.7 million square meters in 2000 to 4.8 million square meters in 2009 (Suryadjaja 2012). Another seven malls were built between 2013 and 2016 including Cipinang Indah Mall, The Baywalk Green Bay Pluit, St. Moritz, Mall at the City Centre, The Gateway, Pantai Indah Kapuk Mall and Pondok Indah Mall 3.

    Jakarta has held strong domination in Indonesia’s economy since the colonial era (Salim and Kombaitan 2009). Jakarta has been the most attractive area for both domestic and foreign investments in Indonesia. Nearly one-fourth of total approved foreign investment in Indonesia over the period of 2000-2005 was in Jakarta due to Jakarta’s high concentration of skilled labor and entrepreneurs (Firman 2008).

    Jakarta's contribution to Indonesia's GDP in 2010 increased to 16.7% from 14.9% in 2000. The staggering Jakarta's contribution to Indonesia's economy was primarily caused by the dominance of Jakarta in the financial and business sector. The high economic growth of Jakarta also pulled more people to move to Jakarta. Kenichiro (2015) identified that coming back to the city as a new trend after the krismon. Such a trend was indicated by the population growth of Jakarta over the period of 2000-2010 that was higher than that of the period of 1990-2000.

    Since 2005, Jakarta witnessed the construction of luxury high-rise apartments in many parts of Jakarta. The investors of luxury high-rise apartments also came from several Asian countries including China, Singapore, Hongkong and Japan (Colliers International 2017). The cumulative supply of luxury apartments in Jakarta reached more than 100,000 units by 2012 (Kenichiro 2015). The luxury apartment market in Jakarta has been strong in the last decade. In the first four months of 2017 alone, a total of 2,790 units of luxury high-rise apartments have been completed in three projects including Nerine Tower, Elpis Residence and Paradise Mansion (Colliers International 2017).  

    According to the Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat, Jakarta has a total of 377 tall buildings with the minimum height of 100 meters by 2017. Jakarta ranks twelfth among cities in the world for the number of tall buildings (CTBUH 2017). Jakarta has a strong trend for vertical urbanism marked by the construction of numerous high-rise buildings (Alexander et al 2016). A total of 66 high-rise buildings are still under construction and being proposed in Jakarta including the Signature Tower that will become the Jakarta’s tallest building in 2022.  




    Jakarta has experienced a tremendous population growth and faced a wide range of urban problems in the last few decades. Two major problems of Jakarta are traffic congestions and floods. The urbanization and suburbanization in Jakarta are strongly associated with the traffic congestion in Jakarta. Jakarta is estimated to lose US$3.5 billion a year because of traffic congestion which can’t be separated from the high growth rate of vehicle ownership (Wismadi et al 2013). Jakarta heavily relies on road transportation and about 80% of trips made by private vehicles (Sugiarto et al 2015).

    According to the Jakarta’s Bureau of Statistics (2016), nearly three quarter (74.66%) of vehicles in Jakarta in 2014 was motorcycles. The number of motorcycles increased at a rate of 13.35% per year from 6.76 million in 2008 to 13.08 million in 2014. The number of passenger cars increased at a rate of 8.65% per year from 2.03 million in 2008 to 3.27 million in 2014. Over the same period, the total road length in Jakarta increased at a rate of 0.90% per year.

    Several programs have been implemented to alleviate the acute traffic congestions in Jakarta including the expansion of inner-city toll road and the development of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) and Mass Rapid Transit (MRT). The total length of inner-city toll road in Jakarta increased from 112.9 kilometers in 2008 to 123.73 kilometers in 2014. The BRT or popularly known as TransJakarta was introduced in 2004 and the service of TransJakarta had been expanded to 12 corridors with a total of 669 buses by 2014. The total number of passengers of the bus rapid transit in 2014 was 111.6 million.

     For at least 20 years, the proposed MRT has been under discussion by the Jakarta administration and the government of Indonesia. Activists and non-governmental watchdogs have seen the MRT proposal as a possible bonanza for corrupt politicians and contractors. Eventually, the government secured a $1.6 billion loan agreement with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) in 2009 for funding. The construction of the MRT project began on October 10, 2013. The first MRT tract will connect Lebak Bulus, South Jakarta and the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle with six underground stations, seven elevated stations and a capacity of 173,000 passengers per day (Rukmana 2014). By June 30, 2017, the completion of the MRT first tract was nearly 75 percent. The Jakarta city administration expected to launch the service of MRT to the public for trial purposes in August 2018.

    Jakarta lies in a lowland area with 13 rivers. All tributaries and basin areas of these 13 rivers are located in the peripheries of the megacity, strongly associated with the floods in Jakarta. Industrial parks and new towns were built in the peripheries of Jakarta and many of them have converted water catchment areas, green areas and wetlands. Such land conversions have affected the severity of flooding in Jakarta. Floods have become a threat and bring increasing woes for Jakarta residents every year.

    Flooding has had critical impact on the infrastructure and population of Jakarta. In 2008, floods inundated most parts of Jakarta including the Sedyatmo toll road; and nearly 1,000 flights in the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport were delayed or diverted while 259 were cancelled. In 2012, floods submerged hundreds of homes along major Jakarta waterways, including the Ciliwung, Pesanggrahan, Angke and Krukut rivers, and displaced 2,430 people. In January 2013, many parts of Jakarta were inundated following heavy rain; and, as reported by the National Disaster Mitigation Agency (BNPB), the ensuing floods killed at least 20 people and sent at least 33,502 fleeing their homes (Rukmana 2014)

    In the aftermath of these annual floods, the government normally attempts to dredge the rivers and release floodwater as quickly as possible into the sea via the East Flood Canal. Construction of the East Flood Canal began in the aftermath of major floods in 2002, and reached the sea on December 31, 2009 after very slow progress due to the complicated land acquisitions. The East Flood Canal has been considered the most feasible means to prevent future flooding in Jakarta, but clearly cannot prevent flooding entirely.


    New Towns and Industrial Estates in the Suburbs of Jakarta

    In order to understand the suburbanization in the metropolitan region of Jakarta, it is essential to recognize the socio-economic dualism pervading Indonesian urban society. The manifestations of this dualism are the presence of the modern city and the kampung city in urban areas. The kampung, ‘village’ in Indonesian, is associated with informality, poverty, and the retention of rural traditions within an urban setting. Firman (1999) argues the existence of kampungs and modern cities reflect spatial segregation and socio-economic disparities.




    The growing numbers of migrants to Jakarta and poor Jakarta natives have produced new squatter kampungs on the periphery of Jakarta (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). Many constructions in the central city also caused some residents of kampungs to be evicted and relocated to the periphery (Silver, 2007). The periphery also attracted migrants because of its improved infrastructures and facilities in (Goldblum and Wong, 2000). Since 1950, Jakarta has attracted people from all parts of Java and other Indonesian islands. The flood of migrants came to Jakarta for economic reasons as Jakarta offered the hope of employment.
    Starting in the early 1980s, agricultural areas and forests in the suburbs of Jakarta were converted massively into large-scale subdivisions and new towns (Silver 2008). Over the period of 1990 and 2010, more than 30 new large new towns were built in the suburbs of Jakarta ranging from 500 hectares to 30,000 hectares. They converted more thousands hectares of rural land (Firman 2014; Winarso and Firman 2002)

    The massive development in the suburbs of Jakarta was a result of a series of deregulation and de-bureaucratization measures enacted by the Suharto government in the 1980s (Winarso and Firman 2002). The subsidized housing finance program and municipal permit system for land development also contributed to the massive development in the area. These policies have most benefited some developers that were strongly linked with the New Order regime (Leaf, 1994).

    The residential enclave for narrowly targeted moderate and high-income families characterized Jakarta’s suburban area (Firman, 1998; Leaf, 1994). Located on the periphery of the city, these settlements were built in automobile-accessible areas with various high-quality amenities such as modern golf courses. High-income families in the central city also moved from the city in search of better living quality (Goldblum and Wong, 2000). The high cost of houses and the need for automobiles restricted low-income families from the suburban housing market. One in five families in Jakarta’s suburbs owned an automobile (Leaf, 1994).

    The first new town in the suburbs of Jakarta is a collaborative project of Bumi Serpong Damai in the early 1980s. This first new town was planned for an eventual population of 600,000 in a total area of 6,000 hectares; a project developed by several private developers and led by the largest private developer – the Ciputra Group. Other new towns in the suburbs of Jakarta include Bukit Jonggol Asri, Bukit Sentul, Pembangunan Jaya, Lippo City, Cikarang Baru, Tigaraksa, Kota Legenda, Kota Cileungsi, Royal Sentul, Bintaro Jaya, Lido Lakes Resort, Gading Serpong, Modernland, Kota Wisata Teluk Naga, Kota Modern, Kota Citra Raya and Alam Sutera dan Kedaton (Firman 1998; Silver 2007; Winarso 2010).

    New towns in the suburbs of Jakarta are aimed at middle-upper income groups (Goldblum and Wong 2000; Firman 2004). They are mostly furnished with golf courses, shopping malls, cinemas, hospitals and hotels. The design of new towns was influenced by American design concepts to offer luxury, secured and self-sufficient neighborhoods and improved lifestyles. Many new towns also led to large scale displacement of farmers and existing residents such as Tigaraksa that evicted about 1,400 farmers (Firman 2004).

    In a number of these new towns, the State Housing Provider Agency (Perumnas) joined with private developers to assure some housing was targeted for low and moderate-income families (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). Most of the new towns offered relatively few employment opportunities. Their initial concept was to create self-contained communities but this was barely implemented. Instead, the new towns became “bedroom suburbs for city-bound commuters” (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). The new towns were still heavily dependent on the central city (Firman, 1999; Silver 2007) and the development of large-scale housing projects intensified the daily interaction between the fringe areas and the central city of Jakarta. This worsened the traffic problems in metropolitan Jakarta.




    People who live in the outskirts of Jakarta can save as much as 30% of their transportation costs using motorcycles to work rather than public transport. Motorcycles are ubiquitous and can be acquired with a down payment of as little as $30. The daily jams in Jakarta are getting worse; the peripheries are a “bedroom suburb” for the daily commuters of Jakarta, the center of government and corporate offices, commercial and entertainment enterprises. Commuters from the peripheries primarily used three highways including the Jagorawi toll road connecting Jakarta and the southern peripheries, the Jakarta-Cikampek toll road connecting Jakarta and the eastern peripheries and the Jakarta-Merak toll road connecting Jakarta and the western peripheries. The economy of Jakarta dominates its peripheral areas. In the daytime, the total population in Jakarta is much more than its population in the nighttime; the number of daily commuters in Jakarta is estimated 5.4 million.

    Winarso and Firman (2002) revealed almost all large developers were well connected to the President Suharto’s family and inner circle including his daughters, sons, brother, in-laws and close friends. The connection to the Suharto family and inner circle became significant; closeness to the first family helped the large developers expand their business. Interlinking also occurred among the large developers through cross-shareholding, shared directorships and joint ventures; process which turned potential competitors into collaborators and created oligopolistic types of land and housing markets.

    In addition to residential zones, the periphery of Jakarta is also made up of specialized zones of commercial and industrial enterprises. These areas complement the other districts of Jakarta: the central business districts on Thamrin-Sudirman corridor, the government offices around Medan Merdeka, the international seaport of Tanjung Priok, and the growing network of freeways. The development of industrial zones in the peripheries of Jakarta also indicated a spatial restructuring that shifted manufacturing from the central city to the periphery. Firman (1998) reported that the central city attracted disproportionate investment in service industries, trade and hotel, and restaurant construction.

    The peripheries attracted most of the industrial construction; these include textiles, apparel, footwear, plastics, chemicals, electronics, metal products and foods (Cybriwsky and Ford, 2001). The total area of industrial estates in the suburbs of Jakarta region increased from 11,000 hectares in 2005 to 18,000 hectares in 2010 (Firman 2014; Hudalah 2013). About 40% of the industrial estates in the region were located in the district of Bekasi including seven large industrial estates: Bekasi Fajar Industrial Estate, East Jakarta Industrial Park, Bekasi International Industrial Estate, MM 2100 Industrial Estate, Jababeka, Lippo Cikarang and Pembangunan Deltamas.

    Three industrial estates in the district of Bekasi (Jababeka, Lippo Cikarang and Pembangunan Deltamas) also integrated their industrial areas with residential and other urban activities. They created towns rather than estates (Hudalah and Firman 2012). Jababeka also built an inland port named Cikarang Dry Port and opened it in 2010. The Cikarang Dry Port offers a one stop service for cargo handling for international export and import and domestic distribution.

    The large seven industrial estates in the district of Bekasi is Indonesia’s largest industrial concentration. They produced about 46% of the national non-oil and gas export of USD 66.428 billion in 2005 (Hudalah and Firman 2012). The industrial activities in the district of Bekasi also generated taxes for the central and local governments as much as 3.4-6 trillion rupiahs in 2005. Nearly 10,000 expatriates also lived in the district of Bekasi in 2005 due to the industrial activities.

    The development of private industrial parks in the peripheries followed the development of the three highways stretching from Jakarta to the peripheries - the Jagorawi toll road, the Jakarta-Cikampek toll road, and the Jakarta-Merak toll road highways (Henderson and Kuncoro 1996; Hudalah et al 2013).  Private industrial parks in the peripheries range from 50 to 1,800 hectares and on average the size is about 500 hectares (Hudalah et al 2013); major industrial centers are located in Cikupa-Balaraja of Tangerang Regency and Cikarang of Bekasi Regency. The industrial center of Cikarang with a total industrial land area of nearly 6,000 hectares is the largest planned industrial center in Southeast Asia (Hudalah and Firman 2012).

    The industrial estate in the suburbs of Jakarta region are becoming increasingly specialized and intensifying the trend for the region to become more polycentric (Firman 2014; Hudalah et al 2013). Each industrial estate built its own facilities and infrastructure including roads, waste treatment plants and communication network and resulted in a fragmented industrial complex (Hudalah et al 2013).


    Post-suburbanization of Jakarta


    Urban development in metropolitan Jakarta has continued and expanded beyond the suburbs. Jabodetabek fringe areas, that used to be ‘traditional’ dormitory towns, have transformed into more independent areas with a strong economic base. Agricultural land in these areas have converted into various urban land uses, including new town and large-scale residential areas, industrial estates and shopping centers. The core of the metropolitan region, Jakarta City, in contrast is experiencing low population growth due to considerable population spillover to fringe areas. While population growth in Jakarta City was 3.1% between 1980 and 1990, it was only 1.5% between 2000 and 2010 (see also Table 1). As a result of new town and industrial development in fringe areas, commuting is evident in Jabodetabek, in which millions of people commute between the Jakarta City and the peripheral areas daily by trains, buses and personal cars. Likewise, a number of the Jakarta City inhabitants commute between the city and small and new towns in the outskirts, including Bogor, Tangerang, Bekasi, Depok and Jababeka, as they work there but still live in Jakarta (Firman 2011).




    As Firman and Fahmi (2017) explain, recent Jabodetabek development reflects some signs of the early stages of post-suburbanization. Post-suburban development in Jabodetabek is, however, less likely to fully resemble that of Western cities (Feng et al. 2008) “because so many people choose to continue to live in the traditional core and commute out to suburban developments for work, as well as other activities” (Firman and Fahmi 2017, p. 77). Post-suburbanization in Jabodetabek is triggered by privatization of land development and management particularly in fringe areas. The private sector has gained stronger control over land, in that it can aggressively acquire, develop and manage land in fringe areas, most notably for residential and industrial activities. The prominent role of the private sector in land development has indeed materialized for a long time. Currently, the private sector plays a more significant role: it is able to direct land development and manage the areas ‘exclusively’ by providing municipal services traditionally delivered by local governments in the areas.

    The shift of power from the public to the private sector in land development is strongly driven by decentralization and its associated reforms in Indonesia. For the Jabodetabek case, the central government still plays a strong role in suburban development, in that many industrial activities in fringe areas are made possible by foreign direct investments, which are subject to the central government’s approval.  On the other side, local governments now have the authority to direct spatial plans and the development in their areas, as well as to grant building permits to private developers.

    Industrial centers in Jabodetabek are increasingly becoming diversified, so that fringe areas are becoming a more polycentric and a fragmented industrial region (Hudalah et al. 2013). This development can be associated with the behavior of private developers, both foreign and domestic origins, who seek economic benefits from the ongoing industrialization processes as well as the pro-growth economic policies of both central and local governments. The central government has stimulated the development of industrial estates in fringe areas by subsidizing the provision of infrastructure and other facilities built and managed by ‘licensed companies’ (Hudalah et al. 2013). According to Government Regulation 142/2015, the licensed companies, those holding permits from either central or local government, have the exclusive right to develop and manage specific industrial areas, provide and manage ongoing utilities and facilities exclusively for the firms that locate in these areas. The license to develop and manage industrial parks is to be granted by the local government where the potential estates are located and by the provincial government if the potential location extends into two or more municipalities/districts. If the potential area extends over two or more bordering provinces, or if it is to be operated by a foreign company, the developer must acquire additional permits from the central government. After a private developer obtains the license to manage industrial park, it has the exclusive authority to sell land units to other companies that wish to start businesses inside the industrial estates.

    The shift of power from the public to the private sector is also reflected in new town development in fringe areas. Private developers expansively build new town and large scale residential projects in response to the local needs driven by economic growth and diversification in fringe areas. They gain permits from the local governments to design the new towns as gated suburban communities, which are surrounded by walls and separated from nearby local communities (Leisch 2002). Private developers not only provide infrastructure exclusive to the inhabitants within the communities, but also administer municipal services as if they were the ‘government’ in the communities. In so doing, they appoint their own ‘city’ managers to ensure service delivery and security of the area. Local governments enable this development by granting building permits to private developers, although these sometimes do not comply with the legalized spatial plans. For example, new town projects are built on land that is supposed to be catchment areas. The local autonomy rights given to the local governments have cultivated a competitive climate, so that they are now eager to promote economic development in their regions and exploit regional resources more intensively. In many cases, economic growth is preferred over enforcing spatial plans (Rukmana 2015). Decentralization has also intensified the practice of ‘clientelism’, or patronage relationships, between the local government and the private sector (Rukmana 2015). Spatial plans are often prepared, and easily altered, to accommodate the interest of developers rather than to plan for more sustainable regions (Firman 2004, Rukmana 2015). Driven by political pressures and interests in placing what are perceived to be profitable economic activities, spatial plans are often negotiated and violated.  This condition actually illustrates contradictory facts. On the one hand, local governments have strong power to direct local development and also to empower developers to perform their profit seeking behaviors, although this violates the spatial plans (Cowherd 2005, Kenichiro 2015). On the other hand, this reflects the inadequacy of local government capacity to enforce the legalized plans, as if they were ‘powerless’ when they have to face the developers.

    The fact that the private sector takes over some governmental tasks, on the one hand, can be seen as an opportunity to fulfill the limited capacity of local governments to provide basic services. On the other hand, the private sector focuses mainly on making profits and often pays less attention to the spatial plans that aim at creating sustainable cities and regions. As local governments have the authority to direct local development and the central government has less power to intervene it, the making and enforcement of spatial plans in Greater Jakarta has been fragmented (see Kusno 2014). As such, recent post-suburbanization of Jakarta reveals new, significant challenges in managing urban development and enforcing spatial plans, which require innovative governance solutions.



    Conclusion

    This chapter has presented the transformation of Jakarta from a concentric and radial pattern urban structure to an early stage of post-suburbanization. Jakarta has been the national capital and the largest city in Indonesia since the Dutch colonial era, although before Independence Jakarta was relatively far smaller (under one million inhabitants). After Independence, Jakarta started to grow beyond the city boundary and formed a metropolitan region consisting of several administrative districts and municipalities (Jabodetabek). In the New Order (1967-1998), as the country enjoyed a rapid economic growth, Jakarta had a chance to expand its constructions and develop into a modern city. Further, the central government’s pro-growth economic policy at that time supported big scale industrial activities in the peripheries of Greater Jakarta. Although the monetary crisis made a development pause in the beginning of the New Millennium, the development in Greater Jakarta has continued. The current development indicates some signs of the early stages of post-suburbanization, in which the traditional core remains preeminent, but the peripheral areas have become more independent satellite cities with strong economic base and diversified activities.

    This development is triggered by privatization of land development and management particularly in fringe areas (Firman and Fahmi 2017). The private sector has indeed played a crucial role in developing industrial and large residential activities in fringe areas. However, it now plays an even more significant role as it can direct land development and manage the areas ‘exclusively’ by providing municipal services traditionally delivered by local governments in the areas. As the result, regional development of Greater Jakarta, which consists of several districts and municipalities, is potentially even more fragmented and unsustainable. A forum, namely the Coordinating Body of Jabodetabek Development, is supposed to integrate local government actions in managing the development in the region. However, this body seems ineffective, as under the Indonesian New Decentralization law the real authority of local development is owned by the local government. This condition suggests that it is now crucial to designate a form of Metropolitan Authority which works above the local government level and is authorized to coordinate the development in the region.


    References

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    Arai, K., 2015. Jakarta Since Yesterday’: The Making of the Post-New Order Regime in an Indonesian Metropolis. Southeast Asian Studies, 4 (3), 445–486.

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    Cybriwsky, Roman and Ford, Larry R. (2001). City profile: Jakarta. Cities 18(3): 199-210.

    Firman, T. and Fahmi, F.Z., 2017. The Privatization of Metropolitan Jakarta’s (Jabodetabek) Urban Fringes: The Early Stages of ‘Post-Suburbanization’ in Indonesia. Journal of the American Planning Association, 83 (1), 68–79.

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    Winarso, Haryo and Tommy Firman. (2002). Residential land development in Jabotabek, Indonesia: triggering economic crisis? Habitat International 26: 487-506

    Winarso, Haryo. (2010). Urban Dualism in the Jakarta Metropolitan Area. Megacities: Urban Form, Governance, and Sustainability. A. Sorensen and J. Okata (eds.). Springer. Pp. 163-191


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    Indonesian President Joko Widodo announced his plan to move the capital of Indonesia out of Jakarta after a cabinet meeting on Monday, April 29, 2019. One of the reasons of the plan is Jakarta is considered too crowded and congested. This post will review Jakarta as the Indonesia’s primate city. Primate city is defined as a city that dominates the urban system in the region. Jakarta as the Indonesia’s primate city is not merely the largest city in Indonesia; it is more than twice as large as the Indonesia’s second largest city.


    The metropolitan region of Jakarta is home to more than 30 million. The metropolitan region called Jabodetabek includes the core (the capital city of Jakarta), the inner peripheries (City of Tangerang, City of South Tangerang, City of Depok, City of Bekasi), and the outer peripheries (City of Bogor, Tangerang Regency and Bekasi Regency).


    Table 1 below shows the population of the metropolitan region of Jakarta from 1980 to 2015. All data come from the population censuses, except data in 2015 from the intercensal survey of Indonesia (SUPAS).  The Jakarta metropolitan increased from 11.91 million in 1980, 17.14 million in 1990, 20.63 million in 2000 and 28.01 million in 2010 to 31.62 million in 2015. The Jakarta metropolitan in 2015 was 12.39 percent of Indonesia’s total population but this population resides in less than 0.3 percent of Indonesia’s total area. The proportions of Jabodetabek’s population to the total population of Indonesia have steadily increased from 8.07%, 9.56%, 10.0% to 11.79% (in 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 respectively). I predict the number will continue to increase as Jakarta will stay as the Indonesia's primate city.   



    Table 1

    Population of the Metropolitan Region of Jakarta in 1980-2015

    (in millions)


    Area

    1980

    1990

    2000

    2010

    2015

    Core

    6.5

    8.26

    8.39

    9.6

    10.17

       Jakarta

    6.5

    8.26

    8.39

    9.6

    10.17

    Inner peripheries

    n.a

    n.a

    4.93

    7.22

    8.36

       City of Tangerang

    n.a

    n.a

    1.33

    1.8

    2.04

       City of South Tangerang

    n.a

    n.a

    0.8

    1.29

    1.53

       City of Depok

    n.a

    n.a

    1.14

    1.75

    2.09

       City of Bekasi

    n.a

    n.a

    1.66

    2.38

    2.7

    Outer peripheries

    5.41

    8.88

    7.31

    11.2

    13.09

       City of Bogor

    0.25

    0.27

    0.75

    0.95

    1.04

       Tangerang Regency

    1.53

    2.77

    2.02

    2.84

    3.36

       Bekasi Regency

    1.14

    2.1

    1.62

    2.63

    3.23

       Bogor Regency

    2.49

    3.74

    2.92

    4.78

    5.46

    Metropolitan region of Jakarta

    11.91

    17.14

    20.63

    28.02

    31.62


    Source: Rukmana, et al (2018), SUPAS 2015


    The following section analyzes the urban primacy in Indonesia. Urban primacy indicates the ratio of the primate city to the second largest city in the country. This post will also extend the urban primacy to the third largest city. The second largest Indonesian city is Surabaya. The metropolitan region of Surabaya popularly known as Gerbangkertosusila has retained as Indonesia’s second largest city to Jakarta for more than four decades. Table 2 below shows the population of the metropolitan region of Surabaya from 1980 to 2015. The Surabaya metropolitan region includes the core (City of Surabaya), the inner peripheries (Sidoarjo Regency and Gresik Regency), and the outer peripheries (Mojokerto Regency, Lamongan Regency, Bangkalan Regency, and City of Mojokerto).



    The Gerbangkertosusila’s population increased from 6.107 million in 1980, 7.233 million in 1990, 8.168 million in 2000 and 9.137 million in 2010 to 9.551 million in 2015. The areas experienced the highest population growth in the past ten years is the inner peripheries. The population of inner peripheries surpassed the City of Surabaya’s population in 2010 and surpassed the population of outer peripheries in 2015.



    Table 2

    Population of the Metropolitan Region of Surabaya in 1980-2015

    (in millions)


    Area

    1980

    1990

    2000

    2010

    2015


    Core

    2.017

    2.473

    2.599

    2.771

    2.843


       City of Surabaya

    2.017

    2.473

    2.599

    2.771

    2.843


    Inner peripheries

    1.581

    2.025

    2.568

    3.129

    3.368


       Sidoarjo Regency

    0.853

    1.167

    1.563

    1.949

    2.114


       Gresik Regency

    0.728

    0.858

    1.005

    1.180

    1.254


    Outer peripheries

    2.509

    2.735

    3.001

    3.237

    3.340


       Mojokerto Regency

    0.705

    0.788

    0.908

    1.028

    1.078


       Lamongan Regency

    1.049

    1.100

    1.181

    1.180

    1.185


       Bangkalan Regency

    0.687

    0.751

    0.804

    0.909

    0.952


       City of Mojokerto

    0.068

    0.096

    0.108

    0.120

    0.125


    Gerbangkertosusila

    6.107

    7.233

    8.168

    9.137

    9.551



    Source: BPS 2010, SUPAS 2015







    The third largest Indonesian city is Bandung. The metropolitan region of Bandung is popularly known as Bandung Raya. Table 3 below shows the population of the metropolitan region of Bandung from 1980 to 2015. The Bandung metropolitan region includes the core (the City of Bandung) and the peripheries (Bandung Regency, West Bandung Regency and the City of Cimahi). West Bandung Regency was founded in 2007 when it seceded from Bandung Regency.


    The Bandung Raya’s population increased from 4.13 million in 1980, 5.239 million in 1990, 6.293 million in 2000 and 7.623 million in 2010 to 8.22 million in 2015. The peripheries of the Bandung metropolitan area have experienced a higher population growth than the core since 2000.








    Table 3

    Population of the Metropolitan Region of Bandung in 1980-2015

    (in millions)







    Area

    1980

    1990

    2000

    2010

    2015

    City of Bandung

    1.461

    2.058

    2.136

    2.394

    2.48

    Bandung Regency

    2.669

    3.201

    2.47

    3.178

    3.528

    West Bandung Regency

    n.a

    n.a

    1.245

    1.51

    1.627

    City of Cimahi

    n.a

    n.a

    0.442

    0.541

    0.585

    Great Bandung region

    4.130

    5.259

    6.293

    7.623

    8.220







     
    Source: BPS (2010), SUPAS 2015


    Table 4shows the ratios of the population of Jakarta (the core only and the core and peripheries) to the populations of Surabaya and Bandung from 1980 to 2015. The dominance of Jakarta to the second and third Indonesia’s largest cities has been increasing from 1980 to 2015. The ratio of Jakarta metropolitan areas (the core and peripheries) to Surabaya steadily increased from 2.0 in 1980 to 3.3 in 2015. Similarly, the ratio of Jakarta metropolitan areas (the core and peripheries) to Bandung gradually increased from 2.9 in 1980 to 3.8 in 2015.  



    Table 4

    Urban Primacy of Indonesia’s Three Largest Cities in 1980-2015

    (in millions)







    Area

    1980

    1990

    2000

    2010

    2015

    Core only






      Jakarta to Surabaya

    3.2

    3.3

    3.2

    3.5

    3.6

      Jakarta to Bandung

    4.4

    4.0

    3.9

    4.0

    4.1

    Core and Peripheries






      Jakarta to Surabaya

    2.0

    2.4

    2.5

    3.1

    3.3

      Jakarta to Bandung

    2.9

    3.3

    3.3

    3.7

    3.8







    The ratio of the population of Jakarta to the city of Surabaya’s population has increased from 3.2 in 1980 to 3.6 in 2015. There was a slightly ratio decrease from 3.3 in 1990 to 3.2 in 2000 due to the relocation of Jakarta residents from the city center to the peripheries during 1990s. In the meantime, the ratio of the population of Jakarta to the population of the city of Bandung decreased from 4.4 in 1980 to 3.9 in 2000 and it has increased again to 4.0 in 2010 and 4.1 in 2015.  


    Conclusion

    Jakarta remains as the Indonesia’s primate city. The dominance of Jakarta has been increasing since 1980. The ratio of the population of Jakarta metropolitan area to the total population of Indonesia has steadily increased from 8.07% (1980), 9.56% (1990), 10.0% (2000) to 11.79% (2010) and 12.39% in 2015. The dominance of Jakarta has also been increasing to the second and third Indonesia’s largest cities (Surabaya and Bandung) from 1980 to 2015. Jakarta’s dominance will continue to increase and the capital city will remain the Indonesia’s primate city for many years to come.


    Reference:
    1. BPS (2010). Sensus Penduduk Indonesia
    2. BPS (2015). Survey Penduduk Antar Sensus
    3. Rukmana, Deden, Fikri Zul Fahmi, and Tommy Firman. (2018). Suburbanization in Asia: A focus on Jakarta. The Routledge Companion to the Suburbs. Bernadette Hanlon and Thomas J. Vicino (Eds.) New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 110-120

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